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LIBERALISM AND A THEOLOGY OF DEPTH

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Crozer Theological Seminary

ONE of the impressions which has come to me over the past ten years with increasing distinctness is that Christianity is a religion of depth. There is, however, no reference in that statement to the frequently quoted quip that in a study of the history of Christian doctrine one goes down deeper, stays down longer, and comes up drier than in any other subject of academic interest. By depth, in the sense in which it is here employed, we mean that Christianity breaks through the surface phenomena of existence, penetrating the mere events of history, the face of nature, and the physical life of man to bring an apprehension of what controls history, what glorifies the face of nature, and what motivates man as a spiritual entity. In other words, when it is true to its genius, Christianity peers into the hidden phases of existence and being, convinced that in history, nature, and human life there is more than meets the eye.

Interpreting this apprehension philosophically, the Christian says that Christianity is concerned with the eternal and the absolute in time and the flux of events. To accept that view is to abandon once and for all the Kantian dualism between noumena and phenomena, between eternity and time, between God and man. One is brought rather to the position that there is no absolute disjunction between God and reality, since God is what is ultimately real. Without sharing in his reality to some indeterminate extent no thing could be. The eternal penetrates time, God enters history, while the divine alone gives reality to nature with its substance, form, and beauty. Yet that that is no twentieth-century version of Christian philosophy, any student of Christian thought will quickly perceive who has not come up entirely dry from his bath in Christian thinking. As long ago as the early fifth century the great Augustine wrote his monumental *City of God,* which has as a central thesis the conception that God controls the affairs of history. But Augustine did not stop there. Looking out upon the realm of physical reality he adds the further conviction that God is the source of all:

> And what is this? I asked the earth; and it answered, "I am not He"; and whatsoever are therein made the same confession. I asked the sea and the deeps, and the creeping things that lived, and they replied, "We are not thy God, seek higher than we." I asked the breezy air, and the universal air with its inhabitants answered,

"Anaximenes was deceived, I am not God." I asked the heavens, the sun, moon, and stars: "Neither," say they, "are we the God whom thou seekest." And I answered unto all these things which stand about the door of my flesh, "Ye have told me concerning my God, that ye are not He; tell me something about Him." And with a loud voice they exclaimed, "He made us." My questioning was my observing of them; and their beauty was their reply.[1]

Augustine was convinced that there are divine depths in nature and history, in man and Christ. That is one of the secrets of his perennial vitality. Life for him was no set of surface phenomena consisting simply of length and breadth, of duration and behavior. To these must be added that which alone explains the duration and behavior, the length and breadth. Because he dared to say what that was, depth came into his thought: depth which has fascinated many and commanded the respect of every succeeding generation.

In a very profound sense Christianity has its surface, subsurface, and depth phenomena. The surface phenomena are, of course, the most obvious, consisting of books, churches, ceremonies, pilgrimages, ecclesiastics; in short, of the general, external paraphernalia of Christianity. The subsurface phenomena are not so obvious, but are easily called to mind and apprehended by the faithful. Among these are such elements as the history of the church, the record of the earthly career of Jesus, the distinctive principles of one's denominational or Christian division, the historic meaning of Christian doctrines, the church as a reality greater than all the churches, and the backgrounds of the various biblical records. Below these, however, reside the depth phenomena of Christianity, consisting of the roots out of which the book, the church, the history, the doctrines, and the distinctive life of Jesus came. What made these possible and clothed them with reality in the first place? These depths are not easily uncovered. In truth, for many Christians they remain a hidden region, obscured by the surface phenomena of church and ritual and the subsurface facts of biblical record and Christian history. Yet despite that blindness in many Christian lives, the depth region is the crucial region without which we cannot give adequate rhyme and reason to that which has been erected over it. The depths are there, Christian depths waiting to be explored. Our question is, What lies in those depths?

Depth Theology and Liberalism

This whole problem of Christianity and depth is raised because of the major trends in liberalism in the last half of the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth centuries. Much of liberalism's burden in that period lay in introducing a new conception of biblical emergence and development. The books of the Bible were presented as the products of

[1] Augustine, *Confessions*, x, 6, 9.

specific historic situations and needs. Hence liberalism championed what has long been termed the historical approach to the Bible and the higher criticism, insisting that the books were never supernaturally handed down through the dictation of the Holy Spirit, but sprang rather from men facing critical life situations in which they called upon God for guidance and power, which were frequently granted to them through God's Holy Spirit.

The result of liberalism's historical approach to the Scriptures, illuminating though it has been to many minds, and while freeing countless others from an unrelieved supernaturalism, has nonetheless been to concentrate the attention of too many liberals upon surface and subsurface factors to the complete concealment of the depth phenomena originally responsible for biblical religion. The healthy demand now appearing for a rebirth of Old and New Testament theology is of prime importance, since it is clearly a recognition of the prior question of depth. What, in the first instance, was crucial to the history, teaching, and preaching of the New Testament and the more extensive biblical records? Certainly if no more was there than duration and the behavior of certain groups of people placed upon the stream of history, the fact of depth is lacking and there is nothing in biblical experience to give the sense of eternity and absolute obligation. The truth is that if the Bible does not carry or mediate the dimension of depth we can have no living or existential interest in it. If it does not root in eternity, then it is other than we need for faith, and our interest in it, at best, can only be an antiquarian one. We shall look upon it as an interesting record of human beginnings, historical events, ancient temple songs, stories, and historical notes on an emerging Christian movement, but beyond that it will have no challenge for us, nor shall we find in it any ultimate obligation for our lives.

The growing weakness of liberalism in the period under discussion was that it failed to grasp the Bible as a whole, an apprehension which is impossible without an appreciation of the depths which it constantly plumbs. Failing to descend to the depths, many a liberal Christian satisfied himself with disturbing himself and his fellow Christians through calling attention to the multiple problems of date, authorship, interpolation, contradictory statements, outgrown ideas, rearrangement of the text, discrepancies, cultural coloration, historical setting, and the hope of the author. Doing that piecemeal with book after book of the Bible, too many liberals exhausted themselves to the point where they had not sufficient intellectual strength left to wrestle with the question of depth. Is there an inner continuity in the Bible, a thread of truth which runs through the sixty-six books as a thread runs through sixty-six pearls, holding them together and imparting a unity to them? Is there such a reality within the Bible,

more enduring than the tablets of Sinai, the ark of the covenant, the temple at Jerusalem, the holy city itself, or the new Jersualem of the Revelation? If so, then there is an eternal and unchanging factor in the Bible which puts it beyond the flux of time and the carping of its critics, making it as significant a foundation for faith today as it was in the second century or in the sixteenth when the Reformers sounded forth their cry of *sola Scriptura.* Such a fact, if true, delivers us at once from any purely scholarly and antiquarian attitude in relation to the Scriptures, sending us to them to discover the underlying unity which gives them depth and ever makes them a rock for faith.

Because liberalism devoted itself too exclusively to surface and subsurface Christian phenomena, neglecting the elemental experience, the primordial activity, the untiring divine pressure which gives depth and unity to biblical and Christian experience, in the eyes of many it came to be regarded as a destroying fury, rushing through Christianity, uprooting, tearing down, and obscuring the foundation works with the dust and rubble of critical and intellectual controversy. As Kant was called by some of his critics *der Allzermalmende* (the all-destroyer,) so many a liberal came to be known to his contemporaries. Certainly there is no desire on my part to contest the liberal's right to do all that he has done. The exposure of the good parts of the apple sometimes entails the cutting away of the rotten spots. Granted! What I am pleading for is that the liberal expose *all* the facts of Christianity: surface facts, subsurface facts, depth facts. The experience of countless Christian men and women clearly indicates that all three of these levels are there. It is the liberal's duty to recognize the third level and to expose it with fidelity and appreciation. Any other course will justify the fury of his critics' attacks and leave him personally with a partial version of biblical and Christian faith. As an English scholar has written within recent years: "When the critic has chopped the gospels up into Q and all the rest, he is still left with the problem, What was it which caused the anonymous and undated writers of the apostolic church to speak? What lies behind the theologizing of Paul and John? It is the fact that Liberalism could give no satisfactory answer to these questions that constitutes its failure."[2] Yes, liberalism must come to grips with the depth facts if it is to meet the demands of the Christian mind.

We may perhaps benefit at this point by calling to mind what are undoubtedly two important movements in the long sweep of Christian thought, even though we may be largely out of sympathy with the theologies involved in them. Widely separated in time and temper, these two movements yet have one thing in common; namely, their contention that the Christian experience is sheer mystery apart from the acknowledgment of

[2] Reginald Cant, "Recent Tendencies in Theological Writing," in the *Church Quarterly Review,* CXLII (July-September, 1946), p. 151.

depth. I refer to the emergence of a full-blown scholastic theology under Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century and the crisis theology under Karl Barth in our generation.

Thomas Aquinas was one of the modernists of the thirteenth century. Like every modernist, he had a healthy respect for reason and used it to the full extent of his power. You never find him belittling the rational function. Like his master Aristotle, he believed in the validity of rational procedures and used them magnificently in constructing his natural theology. Grant his premises, and you will find his thought logical, since he had a thinking machine in his head, matched by few before him or since. Yet Thomas had to admit that there was profundity in Christianity which went beyond reason. Man's mind was no match for the subtleties and sublimities found therein. While reason is always valid as far as it goes, it always represents insufficient approximation to the final truth. That was the fact Thomas was unable to escape as he allowed his mind to play upon the totality of Christian experience and history. Therefore, said he, we have to go beyond reason if we are to apprehend the depths in Christianity. These depths, he held, are disclosed through revelation, which deals with such matters as the Trinity, the Incarnation, original sin, eschatology (including the resurrection of the body), the sacraments, everlasting blessedness, and rewards and punishments. So much for Thomas, with whom many of us would quarrel about many things. The only question I raise here is this: Was he right when he said there was an eternal and absolute depth in Christianity?

In our day the Swiss theologian Karl Barth is the spear point of a theological movement whose aim is to clarify the depths of Christianity. He and his theological colleagues have reacted violently against the theology of religious experience proposed first by Friedrich Schleiermacher in the early nineteenth century and modified by Albrecht Ritschl, Wilhelm Hermann, George Cross, D. C. Macintosh, and others after him. Their appeal to the individual's impressions, Barth contends, represents a shift from fundamental Christian depths to the shallows of personal experience, allowing man to stand proudly in his own achievements. Hence Barth and his followers are shocked into bitter resistance when they find Schleiermacher asserting that the man who works his way back to his heart, through feeling that the whole of humanity lives and works in him, thereby finds the Infinite within himself and henceforth no longer needs "a mediator for any sort of intuition of humanity."[3] Barth and his disciples are opposed to all such experience with the same antipathy that they are opposed to death and the devil. Their insistence is that Christians must not depend upon any experience of their own to bring them to God, but must return

[3] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, translated by John Oman, London, 1893, p. 79.

to those crucial depths out of which Christian faith was originally born. May it not be that while we may disagree somewhat with what the crisis theologians find in those depths, their major movement is nonetheless in the right direction? May it not be that liberalism can come to full strength and meet the spiritual needs of our generation only as it too goes beneath biblical criticism, historical perspective, and adjustment to contemporary thought and culture to ferret out those depths which made Christianity possible in the first place and which render it a live option today?

My position is that such is the indispensable condition for the revitalizing of a waning liberalism. It too needs a depth theology, but one which represents a true perception of depth because it takes cognizance of *all* the facts of Christian history, community, and experience.

Aspects of a Depth Theology

It is now our purpose to explore some of the depths in Christianity which liberalism must recognize if it is to produce anything more than a secular and surface arrangement of intellectual propositions, acceptable to many not because of their participation in the elemental springs of Christian thought and life, but because the propositions smack of the intellectual conceptions of our age. If liberalism is to maintain rapport with Scriptural Christianity and meet the profound spiritual needs of modern man, it must go beyond any mere window dressing of Christian thought and come to rest in the basic flow of spiritual energy which aroused the thought in the first place. Here we are searching for the living, vitalizing factors which made possible the tangible realities of book, church, and doctrine. If there are no such vitalizing factor, then our Christianity is entirely a human production, a phenomenon of length and breath, but lacking fatally in depth.

1. The Moral Foundations of Reality

First of all, liberalism must see that the roots of Christianity go deep down into a moral foundation for reality. That the world is great needs no argument. The years it would take any one of us to explore it adequately underscore that surface fact. But that the world has moral foundations is more difficult to discern. Indeed many have failed to see into these moral depths at all, even though they call themselves Christians. They would have difficulty understanding the attitude of John Morley who was not a Christian, but an agnostic. When Great Britain went mad, threatening to wage war against the tiny Boer republic in South Africa, John Morley spoke to a war-obsessed audience of his countrymen in Manchester, concluding his remarks with this grand, potent monosyllable:

> You may carry fire and sword into the midst of peace and industry: it will be wrong. A war of the strongest government in the world with untold wealth and

inexhaustible reserves against this little republic will bring you no glory: it will be wrong. You may make thousands of women widows, and thousands of children fatherless: it will be wrong. It may add a new province to your empire: it will still be wrong.[4]

Many moderns, always drifting above such moral depths, have given birth to a relativism and a skepticism which have rusted the springs of ethical action. Like the Sophists of ancient Greece, they have reached and preached the conclusion that man is the measure of all things. No longer is he to match his actions to suit the demands of the universe, but merely to satisfy his own convenience and appetites. Hence the relativism. Hence the skepticism about all ultimates save one; namely, the ultimate that there are no ultimates. For such there can be no eternal foundations. The spirit of the extreme relativists and secularists is baldly presented to us in these staccato lines of the poet:

> Let nothing bind you;
> If it is a Duty, away with it.
> If it is a Law, disobey it.
> If it is Opinion, go against it.
> There is only one Divinity, Yourself;
> Only one God, YOU.[5]

There individualism is on the rampage because it has cut away from all moorings which tie man to a moral order.

The student of modern thought is well aware of the parentage of this ethical relativism whose sad results are scattered about us in the wreckage of much of our twentieth-century civilization. Starting with Hegel who found the Absolute (God) coming to self-consciousness only in man's self-consciousness, God was increasingly ushered out of the universe until only man was left. And this man possessed only a theology which had become an anthropology. All was centred in man—even God. Ludwig Feuerbach, for instance, who applied Hegel's method and ideas to religion, reached the conclusion that God is merely man's own nature projected into the transcendent realm. In other words, God is humanity. Since man because of his nature must worship something, he worships himself and his achievements. The ethics of that position is man's exaltation of himself as the norm and standard of all things. From the moment that all moral foundations beyond man were abandoned modern secularism came to birth, finally to bluster forth in the anti-Semitism of Hitler and the liquidation programs of Russian communism.

Picked up by Karl Marx, this Hegelian-Feuerbachian strain of thought eventuated in the militant atheism undergirding the Bolshevist world view. Since no divine Power exists to guarantee the sanctity and dignity of human life, the inalienable right *of the individual* to life, liberty, and the

[4] John Morley, *Recollections*, New York, Macmillan, 1917, vol. II, p. 86.
[5] Author unknown.

pursuit of happiness disappears, or, more accurately, is swallowed up by the sole right of the classless proletariat to these benefits. Thus the process of dehumanizing the individual and putting a class in his place is complete. That is truly the fate of all totalitarianisms. For them individuality does not count. That is why Hitler could be prodigal with the individual lives of real men. For him they did not count, but only what he considered to be the fate of the species. That alone mattered to him. "Only the collective noun had reality for him" as a modern historian puts it.[6] Hence the ascent to the group or class to find reality, in which ascent persons standing alone come to be counted as so much dirt beneath the collective feet. The treatment of individuals in the Spanish Inquisition, nazi Germany, fascist Italy, communist Russia, and the undemocratic areas of American life leaves less proof of this tragic fact ardently to be desired. One would prefer to shut one's eyes to the abominations of torture chambers, concentration camps, Jew-baiting, mass murders, lynchings, enforced segregation, third degrees, and ruthless blood purges, all of which have their ultimate source in a relativistic ethic. Yet the diabolic facts are there, warning of the extreme wretchedness of man when he makes his desires the ultimate criteria for action.

The truth is that when the real God is thrust out, the pseudo gods rush in to fill the vacuum. The God of moral grandeur, who is "of purer eyes than to behold evil,"[7] is the supreme discovery of prophetic genius. He is abandoned only at the risk of substituting a state, a class, or a human institution to which men pledge their last full measure of devotion. Thus Mussolini wrote that the state is an absolute, whereas all individuals and groups are relative, to be considered at all only in their relation to the state.[8] This and the other pseudo absolutes of race, an "eternal" country, or a classless society spell the absolute devotion of man to his own ideas and fictions. When that condition becomes widespread in a large group, disaster is only a matter of time. Torn away from universal moorings, man becomes the victim in his actions of what he wants, what his little mind tells him is right for him, and what he has the power to get. In that state of mind, the deeply rooted lust for life cries out, "God is dead: everything is permitted! Try and get away with it!" Thus is self enthroned in the place of that Great Other who constantly chides and chastens man for his self-seeking, his pride, and his excessive love of personal comfort. Conscience is still the voice of God when it whispers that we are our brother's keeper rather than the lords of our little lives.

The truth which emerges out of the hardships and miseries of our generation is that self-seeking and neglect of the common good lead to

[6] H. Butterfield, *Christianity and History,* New York, Scribner, 1950, p. 28.

[7] Hab. 1:13.

[8] See Benito Mussolini, *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism,* New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1935, p. 13.

personal and social tragedy. Thinking men now see clearly that men must lose themselves in that which envisages the good of others if they are going to be safe themselves. He who would save his life must lose it in something more significant than his own little life. Because we have overlooked that, we have introduced tragedy into our social, national, and international life. Recognizing the indispensability of the larger good, we find a professor of international politics in the University College of Wales, Edward Hallett Carr, writing in 1942: "Our civilisation is in danger of perishing for lack of something with which we have dispensed for 200 years, but with which we can dispense no longer: a deliberate and avowed moral purpose, involving the call for common sacrifice for a recognized common good."[9]

Religion's task is to bring humanity assurance concerning those depth foundations implicit in moral absolutes plus the conviction that action in harmony with them will not fail of saving results. It may do this in two ways: 1. through pronouncement; 2. through appeal to history. As to pronouncement, the great divisions of Western Christianity have both emphasized the reality of moral law and obedience to it as the requisite condition for social health. The statement of the Federal Council of Churches' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace will suffice to clarify this fact. "We believe that moral law, no less than physical law, undergirds our world. There is a moral order which is fundamental and eternal, and which is relevant to the corporate life of men and the ordering of human society. If mankind is to escape chaos and recurrent war, social and political institutions must be brought into conformity with this moral order."[10] The religious assurance expressed in that statement emerges from the faith that the universe is under spiritual control. Spiritual control, however, is inseparable from moral motivation and action. The stars in their courses fight against Sisera. That ancient faith in the morality of the universe is the modern Christian's faith also.

What John Ruskin called the greatest painting he had ever seen gives graphic expression to this religious insight that the universe has moral foundations. The picture is Tintoretto's "The Miracle of St. Mark," which may be seen in the Academy Gallery in Venice. In the centre of the picture a giant of a man is portrayed. Naked, he is held flat on his back by many hands. Found guilty of robbing the treasury of St. Mark's church, a terrible fate awaits him, pronounced by the judge who sits in his chair on the right. The guilty man's hands must be cut off, in which condition he will be displayed around Venice. After that he is to be hanged between the two columns in St. Mark's square. When dead, his body will be cut down, quartered, a part to be displayed at each of the four ends of Venice

[9] Edward Hallett Carr, *Conditions of Peace,* New York, Macmillan, 1942, pp. 114 f.

[10] Statement of Guiding Principles" of the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, in *A Righteous Faith for a Just and Durable Peace,* New York, Federal Council of Churches, 1942, p. 101.

where it will serve as a terrifying warning to any prospective robber of St. Mark's church. To return to the picture, just as the astonished executioner lifts his hammer and hatchet to sever the man's hands, the tools suddenly break. St. Mark is seen flying in mid-air, for he has come from heaven to protect this man who is innocent of the crime of which he has been accused and found guilty. Now the point of the painting is not that this miracle actually occurred. Hammers and hatchets do not marvelously break even though the accused be innocent. What is significant is the reflected faith of Tintoretto and his fellow Venetians that a moral principle is at the heart of the universe which is always on the side of the moral man, whether he lives or dies. That is the deep faith offered by the prophetic religious consciousness: life does have moral foundations because of the spiritual nature of ultimate Reality.

Appealing to history to undergird his assurance of moral dimensions therein, the Christian points to one nation and civilization after another—Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Rome, Persia, Greece, and a score of others—which have gone into disintegration or to total destruction because they forgot the laws of social obligation whose observance alone is productive of unity and strength. Empires and nations are weakened first from within by the inner decay provoked by the evils of concentrated wealth, oppression, loss of direction, excessive pleasure, and class stratification before they become easy prey to younger and more virile peoples from without. Hence the judgment of James A. Froude, eminent British historian, who cannot be described as an overly religious man: "One lesson, and only one, history may be said to repeat with distinctness: that the world is built somehow on moral foundations; that, in the long run, it is well with the good; in the long run, it is ill with the wicked."[11] The great historian was simply putting into philosophic conclusion what the prophet Isaiah saw centuries earlier and stated in these vivid words as his countrymen trembled before the Assyrian menace:

> Here is what the Eternal said to me, with overwhelming force,
> as he warned me not to take the line of this people:
> "Do not call out 'Danger!' when this people calls out 'Danger!'
> Have no fear of what they fear, never dread it.
> The danger lies with the Lord of hosts;
> 'tis he whom you should fear,
> 'tis he whom you should dread!
> Over him, like a stone in the road,
> both houses of Israel shall trip and tumble;
> to the Jerusalemites he is a trap and snare—
> many shall trip and fall with a crash,
> many shall be caught and captured."[12]

Isaiah saw that the world has moral foundations. The sins of the fathers are sometimes visited upon the children to the third and fourth

[11] James A. Froude, *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, vol. 1, pp. 22 f.
[12] Isa. 8:11-15 [Moffatt].

generations. Our children's children will be suffering the effects and paying the costs of two global wars in this bloodiest of all centuries. Moral retribution is a terrible reality. Moral defects in nations do lead to national and world disasters. Because of the universal cupidity found in mankind, no nation is free from judgment. There is that in the very nature of things which offers resistance to the selfish ambitions of individuals, institutions, and nations. Both Napoleon and Bismarck witnessed to that fact, feeling that they could go so far in ruthless action and no farther. There is a Providence which has "the last word to say about the results" of history.[13] Consequently judgment is an accompaniment of the failures of men to conform to the moral demands of reality. A contemporary historian, Herbert Butterfield, professor of modern history in the University of Cambridge, states it as his opinion that history writes this truth large. Speaking of Europe under judgment, he has this to say:

> If Germany came under judgment, then the ancient Russia did the same, meeting a doom more terrible, more swift, more assuredly permanent than that of Germany herself. And ever since that time we have looked apprehensively to France to learn whether upon her there has not come a judgment equally lasting by virtue of the very efforts that have been made to improve her position. In other words, it is a dangerous illusion to imagine that if Germany can be proved to have sinned those who were fighting against her may be assumed to have been righteous. We are hoaxing ourselves if we think that because judgment came upon Germany through the victory of our arms, we—being the instruments of God in this matter—may count ourselves as having qualified for virtue; or as having even found special favour in His sight. . . . the truth is that a God who could use even the Philistines in order to chastise His chosen people may similarly use us for the purpose of chastening Germany, while still reserving for us a terrible judgment later.[14]

Here is one historian who recognizes that the fact of judgment implies the reality of the moral law. It is ultimately well with the righteous; ultimately it is ill with the wicked. The moral foundations of reality are there, terribly there. Without that depth liberal theology will fail modern man.

2. Spiritual Control

But something more than the moral foundations of reality must be recognized by the liberal as being among the depth facts of a Christianity which is biblically grounded. These moral foundations imply a spiritual control. No prophet ever brings forth a moral view of reality without associating it with the living God and his power. Indeed, we are justified in saying that the depth of the Bible is nowhere better suggested than in its reiterated emphasis that the universal process is under spiritual control. It is God who has "stretched" forth "the heavens,"[15] created man in his own image,[16] given breath to all people,[17] numbered the very hairs of our

[13] See H. Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[15] Isa. 42:5.
[16] Gen. 1:26.
[17] Isa. 42:5.

heads,[18] and reconciled us to himself through Jesus Christ.[19] Throughout the Bible this sense of spiritual control is acknowledged, however much man may rebel against it. Of this the prophets possessed a sublime conviction. They did not gaze into the solitudes of mystic quiet to find God, but out upon the turbulent, sweating, dust-obscured battle of human life. In the clash and strain of life they saw God, certainly and surely in control of the lines of history however much their perverse and rebellious countrymen chafed at the bit. It was precisely their perception of a God involved in the life of their day which lends depth to their thought and isolates them as among the earliest exponents of a philosophy of history. To them and many of the members of their race history was no parade of inconsequential units upon the time stream. On the contrary, history was man's opportunity to coöperate with God and find salvation, or rebel against God and invite destruction. The entire scene of history was no passing panorama, here today and gone tomorrow, or destined to bend back upon itself in endless, cyclic repetition. It was rather a process under divine control, destined for glorious fulfillment or tragic denouement as man coöperated with God or abandoned his purposes. In either event the control belonged to God. The issue lay in his hands. Hence the Old Testament writers of history were not interested merely in recording historic events. They rather wrote of these events to reveal God's judgments in the crucial moments of history.[20] Whether right or wrong in this conclusion, there can be no doubt that the biblical writers lived with the conviction that God acts in human history.

Here, then, is a world view integral to the Bible and implicit in Christian faith which imparts depth and seriousness to the pageant of human existence. No generation has needed this feeling of depth more acutely than our own. It may be that we are too close to contemporary history to realize that there are forces of creativity and control at work in coöperation with which alone lies the salvation of our world. Yet future generations, in some happier age than ours, will ascertain those lines of support, control, and judgment as certainly as the prophets of old discerned them among their own people. Mankind is now under a ceaseless pressure to get together into larger units of coöperative life or perish. Not a one of us, probably, who does not feel that need and who would not gladly sacrifice his life if through doing so that end could be attained. We feel an insistent pressure to move in the direction of enlarging friendship. In strange ways mankind has been prepared for this new world of coöperation and brotherhood. When the modern missionary movement got under way back in 1792 with William Carey, no one could have envisaged the emergence of a fellowship of people of like thought, purpose, loyalty, and hope

[18] Matt. 10:30.

[19] II Cor. 5:18 f.

[20] *Cf.* Millar Burrows, *An Outline of Biblical Theology,* Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1946, pp. 39, 46, 59.

such as is now established in every country upon the face of the earth. Yet such a world fellowship, rooted in a world church, has come out of the Christian missionary movement, ready now to implement the insistent demand for world life and world coöperation. And it is implementing it. At its meeting in Geneva last spring, the executive committee of the World Council of Churches unanimously declared that in an atomic age war has become "a perversion; it is against the moral order by which man is bound; it is sin against God."[21] Pleading for new international negotiations before the threat of the hydrogen bomb, the executive committee of the World Council said: "The governments of the world have an inescapable responsibility at this hour. . . . As representatives of Christian churches we appeal for a gigantic new effort for peace. We know how strenuously the governments have discussed peace in the past. But sharp political conflicts continue and the atomic danger develops uncontrolled. We urge the governments to enter into negotiations once again, and to do everything in their power to bring the present tragic deadlock to an end."[22]

We know now that we must live together or perish. If we will not have one world, we may have no world. Should not this pressure for one world, a pressure which we are convinced is more than human, lead us to believe in our day what the prophets dared to believe in theirs; namely, that there is spiritual control in the universe. He who finds reason for introducing that into a liberal theology will inevitably impart depth to it.

It is precisely this factor of spiritual control which radically separated the world of Greek philosophy from the Judæo-Christian tradition. Greeks believed in eternal recurrence; Jews and Christians believed in God's control of the world and man, with history making for a goal. As a vivid illustration of these contrasting views, let us turn to the conversion of Justin Martyr to Christianity back in the second century. For years Justin searched for peace and a satisfying truth in Greek philosophy, trying successively Stoicism, Aristotelianism, Pythagoreanism, and Platonism. In none of these, however, did he attain his goal. Always there was something lacking. At last he met one who directed him to the Hebrew prophets, who were described to him as friends of Christ, through whom he found the truth which alone satisfies. We might well ask, "Just what did Justin find?" Studying the first eight chapters of his *Dialogue with Trypho,* we soon discover what it was. From the Greek philosophers he had acquired a satisfying view of neither God, man, nor history. God for the Greeks was not one who cared for the individual, but an impersonal entity far above the cares and distractions of this world. He did not get into life, lending spiritual support and control to earthly process. As to man, he was regarded by the Greeks as unbegotten and immortal; hence, logically, immortality is not God's gift because of virtue, but follows from the

[21] *Christian Century,* March 15, 1950, p. 324. [22] *Ibid.,* p. 324.

ineradicable character of the soul. Moreover, since all things recur, the soul will once again revert to type and be plunged repeatedly into earthly life. As to history, it is a cyclical phenomenon, making towards no goal, but bending eternally back upon itself.

In contrast to these views of Greek philosophy what did Justin find in Christianity? Basically, he gained the Christian conception that existence is under divine rule. There is, moreover, a beginning and an end to things. The universe is not unbegotten. It had a beginning. Nor is it immortal, bending back in an unending circle of recurrence. On the contrary, it is characterized by a line process which moves to an end. Whereas in the Greek view everything was predetermined, in Christianity Justin found a creative God and a man capable of making one response or another to effect his salvation or his damnation. So he says to Trypho: "If, then, you have any concern for yourself, and if you are eagerly looking for salvation, and if you believe in God, you may—since you are not indifferent to the matter—become acquainted with the Christ of God, and, after being initiated [literally, having become perfect], live a happy life."[23]

This rather long reference to Justin is justified if thereby we glimpse the element missing in Greek philosophy which Christianity presented. Essentially it was a world view in which God exercised spiritual control. It was that which introduced added depth into human experience and historic event for Justin, leading him with great joy to espouse what he calls the philosophy which alone is "safe and profitable."[24] That factor of spiritual control must become integral in liberal theology if it is to have the depth required by a living Christianity.

3. Specific Action

Beyond moral foundations and spiritual control there lies a third requirement for a depth theology. This depth is particularly related to Jesus Christ. As a religion which concentrates much of its attention upon a particular, historic life and its significance, Christianity never plumbs its full depth when it remains on the levels of the moral nature of reality and the spiritual control exercised by God. That choice life, lived so radiantly, poured out so strangely on a cross, continued so strongly as a spiritual companion strengthening men in all sorts of trials and disasters, will not allow Christianity to stop with these more general assertions. So Christianity boldly penetrates a greater depth to voice the faith that specific, personal, divine action for human redemption occurred in Jesus of Nazareth. It declares that this man was not merely a man who lived and died unfortunately upon a cross. Many other men have lived good lives and suffered likewise. To say that and no more about Jesus is to remain on the surface level of thinking concerning him. Nor is it sufficient to observe that Jesus

[23] Justin Martyr, *Dialogue* 8. [24] *Ibid.*

was a good man voluntarily sacrificing himself for others. That, too, could be said concerning many more. For Christian depth we must rather go still deeper, asserting that Jesus was God's Son who died that the redemptive love of the Father might be let loose in the world. Here we strike a new depth in Christian thinking. Many would agree with a modern New Testament scholar who declares that that life and what happened therein may be called "the supreme moment of human history."[25] That is so for Christians because in that life they perceive the eternal in the timely, the infinite in the finite, the divine in the human. This life is evidence that God and man belong together.

Christianity, accordingly, is a given religion. It is the result of no merely human effort. It arises out of an event. That event has its roots in the everlasting concern of God for humankind. God believed that the best life was none too good for beings with capacities for moral decision and spiritual growth. God's thought culminated in the historic event of the person, life, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. Without that divine event Christianity could not be. It means in truth that the source of the Christian religion lies in God rather than in man.

The New Testament is shot through with the insight and faith that in the man of Nazareth an event of divinest magnitude occurred. "Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life."[26] ". . . when the fulness of the time came, God sent forth his Son."[27] ". . . in these last days he [God] has spoken to us by a Son."[28] "And the Word became flesh."[29] "God hath made that same Jesus both Lord and Christ."[30] "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself."[31] These are but typical of numerous statements in the New Testament which witness to the Christian conviction that God was doing something of the utmost importance through the life of Jesus. In truth, Christians held that therein the purpose, hope, and love of God found convincing expression. They said, in effect, "If God is not to be found in this radiantly loving and self-forgetful life, then God is to be found nowhere." If that is true, then this Galilean's life carries the most momentous news—a gospel—the good news of God's loving and gracious interest in mankind. Here is personal depth than which no greater can be found within the limits of human flesh. A man becomes a Christian when he responds to God's great love in Christ.

The chief significance of Jesus' total life experience, therefore, is that it is a revelation of the personal and loving will of God. That is not easy to believe. Do not ask me to prove it to you. I cannot. All I can do is to suggest what God may be in his essence and to suggest that the loving spirit which I believe is characteristic of God finds decisive expression in

[25] John Knox, "The Revelation of God in Christ," in the Interseminary Series, Vol. Three, *The Gospel, the Church and the World,* New York, Harper, 1946, p. 16.

[26] John 6:68. [29] John 1:14.
[27] Gal. 4:4. [30] Acts 2:36.
[28] Hebr. 1:2. [31] II Cor. 5:19.

Jesus of Nazareth. From there on the Christian religion is a venture of faith, believing that which is really above human reason, yes, beyond the highest human thought. A century ago the Danish philosopher-theologian, Soren Kierkegaard, termed this presence of God in Jesus Christ the "absolute paradox" or the paradox of God in time. He claimed that the human mind could not fathom this fact. If it was to be accepted, God himself must provide the faith through which alone it could be apprehended. And so it is. To find the love of God, for instance, in a cross! No wonder Paul speaks of that horrible agony as foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling block to the Jews.[32] One might possibly look for God in a saffron-hued forest, a ruddy sunset, the moving majesty of the sea, the dialectic of the soul, a mother's love, or the religious experience of a saint. Signs and human wisdom are traditional pathways to God.[33] But who would find God in a life tortured and writhing in pitiful weakness on a cross? Truly no human thought would ever take that pathway into the mind and purpose of God. That Christians were led to do so was clear evidence to Paul of divine event and wisdom. Hence he wrote that "the world through its wisdom knew not God."[34] That is to say, the final and full knowledge of God is beyond the finest and highest thought of men. It is rather given by God himself through an event, "Christ crucified,"[35] wherein man unaided would never find "the power of God, and the wisdom of God."[36] Thus is born in Christian minds the conviction that the decisive nature of God lies in gracious and loving will. That pivotal Christian belief is inseparable from God's illuminating action in Jesus Christ. Christianty inevitably takes man into the mysterious depth of specific divine action. Any liberal theology which overlooks that faith will miss one of the essential Christian depths.

4. Continuing Divine Concern and Human Opportunity

There is yet a final depth which undergirds a living Christianity. Beyond moral foundations, spiritual control, and specific divine action, a full Christianity apprehends God's continuing concern and man's present opportunity. We need to get it clear that Christianity does not exhaust itself in a fixation upon distant, divine event. Despite the fact that when the Christian remains true to the genius of his religion he never loses the great historic moments of the faith from his field of vision, he yet knows that the divine life available then to Jesus and Peter and Paul is available to him now. The mighty Nile has flowed across an entire country for many centuries, imparting of its life-giving waters to people on every hand in every generation. In similar manner the stream of spiritual life which Christianity is has flowed from God across the centuries, offering spiritual power and joy to all who in any generation will partake of them.

[32] I Cor. 1:23.
[33] *Cf.* I Cor. 1:22.
[34] I Cor. 1:21.
[35] I Cor. 1:23.
[36] I Cor. 1:24.

Historically this sense of contemporary Divine Presence has been spoken of by Christians as "the testimony of the Holy Spirit." In our day it is more apt to receive the less colorful term "religious experience." Called by either phrase, it is the Christian's witness to the fact that God is not far off, removed from earth to look over it in majestic splendor, but that he is involved in life now. From Pentecost that has been the experience of many Christians in every generation. God comes to them *now.* It is precisely this immediacy of the Divine which renders Christianity a religion of great expectations. Herein lies much of its perennial wonder and spiritual vitality. Christians are taught to expect and to know the presence of God within their lives and the world. So a Christian of the seventeenth century could pen such lines as these:

The soul wherein God dwells,
What church could holier be?
Becomes a walking-tent
Of heavenly majesty.
How far from here to heaven?
Not very far, my friend,
A single, hearty step
Will all the journey end.

Oh, would thy heart but be
A manger for His birth;
God would once more become
A child upon the earth.
Go out, God will go in;
Die thou—and let Him live;
Be not—and He will be;
Wait, and He'll all things give.[37]

Certainly that is a most daring faith, a most profound faith to plumb, that God can and does come into human life. Yet until one penetrates that depth, one does not understand either the profundity nor the amazing wonder of the Christian faith. In the heat of the modernist-fundamentalist controversy of the 1920's, the one who was regarded as the spear point of liberal tendencies did not fail to call attention to this inescapable depth in Christianity. Wrote Harry Emerson Fosdick: "Christianity is the religion of incarnation and its central affirmation is that God can come into human life."[38] Why not? God is no physical being tied to one place as we are with our fleshly bodies. God is spirit, who is wherever he wants to be. He is a Spirit of love. In the two New Testament definitions as to God's metaphysical character, "God is spirit"[39] and "God is love,"[40] is to be found a comprehensible, working conception of deity. Wherever such loving spirit and its results are found, there God as the Spirit productive of all spirit is found at work. In the striking and audacious words of I John: "God is love; and he that abideth in love abideth in God, and God abideth in him."[41] Paul had much the same thing in mind when he wrote, "Know ye not that ye are a temple of God?"[42] These biblical writers would understand the daring statement on the tomb of Louis Pasteur in the Pasteur Institute in Paris: "Happy is the man who carries God within him."

[37] Angelus Silesius (Johann Scheffler), "The Soul Wherein God Dwells," trans. from the German in *The Catholic Anthology,* ed. by Thomas Walsh, rev. ed., p. 208.
[38] Harry Emerson Fosdick, *The Modern Use of the Bible,* New York, Macmillan, 1924, p. 263.
[39] John 4:24. [41] I John 4:16.
[40] I John 4:8, 16. [42] I Cor. 3:16.

Thus emerges the Christian conviction of God's divine concern now and of man's opportunity to enter into saving relationship with the Father. God ever stands ready as loving Spirit to enter man's life, imparting to him his distinctive quality of spirit. Surely that is a profound depth. Moreover it is a depth confirmed by the lives of Christians great and small throughout the centuries. We know that God is present because of the gentle, self-forgetful life of a St. Francis, or because of some obscure Christian whose quality of inner being has brought us to spiritual attention. Daniel Webster used to say that he knew Christianity was true because of an old aunt of his who lived far back in the New Hampshire hills. Quite so. The best way of understanding Christianity is to know a saint in the flesh. The incontrovertible fact of qualitative spirit is the contemporary evidence for divine reality and the proof of man's continued opportunity with God. Unless that depth is reached and lived in, Christianity quickly becomes a decadent institutionalism with a host of spiritual incompetents oiling the ecclesiastical machinery and repairing the broken parts. The end of that is stultification and death. All machinery wears out.

The religious relevance of contemporary Christianity lies precisely in this fact that Christians do find God. Or we may prefer to state the fact by saying that God as Holy Spirit finds them. However we express the experience of Divine-human encounter, the end result is the same: Christians know God.[43] They may approach him through Christ. Most of them do. But they finally know God as an essentially personal Being, with will and purposes of his own, controlling the world, and reaching his children in the deepest places of their being. Such religious experience is determinative. It is inseparable from what Christians have had in mind when they speak of God as Holy Spirit. If we know not that profound Christian depth, or, if once having known it, we have floated upwards to more visible surface facts, we would do well to cry with Charles Kingsley:

Welcome, wild North-easter!
Shame it is to see
Odes to every zephyr;
Ne'er a verse to thee.

Through the black fir-forest
Thunder harsh and dry,
Scattering down the snow-flakes,
Off the curdled sky.

Come; and strong within us
Stir the Vikings' blood;
Bracing brain and sinew;
Blow, thou wind of God![44]

A Christianity which no longer presents evidence of God's continued concern and of man's opportunity for saving fellowship with his Maker

[43] For an arresting instance of this fact, contrasted with the inadequacy of other religious approaches to divine reality, see, W. E. S. Holland, *The Goal of India,* London, United Council for Missionary Education, 1917, pp. 209 f.

[44] Charles Kingsley, from the "Ode to the North-east Wind," in his *Poems,* New York and London, The Coöperative Publication Society, 1899, pp. 310 ff.

has lost contact with one of its profoundest historic depths. Whatever else it may be good for, it is no longer good for man's ultimate need—to know who he is and where he stands in relation to the Reality (God) undergirding all existence. Yet when this depth is found, God is known as personal, loving will bent on imparting his good will and his saving love to his children. That being so, Christianity must ever say, "Blow, thou wind of God!"

Conclusion

That we have come to the end of one theological era and are entering a new one few will deny. The large question we now face is, "What kind of an era is that to be?" Can liberal theology, now on the defensive because of the resurgence of those theologies stressing a large degree of irrational supernaturalism, experience a rebirth? Yes, if it understands God and his activity and man and his possibilities. Yes, if it takes full cognizance of the deep flows of spiritual reality out of which Christianity first grew and on which it has fed across the centuries. That means a recognition of the divine factor in history and life, but not as an arbitrary or irrationally functioning entity. God is a being of rational order whether his activity is discerned in nature[45] or in religious experience.[46] That is one of the hard-won gains we owe to Hegel, and it is one the scientific and philosophically religious mind will not easily surrender. Nonetheless, the rejection of a crude supernaturalism which feeds upon unexpected, miraculous thrusts from heaven must not crowd out the conviction that there are more than surface facts in the universe, in history, in Christian origins, and in the continuing life of the Christian community. To ferret these out and then to fashion them into a refined supernaturalism and a rational structure of Christian thought, insofar as that is possible, is to win a depth theology. Such a theology will have pertinence for our day and generation because it feeds upon universal fact, historic truth, and the living communion with God now enjoyed by Christian men and women. Exploring these depths and giving rational expression to their significance holds the only hope for a new liberal theology which will live because it adequately meets the intellectual and emotional needs of our present Christian world.

[45] An American scientist writes, for instance, of our vast cosmos: "To an astronomer the most remarkable and interesting thing about that part of the physical universe with which he has become acquainted is not its vast extent in space, nor the number and great masses of its stars, nor the violent forces that operate in the stars, nor the long periods of astronomical time, but that which holds him awestruck is the perfect orderliness of the universe and the majestic succession of the celestial phenomena. From the tiny satellites in the solar system to the globular clusters, the galaxy, and exterior galaxies there is no chaos, there is nothing haphazard, and there is nothing capricious. The orderliness of the universe is the supreme discovery in science. . . ."—Forest Ray Moulton, "Astronomy," in H. H. Newman, ed., *The Nature of the World and Man,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1926, p. 30.

[46] Consider D. C. Macintosh's treatment of laws of the spiritual life in his *The Problem of Religious Knowledge,* New York, Harper, 1940, pp. 203-209.

THE MINISTRY OF SCHOLARSHIP

J. PHILIP HYATT
Vanderbilt University

In its lists of the "spiritual gifts," or of the various ministers who served the early Christian church, the New Testament does not list scholars. It names apostles, prophets, pastors, teachers, miracle-workers, healers, administrators, speakers in tongues and interpreters of tongues, and others.[1] Perhaps it comes close to the scholars when it mentions teachers (or, some might say, when it refers to those who speak in unknown tongues). If we were asked today to compile such a list of the ministers who serve the cause of the Christian church, we might feel impelled to omit some of these (such as miracle-workers and those who speak in or interpret tongues), but I believe that we ought to include scholars in their own right. It is for the ministry of scholars to the church and to the synagogue that I wish to make a plea.

It might be well first to define our term "scholar," for it is used with a variety of meanings. A dictionary definition would run about as follows: A scholar is one who, as the result of long and systematic study, has acquired a great fund of information in one or more of the recognized areas of knowledge, accuracy and skill in investigation, and the power of critical analysis in the interpretation of knowledge. I should like to suggest that there are three levels of scholarship, each of which has its special validity and purpose.

On the first level of scholarship is the scholar who knows his subject well, has a reasonably wide knowledge of both the primary and the secondary sources of information, and possesses fair ability in investigation and analysis. This is the level on which every good teacher ought to live, if he is to be an honest teacher, giving to his students training which will carry the ring of integrity. It is also the level on which many pastors, writers of church literature, and other religious workers ought to live.

The second higher level of scholarship is occupied by those who have an unusually wide range of information, especially of the original sources, but who are not especially profound or creative in the interpretation of the data they possess. Perhaps this is the level of the pedant, of the man who makes a great deal of language ability and of antiquarian knowledge.

The highest level is made up of those scholars who not only have a great fund of information, with special emphasis on the primary sources, but have unusual powers of critical analysis, and creative imagination to advance new theories for the explanation of the facts they have unearthed.

[1] I Cor. 12:27-31; Eph. 4:11; *cf.* Rom. 12:6-8.

These are the men who found schools, originate trends, and have the most far-reaching influence on the branches of knowledge with which they deal.

Scholars of all levels are needed, and all perform valuable services. Every scholar should aspire to occupy as high a level as possible, but the level to which he will be able to attain is probably determined more by innate ability and opportunity than by ambition and industry.

In the field of biblical scholarship, with which many readers of CROZER QUARTERLY are especially concerned, there are certain qualities which enable one to reach the highest level. Devotion to the task, industry, and self-discipline which lead one to acquire the necessary tools must be taken for granted. The qualities which count most are sympathetic insight and understanding in the interpretation of the Bible, creative imagination, and the ability to see and account for relationships which are not seen by the ordinary scholar.

Now, I doubt if any will question my statement that there is a dearth of competent biblical scholars today, most strikingly at the highest level. If you have had anything to do with finding personnel for a biblical department, or with some coöperative publishing venture, or with editing a biblical journal, you will readily admit that we are in an age of scarcity. Our present plight was discussed with great pessimism by Professor Morton S. Enslin in his presidential address before the Society of Biblical Literature in 1945 entitled "The Future of Biblical Studies."[2] Ominously he said that his subject might better be stated, "Is There a Future for Biblical Studies?" After pointing out the catastrophe which has overtaken German scholarship, and the low estate of British scholarship, he predicted that the possibilities for great biblical scholarship in our own country in the future are not encouraging.

There are many reasons for our present condition. I cannot discuss all of them, but will only list a few of the more important. 1. One is the fact that we live in an age of materialism and of scientism. A physician friend says that we are not only in a materialistic age, but a somatic age. The facts with which we deal must be "objective," capable of being measured and weighed and set down in quantitative terms. (For every graduate student in the biblical field there are dozens in physics.) 2. Biblical scholarship requires long training, and the rewards in prestige and in financial security are not likely to be high. 3. The cult of "the practical" is very strong, in religion and elsewhere. Much that is to be found within the covers of the Bible is not practical, and following its precepts does not necessarily help one to win friends and influence people. 4. In all candor we must say that a great stumbling block to many prospective scholars today is the number of languages required in order to read the Bible in

[2] Published in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXV (1946), pp. 1-12.

its original and some of the most important books written on the Bible. American students seem to have a special allergy to languages, and no one has yet been able to discover an effective antihistamine that works on all cases.

I would add as another cause of our present dearth of biblical scholars a factor which is partly implied in some of the above, and partly a new factor: the importance of scholarship in its own right is not recognized by the leaders and the laymen of the Christian church. In this regard Judaism is, I believe, in a better position than Christianity, for the scholar has usually had a place of prestige in Judaism that he has not always had in Christianity.

One of the important reasons, then, why biblical scholarship is now at a low ebb and that good biblical scholars are rare is the fact that the value of scholars and scholarship is not correctly appreciated by the church and its leaders. Frequently those who are in positions of leadership and authority do not encourage young men to take training for scholarly positions, even when they are inclined to do so; and the seminaries do not give as much attention to the production of scholars as they should. Furthermore, men who are engaged in what is called "the practical ministry" are frequently scornful of scholarship.

Yet, we ought to see that scholars perform a very important ministry to the church, and that in fact scholarship is absolutely necessary to the ongoing life of the church. There are at least three reasons why this is true. The enumeration of them will show the nature of the service which scholars perform.

1. Christianity and Judaism are not simply religions which have high ethical ideals and certain abstract philosophical beliefs; both are religions which emphasize *history* and the crucial importance of events which have occurred and will occur in historical time as we know it. It was the Hebrews and not the Greeks who first wrote history (the *J* narrative); and one of the very strong factors which led to the firm establishment of monotheism was the prophetic interpretation of history, particularly of the crucial events of the exodus from Egypt and of the Babylonian exile. As for Christianity, no one can contradict the importance of events which culminated in the life of a man who lived in Palestine in the first century of our era.

If this is true, then we must have scholars who will be constantly exploring and investigating the history which we term "sacred history," if that history itself is not to become the object of idolatrous worship. Scholarship can help to keep this history and this sense of history real and vivid in the minds of believers.

2. Christianity and Judaism are also "religions of a book." For Jews

that book is what Christians term the Old Testament; to it Christians add the New Testament. Now, the existence of a sacred book may be an asset or it may be a liability to a religion. It may represent the dead hand of the past, retarding progress and leading to the fossilization of religion; or it may be a continual source of renewal. In the history of Christianity the Bible has sometimes been the one and sometimes the other. The best method of preventing it from being only an idol or fetish, or a source of stumbling for the church, is for it to be the object of continual study and criticism. It is no accident that many of the early Protestant Reformers were sound biblical scholars who laid the foundations for the historical criticism of the present.

In this connection, one may add that it is also the function of the scholar to make translations of the sacred book into the vernacular language of his own place and time, so that it is always available for reading and study. I have often wondered what would have become of the Christian faith if there had not been through the centuries devoted men of scholarship who could translate the Bible so that it could be understood by men of all tongues and of all places. In English, there will never be a perfect translation or one which will be permanently useful so long as English remains a living language, and so we must expect that new translations will be made every generation.

3. The faith of the Christian or of the Jew must be continually subject to adjustment to the intellectual life of every age in which it is proclaimed. This is one of the fundamental planks of the "liberal" Christian, and of the Reform Jew. It is also a process which is ever going on whether it is advocated or not. Otherwise the faith becomes dead.

Of course it is true that the Christian faith has a double relationship to the intellectual life of any age: on the one hand, it stands in judgment upon that life; on the other hand, it must become adjusted to its permanently sound insights and discoveries. If the former did not take place, Christianity would have nothing distinctive to offer; if the latter did not occur, Christianity would become dormant. In the history of the church there are many examples of the "growing pains" which have been experienced by this ever-recurring tension between the faith and the intellectual life of various times. One recalls the many instances of conflict between religion and science, such as that between Genesis and Darwinism. At the present time a good example is the discussion on the continent which centres around Rudolph Bultmann's attempt to "de-mythicize" the Christian faith.

Perhaps biblical scholars are not as directly concerned with these latter problems as are theologians. But the biblical scholar must be aware of the problems, and if he contributes to their solution, the results are

likely to be sounder than if they are dealt with only by the theologians of the church.

In emphasizing the service of scholarship to the church, one danger must be recognized. There is the danger that scholarship may be wholly subservient to the "practical" demands of the church, or to its doctrinal dictation. This danger was pointed out by Professor Enslin in the paper already referred to. There is always present a temptation for the leaders of the church to dominate scholars. It must be frankly recognized that Roman Catholic scholars are somewhat circumscribed by the decrees of the Papal Biblical Commission, although there are large areas in which they have considerable liberty. But, I believe it is of the essence of Protestantism that the scholar must be *free* to pursue truth wherever it may lead him.

Nevertheless, the nature of the scholar's "freedom" should be pointed out. In the realm of religious scholarship, a completely neutral and objective attitude is neither possible nor desirable. One cannot put religion into a test tube or a mathematical equation. Sympathy, imagination, and insight are necessary to a real understanding, and religion is best understood from *within* the faith rather than from the outside. That means that the biblical scholar may justly approach the Bible with Christian or Jewish presuppositions. He should aim at a relative objectivity, and he should be aware of his own presuppositions. Furthermore, his attitude should not be sectarian in the bad sense, and he should be willing to have his own presuppositions subjected to criticism. When these things are true, there is no danger that the scholar's work will be too much dominated by the church or used too much to promote its immediate practical needs.

Those of us who are teachers and scholars in the religious field should see a twofold significance in this plea for the recognition of the scholar's ministry to the church and synagogue. 1. We should see that our own work is as much a part of the ministry as is that of the pastor, the evangelist, the administrator, and others who are usually recognized as ministers. Our position is one of great dignity and of tremendous potential influence upon the life of the church and its personnel. We should be men and women who "gladly teach" and gladly serve as scholars. 2. We should take pride in "propagating our own kind." The church is greatly in need of more scholars and better scholars, not only in the classroom but also in the pulpit and in other positions. I believe that the church would have a higher position of prestige and of influence if our pastors emphasized not so much being glad-handers, glib speakers on any subject, and executives of large ecclesiastical organizations, but men of learning and of genuine scholarship. Such men must be trained in the colleges, universities, and seminaries in which we are teachers.

COMMUNISM AS RELIGION

FOREST K. DAVIS
Goddard College

CONFLICTS are oftener described in terms of the oppositions of their participants than of their similarities. An idea is loosely said to be opposed to another idea; a social institution is "diametrically opposed" to another. Whether such expressions mean much is not obvious. The whole view of a conflict is perhaps a function of the similarities as well as of the oppositions of particular contestants, since likeness of method and objective helps define the disagreement. As the oppositions are usually well considered, it may be helpful to attend briefly to the similarities of two notable opponents.[1]

Religions are ordinarily recognized by means of their objects of belief. A group believing in an accepted deity is apt to be credited as having a religion. The classification is merely one of general consensus. If, however, attention is directed toward religious behavior and forms rather than alone toward the object of belief, useful insights may be obtained, even though the method is but a temporary means of study. In such an approach traditional Christianity and communism—the two subjects of this comparison—appear as similar groups of devoted believers, acting and thinking in large measure alike, making similar assumptions, developing similar organizations—and bitterly attacking each other.

One should not suppose that believers of either kind will appreciate the effort to compare them. Orthodox religionists will not care to be disjointed from their objects of belief like drumsticks from a bird, and communists will angrily reject association of themselves with "religion" in any form.[2] Yet two facts remain: these groups are locked in combat—and they are very much alike. Do conflicts arise in history between institutions and groups more similar than diverse in composition and activity?

To most people in the western tradition a religion is a system of belief and action between man and God. From time to time religions have arisen which attempted to replace God with something else, producing one or another of the several varieties of humanism concerned primarily with man as a child of the ages. For these sects some new player on the cosmic stage must put on the mask of God and claim to pull the strings

[1] These informal reflections on the likenesses of communism and traditional religion are not intended as definitive, but as invitations to those whom the subject may attract. Such comparisons have been observed by many students of these matters. A decisive acknowledgment is made herewith to Professor J. A. C. Fagginger Auer, of Harvard University.

[2] Notice that Marxist theories of the origin and development of religions are irrelevant to the present study. They might or might not be true, and still the problem would remain of the singular resemblance of traditional religion and communism.

of natural process. Sometimes it is a vague conception of the Good toward which men are supposed to strive in conscious effort. Sometimes it is the mechanical and self-sufficient universe in which man is seen as an accidental passenger. There is always something, or there is no system. For communism it is the form of society which acts back upon man and molds him like clay. If only the human aggregation (so runs the tale) could be suddenly remade in the communistic form, human nature would be transfigured by its sculpturing influence. Economic environment is the God-fool of communism.

If communism and traditional religion are similar in that each possesses an effective deity, they are also alike in their respective views of man. For Catholicism to a large degree, and for Calvinistic Protestantism to a greater degree, man is helpless. Borne down by inherent sin, he can be saved only by God's gift of forgiveness, grace bestowed from above. Catholic man can help himself a little; Calvinistic man can help himself not at all; every event in life and nature is an act of God; salvation and damnation are alike foreordained.

Peculiarly, communism also passes a vote of no confidence in average human nature, denying the capacity of the great mass of men to lead themselves—the very proletariat whom it would help and on whom it would build its state. Beyond a point, Lenin felt, the workers have not the knowledge or ability to help themselves. They must be shown the way by a few leaders gifted with special insights and abilities who step down from the middle class to head them, as he himself did. Such revolutionary leaders, of whom Lenin was chief,[3] exhibit the main characteristics of religious prophets, notably the conviction of absolute rectitude as against both enemies and more moderate rivals. The consequences of this will appear below in various connections.

Human nature by and large is evil for both Christianity and communism. For Marx and Engels, as for the church fathers, man in his present state has little to recommend him. That man can be saved by grace alone is the Christian theme. For communism only the prior transformation of society would make man's nature respectable.

An inconsistency appears in communist theory which also obtains in both the traditional branches of Christianity. The average man is by definition helpless, and yet in practice he is found to work devotedly for the realization of his ideals. If the kingdom of God and the proletarian state are respectively due to come inevitably, and if the average man is defined as helpless, why do men trouble themselves? Well, they just do. This inconsistency runs through all of Christianity except the liberal wing

[3] See David Shub, *Lenin* (Doubleday, 1948). W. H. Chamberlin in *The Russian Revolution* refers to Lenin as the Revolutionary Word become flesh.

(where the conception of human dignity obviates it) and it appears in communism. Neither the conservative religionist nor the communist has any reason in his own view to work for his conception of a better world. Both work very hard.[4]

The parallel is further pressed in the common tendency of communism and the authoritarian type of church to insist on government by the enlightened few. This is an institutional consequence of the prophetic mood and should be recognized as a religious trait wherever it occurs. The relationship between prophecy and fascism, and the implications of it for the rôle of democracy, have perhaps been insufficiently examined in recent years with respect to both use and abuse.

In the matter of the elect (persons chosen to be saved), traditional religion is wary of asserting that its leaders belong with those who are given salvation by virtue of their faith or conformity, but the implication is that this is so. It is a rare churchman who does not speak in full assurance of his own rectitude. The whole problem of individual access to truth versus institutional mediation of the truth to men is full of thorns. Again, only the liberal wing of Protestant Christianity asserts the continuance of revelation or its equivalent in nature, history, and human life. For strictly traditional Christianity revelation exists finished and complete in the Bible, the Word of God—the work of religion being to understand and apply its meanings.

The counterpart of the traditional position is again clear in communism. The air of finality which marks communist doctrines[5] of dialectical materialism and social process, and the absolute insistence of communism on its own rectitude and on its institutional authority over the possibly divergent ideas of individuals suggest that contemporary communism is a fundamentally conservative type of thought best compared to the really orthodox sections of Christianity. Christian truth is in general contained in the Bible; salvation is through faith in God and belief in Jesus as the Son of God. Communist truth is in general contained in the writings of Marx and Lenin; acceptance into the community of the elect is through belief in the dialectical process and in the desirability and practicality of the communist state. The touchstones of belief are severally followed by appropriate required practices.

In communism, as in Christianity and Judaism, a large body of interpretive material or commentary has grown up around the law, taking

[4] The Harvard historian, Crane Brinton, has detailed the nature of French Revolutionary Jacobinism as religion in *A Decade of Revolution* (Harper, 1934). See also his illuminating study, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Norton, 1938). Students of the psychology of religion and revolution owe much to these insights.

[5] For the Marxist viewpoint, *cf.* David Guest, *A Textbook of Dialectical Materialism* (International, 1939). For a study of Marxism, *cf.* M. M. Bober, *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History* (2nd edit., Harvard, 1948).

on much of its authority. So thorough and so ardent is this endless mastication of accepted principles that the loose comparison with mediæval scholastic argumentation comes inevitably to mind. In addition, communist doctrine, though barely a century old, appears already to be static. Authority is firmly attached to it. Deviation from it is not permitted any more than deviation in Catholic thought is permitted beyond limits prescribed by ecclesiastical authority. The degree of adherence to doctrine among the convinced and "overconvinced" disciples of Marx often seems to go well beyond the disciplined acceptance of orders and to involve individual emotional devotion.[6]

The operation of authority in communism and in traditional western religion is a recurrent theme even in a sketch of this brevity, since it lies so much at the heart of both, whether in the literal sense or as implied in their common claim of sole access to significant knowledge. Besides tradition and the law the secondary or interpretive avenues to certainty relevant to communism and religion include prophecy and revelation. Here, as in other regions, a comparison will hardly be welcomed by the principals, yet the similarities are plain.

J. W. Allen remarks of the Puritans[7] that they were characterized by an inability to see how anyone could honestly disagree with them, and hence attributed dishonesty to all their opponents. A more apt description of the contemporary communist attitude toward noncommunists would be difficult to imagine. Any opinion contrary to Marxist doctrine is regarded as deliberate deceit for purposes of material gain and maintenance of class control. Fanatic self-deception of this kind is a religious trait marking the prophetic mood in an early stage, its arrogant self-assurance built upon presumption of direct access to ultimate truth and a tremendous feeling of moral obligation to preach that truth.

The reverse attitude of traditional Christianity toward its communist opponent may be recognized as basically the same uncompromising commodity, but in a more advanced and mellowed stage in which the accumulated keenness of centuries of institutional experience tends to modify in some degree the underlying absolutism.

Perhaps no term applied to any part of communism could be less welcome than revelation. This dead-pan school would have its faith regarded as precise induction from observation scientifically conducted, its doctrines seen as based on laws observed to be working in history. The exact extent to which communist doctrines do represent the realities of social change must be left for definition by the social sciences. The philosophy of history is a highly interpretive subject, as its theorists have

[6] For example, *cf.* M. M. Bober, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

[7] J. W. Allen, *English Political Thought, 1603-1644* (London, 1938), chap. 5.

shown from Amos of Tekoa to Arnold Toynbee. Marx's patterns have already had to suffer modifications in the face of fact; evangelical predictions also commonly must. As Pauline Christianity stuttered through its early centuries explaining why Jesus had not yet reappeared in glory, so communism now flaps a frantic tongue, foretelling the imminent dissolution of the west and the accession of the New Jerusalem of Marx to power. Apologetics are neither new nor merely old.

In any theory some empirical observation is present. But observe that neither communism nor unmodified Christianity is concerned with the immediate and present world. Both reject this world in favor of a world to come. The Christian advent is presumed to be spiritual; the communist advent is presumed to be material. But both are worlds other than this one; both will arrive after a period of preparation and by means of a catastrophic passing of the present into the future—revolution in the doctrine of communism—involving elements of final judgment, disposal of nonconformists, and rule by the elect, corresponding to elements in the Christian conception of judgment and salvation. The eschatological nature of the communist idea is apparent.

How does anyone predict a world to come which is different in kind from the present world? Whence does knowledge of an ideal world derive? Christianity and communism alike assert that their respective ideal states have never existed on this earth. Can a totally other be forecast in terms of an actual? The ideal state itself and the means of reaching it must in each case be defined through faith.

Both traditional Christianity and communism claim to possess the truth and to be absolute in knowledge of significant things. In Christianity this knowledge is obtained by revelation through the Scriptures. In communism the type of knowledge is similar; the scripture is similar; the psychological process of acquiring certainty is similar. For both these schools the human individual is rarely influential; it is not clear even to what degree the individual can assist or retard the drives of history and environment. The problem of the new is the same for both Christianity and communism. True knowledge of new things has to come from outside the system, for the system does not contain it. Knowledge received by a system from outside is in effect revealed to it.

Christianity has long since realized the eschatological nature of its conception of the kingdom of God and has been enabled thereby to develop realistic "interim" policies for dealing practically and effectively with the affairs of this world instead of insisting upon direct and exclusve preparation for the second coming. Communism in its youth still has painful lessons to learn in this respect. The same realization is implied in its political philosophy of the interim dictatorship, but its day-to-day activities

in the west are still largely millennial in character rather than realistic—in that they prepare directly for the advent of an ideal state which is by definition impossible of realization in mind or society, given the limitations of human and natural equipment. The disillusionment in store for young and sincere believers in the coming of the communist kingdom is pathetically great. If some communist leaders are emancipated from the idealism of the eschatological view and are interested solely in the interim objective of attaining and holding power at any price (even the price of destroying the genius of their movement), their efforts must merely be countered as any minor fascist threat is countered. By and large the treatment suggesting itself is that accorded to the sect of Jehovah's Witnesses: freedom to valve their steam, freedom of action insofar as it does not interfere with the freedom of others—*and* use of democratic methods to reduce genuine grievances which feed the fascist cause. This aspect of the problem will recur below.

It will be understood that the genius of an eschatological point of view lies in its juxtaposition of the possible and the impossible, the practical and the ideal. This has in fact been the central compulsion of Christianity throughout its history, and the mark of its achievement. Other things being equal, similar achievement awaits the similar movement which balances water on both shoulders in like manner. But it will not do for such a movement to relax into simple otherworldliness, or yet to forget the ideal for concern only with the immediate. History passes a sentence of death upon failure in either respect.

A brief glance at the likeness of communism to a church is now in order. The notion of such a comparison is not new, nor does it require much imagination to see the communist party as a variety of church. In communism the average man must submit to party leaders, and in orthodox religion to the hierarchy. Discipline is imposed upon each membership from above. Distinctive gradations of achievement and status are awarded in both groups.

The existence of ritual and ceremony in French Revolutionary Jacobinism of the 1790's has been described by Professor Brinton in *A Decade of Revolution.*[8] What formal rites are operative in the revolutionary cults of the mid-twentieth century? That there must be some in so tightly organized a group as communism may be supposed, whether or not they are recognized as such. Careful comparisons of persuasions-to-communism with conversions-to-religion have probably not been made; the existence of similarities can reasonably be suspected.

Guerard observes of Napoleon III that he stood for order as the first step in the establishment of the ideal condition of socialism.[9] Some

[8] Chaps. 6, 11; see (*supra*) note 4.

[9] Albert Guerard, *Napoleon III* (Harvard, 1943).

say that Napoleon III was the first of the modern fascist-type rulers;[10] or, if he appears too gentle beside our Hitlers, at least that he was an early stage in the line of political development which produced the more accomplished dictators of the twentieth century. Certainly the prerequisite of order and discipline is a mark of the contemporary communist party on all its levels. Likewise in the demand of the orthodox churches for discipline prior to consideration of individual variation is perceived the prime element of order. The preëstablishment of order would seem to be a general demand of absolutism, and should perhaps be recognized as a religious trait, at least in the traditional sense.

Obvious in Marxist literature is the moral indictment of a society newly dominated by the machine.[11] So is it obvious in various sections and periods of the church. The presence of "concern," in the Quaker phrase, is again a telltale symptom of an operating religious psychology, whether within or without the recognized churches. The parallel runs even farther. The social quest of communism suffers from a negative, backward-looking mood of longing for the relatively primitive days of no machines, or fewer machines, or less complex machines; it is apt to oppose technological change as such on the basis of its immediate impact on labor, instead of studying methods of harnessing technological change in the interest of labor and of all concerned. Remark in this the greybeard theme of so many of man's religions, primitive and contemporary: the theme of the golden age, when the world was young and happy, and sin was not.

Stranger groups in history have been usefully compared to churches. The famous "new model army" of Cromwell's England behaved like a church in one period of its existence, but as a congregational-type church in which conclusions were derived from extended popular discussions in the ranks[12] rather than exclusively from reference to superior authority.

The rôle of violence takes signal place in these reflections, since in its attitude to the arbitrary use of force a movement breaks out its true allegiance and the portent it holds for the democratic way. General Eisenhower's is the most recent of many recognitions that the use of force is an extension of political policy.[13] One might add: of any policy in which particular wills seek to implement themselves in action. Mediæval Catholic use of the Inquisition and Calvinist violence against sectarians were not accidents in the history of churches. Both were extensions of religious (and political) policy into "the field of force." Both are directly comparable to the communist attitude toward violence.

[10] For example, Professor Donald McKay, of Harvard.

[11] M. M. Bober, *op. cit.*, chap. 3.

[12] Military people should read the history of the "new model" to appreciate what can occur in the way of democratic behavior, discussion, even technical insubordination, in an army, without military disintegration. Orientation programs in the services might benefit.

[13] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Doubleday, 1948), p. 88.

American Protestant sects in colonial times were driven into mutual toleration by their numbers and by the impracticability of domination by any one of them.[14] Toleration became necessary less on principle than as a matter of mere survival. Protestants commonly assume that their churches have learned to get along without assistance from the state. Perhaps they have, but it is well to bear in mind that the Protestant churches have been in their historic origin fully as absolutist and uncompromising as any other religious position ever taken. Precisely what the Protestant potential for intolerance might be, given encouraging circumstances, is a question not lightly answered. Many contemporary Protestants may perhaps be relatively unacquainted with the official positions of their respective churches, or with the implications of those positions.

Catholicism is said to be a series of different churches in different countries—French Catholicism one thing, American another. Regional practices vary; but in general with Catholicism as with Protestantism the use of force is no longer politic in this country, albeit American channels of communication are familiar with various forms of quiet pressure. The potential of political and intellectual repression is as much a question with Catholicism as with any religious position, perhaps pointedly so since the Jesuit statement of Catholic policy.[15]

For any group claiming sole access to absolute truth it is entirely logical to use force to wring conformity from unbelievers. After all, unbelievers are wrong; and to be wrong is evil. To burn a mediæval heretic for the glory of God was also to do for the sinner the sober service of terminating his sin. Suppression of unsuitable literature is perfectly logical, given the premise of sole access to truth, to prevent contamination of the innocent reader. Is it far from this to the political and intellectual manipulation of the individual in behalf of the purposes prescribed by communism?

The degree to which communist absolutism parallels the religious is also seen in its attitudes toward more moderate groups of the left wing. The conviction of absolute rectitude on the part of any absolutist group is endangered by the activity of a moderate group which claims to traffic in the same commodity. Herein is rooted the studied anger of communists against socialist and labor groups which they cannot contrive in some manner to control. Such advocates of "gradual social evolution" undercut the absolute communist demand for power on its own terms by doing peacefully what communism declares can be done only by violence under communist leadership.

Certain conclusions follow from all this.

[14] Willard L. Sperry, *Religion in America* (Macmillan, 1946).
[15] *Time*, June 28, 1948.

Like Protestantism and Catholicism, communism is one of the most obvious absolutisms ever to stalk the boards of intellectual history. Ideas are, as everything else in the Marxist view, relative to and dependent upon economic conditions. But, as Bober observes,[16] the relativity of ideas is not admitted by Marx to be a notion which is itself relative, subject to modification at the beck of changing conditions. Economic environment is the absolute in communist theory, and the construction of absolutes should be recognized as a traditionally religious type of thought, shielded from pervasive empiricism and the piecemeal assembly of evidence by the effort of the normative thinker to produce a consistent and particular result. Universalistic interpretations have their usefulness, and to them mankind will return again and again. But there is no excuse for not recognizing absolutisms for what they are.

Since Catholicism is foremost among the militant orthodoxies of the present time, continuing conflict is to be expected between it and communism. This war will be between groups having forms, methods, and some objectives largely in common. Of the two, insofar as physical violence is a thing of the past and in terms of the possibility of freedom through independence, Catholicism is to the liberal observer far in advance of communism.[17] Any absolute system is a potential menace to that state of relative freedom in which the greatest number may strive for their conception of the greatest good. The position of any church on the problem of absolutism should be a matter of specific public record in a democracy, and the failure to make it so constitutes the mounting of a permanent threat against freedom. As between these two, however, communism may be considered as still in the more primitive, early stage of development in which it has not yet learned to add compromise to its absolutism and to live in peace with those who disagree—relying upon methods of democratic persuasion to promote its viewpoint. Its use of violence is much nearer the surface. Catholicism has the tremendous advantage of sophistication; and for all the risks of subtle pressure let it not be supposed that this restraint is without its value when open force contends with freedom.[18]

Catholicism cannot help but feel that communism is a menace. Any highly similar but significantly differing sect has always been felt to be a menace to the main stem of Christian tradition. But it is difficult to imagine that communism could ever win against Catholicism. Overt attacks on Catholic leaders, whatever the undetermined rights and wrongs, have merely allowed the Catholic church to declare public war on communism,

[16] Bober, *op. cit.*, chap. 6.

[17] A strictly moral comparison is not attempted in this survey.

[18] Note the Leninist advance over the Terrorists of nineteenth-century Russian history. Lenin abandoned terror as an inefficient propaganda method. He retained the use of force and revolution by a minority. *Cf.* David Shub, *Lenin.*

and have perhaps been a fatal error in recent communist strategy. Catholicism has had fifteen hundred years of experience in dealing with lay religions, dissident sects, and autocratic governments; it will be at no eventual loss in dealing with communism. And it will never give up, though centuries pass. Communism as a religion has no ultimate chance.

The lasting contribution to human thought which Marxist theory can make may well be first in its rational emphasis on the economic motive as one among the movers of history. For this enormous service mankind will owe a debt to Marx as great as that to Freud. Beyond this a deeper function will be performed. The communist emphasis on social change through fascist means will heighten the challenge to the west to meet similar problems through democratic means. The west must learn that to meet the political challenge of communism it must surpass it in political achievement of social ends. Thus by a kind of electriclike induction the greatest service of this latest of the schismatic sects will be rendered to the mother stem.

For the rest, the rational elements of communism will make a contribution as ideas of any kind should be free to do. The nonrational elements, while explaining much of its form and behavior and lengthening its hold on life, labor at a sharp disadvantage against older and wiser opponents. The difference between the relative durability of Protestantism and the brief life-expectancy of communism, both being considered in relation to Catholicism, lies in this region. Communism comes too late and feebly on the ground. Insofar as this is a religious struggle—which it is in part and only in part—it is an unequal contest of psychologies, and Antæus will win against Hercules.

Observers of contemporary events may suppose, however, that the war between communism and Catholicism is not the main show in the religious affairs of our time or of any time. The direction above all others in which a religion must expend its greatest effort is that of unbelief—indifference, secularism with respect to religion in general, utter lack of interest—not the direction of idolatry, which is religious effort in a different area. Religious activity of any genuine kind, whether within or without a recognized church, argues the presence of "concern," and traditional Christianity knows what to do with that. Conscientious paganism, in the long view, has not been the most formidable obstacle in the march of the Catholic church. The greater threat to an experienced religion continues to be indifference to all belief rather than the activity of an inimical belief.

It is by no means clear that Catholicism has diverted its major forces from the war against secularism to the noisy front it maintains against communism. It is not clear that it will have to do so.

OLD AND NEW LIBERALISM IN SWISS THEOLOGY

FRITZ BURI
Universities of Basel and Bern

JAWOHL! despite Karl Barth and Emil Brunner and despite the disrepute that befell liberalism as a result of totalitarian thinking, there is still in Switzerland today a liberal theology—not something empty, to be sure, a museum piece from the nineteenth century, nor even from before World War I, but a thoroughly new yet nevertheless liberal, theology. It stands in just as lively opposition to contemporary neoörthodoxy, as it does to the old, classical liberalism.

But one no longer knows today what classical liberal theology was, for in its golden age, and not only in Switzerland, it was only a partially liberal theology. But if the new liberal theology in Switzerland is to have its say, it is necessary first of all briefly to sketch its spiritual ancestry.

The Old Liberalism in Swiss Theology

Representatives of this classical liberal theology in Switzerland were Alois Emil Biedermann (1819-1885) of Zürich and Hermann Lüdermann (1842-1929) of Bern. As far as the *theory of knowledge* is concerned, both Biedermann and Lüdermann based their ideas on the principle that in questions of truth, even in the realm of faith, reason was decisive. Thus they neither acknowledged the combination of the natural truth of reason with the supernatural truth of revelation, as Catholic theology and Old Protestant orthodoxy do—even less did they admit an exclusive supernatural revelation, as is the case in Neo-Calvinism—nor did they accept a specifically religious way of knowledge, as some modern tendencies in Protestantism now try to defend. Since reason was the unique source of knowledge for them, they employed it in interpreting not only biblical and ecclesiastical tradition, but also religious experience. For these theologians there was no double system of truth and ultimately no opposition between philosophy and theology. All true philosophy developed necessarily into theology, or as James Martineau put it in his *Study of Religion:* "You cannot make the slightest concession to metaphysics without ending in theology." In addition, all true theology had to prove its claim to philosophical argument. Or in the words of Albert Schweitzer: "Christian faith is to me the deepest philosophy."

In this repudiation of all supernatural theology and in the preservation of a purely natural revelation, these liberal theologians, Biedermann and Lüdermann, were the true offspring of the criticism of dogma as made

by the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, which in itself was but the consequence of the repudiation of the authority of church tradition by the Reformers in favor of the inner testimony of the holy spirit.

To this first characteristic of a classical liberal theology as an uncompromising natural and rational theology, we now add its *doctrine of God,* the method by which our predecessors built up the natural theory of the knowledge of God. We must stress the fact that both Biedermann and Lüdermann interpreted this rational theology as a universal teleology, that is, as a finalistic system embracing the whole of being, in which the value and aim of every individual have their foundation and in which all problems can be solved. It would lead us too far astray to explain how they developed this system, for in these not very easily understood systems the epistemological part is extremely difficult. Let me only say that Biedermann and Lüdermann could reach this teleological definition of all being with the help of idealistic speculation, for which the spirit always is the decisive thing and the nonspiritual nothing more than the material at the disposition of the creative mind. For Lüdermann the aim of our will is reality as such. He believed that it is realized by the mere fact of its being thought, or that it would be necessarily realized, because "it would be nonsense to think that the aim of the world could be forfeited." Even these ideas and their speculative form according to their spiritual attitude are foreign to us. Yet one thing must be recognized in those systems, namely, that they are the expression of a wonderful spiritual freedom. Spirit forms matter, so they said. And they added that matter lets itself be formed by the spirit. It is destined to be material for the Spirit. History represents a process which is perpetually perfecting itself. In this process even evil has its meaning. In God everything is light. The evolution of the cosmos rushes onward towards this light that more and more reveals itself. This natural evolution, then, represented for this old liberal theology the substitution of the biblical plan of salvation as it was conceived in traditional theology, a theology that could not withstand the criticism of historical research.

This brings us to the third characteristic of classical theological liberalism, its interpretation of the traditional *doctrine of the work of Christ.* As is well known, both Roman Catholic and Old Protestant theology maintain that the work of Christ consists in the atoning death of the man-God (Christ) and that the sacraments founded on that atonement can only be administered by the church. To this corresponds Luther's doctrine of justification by faith. Since the days of the first century this doctrine has been weakened by the criticism of the Bible and of dogma. Of the doctrine of the two natures of Jesus Christ, there remains in old Swiss theology only the man Jesus, and of his redemptive work only

Schleiermacher's idea of a creative archetype, or simply the idea of a moral example. But even so the foundation of faith in the historical personality of Jesus, which had become the vision of the nineteenth century, seemed problematic. The object of historical research could only be of relative importance, whereas faith needed a foundation in the absolute. An essential value of this speculative liberal theology is undoubtedly the fact that it saw in due time the danger that menaced religious belief in historical research. It tried, therefore, to make faith independent of history, and achieved this by formulating a religious Christian principle on the basis of the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, a principle that later found its most important representative in Jesus Christ.

To continue, the main characteristics of Biedermann's and Lüdermann's theology were reason as the supreme criterion of universal teleology and a Christian principle essentially independent of history. It is this type of theology that is currently condemned as old-fashioned and thereby dismissed as utterly outdated.

We liberals of the present day also criticize this liberal theology of a former century. But, by the very act of objective criticism, we appreciate this theology as of more value than that type of thinking which in our time dominates the theological arena. Whereas neoörthodoxy does not wish to discuss these questions with theologians of the Biedermann type and would rather confirm itself in its notion of supernatural revelation, we think that real discussion with this old liberalism is possible and that thereby its vitality is proved. We shall try, therefore, to describe our present position on the three characteristics we have been discussing and thereby explain what we mean by "the new liberalism."

The New Liberalism in Swiss Theology

As to the *epistemological principles* or theory of knowledge, we can be brief, for we profess to be in the same position today and find that we cannot present anything better. (Though not in respect to details, even the Neo-Kantian dialectical theology might learn something from Lüdermann's criticism of Kant.) We disagree but little with Lüdermann's basic conviction that in both faith and theology there is a special object that cannot be apprehended except by special methods, as is likewise the case in other sciences. Nevertheless, neither this special object nor the supposedly supernatural methods used to apprehend it can be distinguished from those of any other science. Theology and philosophy are inseparable and each dares not claim its own exclusive measure of truth. For truth is a rational concept and means nothing more than a clear designation of a reality that can be experienced. Even if we are not rationalists, who think that reason is able to apprehend reality, still less that reality is

produced by reason; we nevertheless acknowledge that rational truth is our aim. We have seen where mankind is led when it abandons itself to the irrational, as in the theology built on the sufficiency of the Word of God or as in many pseudoliberal forms of theology, which only accentuate religious emotion. But today, by the partisans of dialectical theology, as well as by those of modern relativism, the principle of reason is repudiated on the basis that human reason itself is relative and fallible. We maintain, in opposition to those voices, that reason, conscious of its limitations, is always superior to reason which condemns itself to incompetence; because now, as always, the incompetence of reason has to be demonstrated by rational arguments. Today, therefore, when every sort of rationalism has so little prestige, we cling unconditionally to a rational criterion of truth, especially in theology. While we young liberals in our days of antiliberalism maintain the older point of view on this first point, we are unable to profess the same adherence to the other two points, and so we must find new ways.

Next a word as to *the conception of God:* it is by no means only in consequence of the decay of our civilization, due to two world wars, that today we are not able to maintain the optimistic belief in a universal teleology. To be sure, this decay has had some influence on our ideas, but this optimism has always been a weak point in liberal theology. Even before the rise of the dialectical theology there had been poets and thinkers who had a quite different view of the world—for instance, the philosopher Eduard von Hartmann and the two Swiss poets Widemann and Spitteler. In accordance with their conception of the darkness and the problems of life, these philosophers condemned modern Christianity as superficial and unreal, because they knew no other forms. But like every other speculative system, Christianity has been from its very beginning keenly aware of evil and sin. Because of this knowledge, not only in the New Testament, but also in the Old, there is the expression of hope for a new and perfect creation. The Bible is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. It neither denies evil nor does it melt away into melancholy. It contains both poles, the greatness and glory of God's creation and its abysmal perdition. In the Old Testament we not only read that creation is good, but also that there is a hidden God, whose thoughts and ways differ infinitely from the ways and thoughts of man. This twofold conception is further confirmed by the New Testament, insofar as an actual victory over evil is announced, while, at the same time, the gospel, which should conquer the world, again and again becomes problematic by not being fulfilled. This dialectical opposition between the meaningful and the meaningless in all existence, as we find it in the Bible, is confirmed by the deeper interpretation of world and self. Today, therefore, the apprehension of the divine mystery

as the final root and abyss of being, is the opposite of the universal teleology of classical liberalism. In this way only are we able to formulate a belief in God, which is not postulated by human reason (subject to the criticism of Feuerbach), but which is a reality accessible to experience and a truth creative of social unity.

And now we come to the third point, *the theory of salvation.* This has become something very different from the Christian principles of classical liberalism. For us salvation actually means the possibility of inner freedom against the world, a freedom that enables us by spiritual love to act sensibly and meaningfully in a senseless world. However active we may be, this possibility is always a gift of the special grace of God. But we cannot now see in Jesus, as he was conceived by the older liberals, an expression of this reality of salvation. Much less can we accept their view of Jesus. As an authentic interpretation of the data of the New Testament, the so-called historical Jesus of the nineteenth century is but the product of speculative reason. He has as little saving power as had the old rationalistic optimism. It is Albert Schweitzer who has once and for all revealed that this liberal conception of Jesus belongs to the realm of phantasy.

Instead of this modern phantasy we return today to the primæval and eternal myth of Christ, which was the fountain from which sprang the testimony of the New Testament itself. This Christological myth of the mission of the divine healer to a world possessed by demons, that he might conquer them and thus initiate the era of perfection, is nothing more than an expression of the saving crisis in human existence. Whenever the crisis of man's destiny arises and the gift of grace is given to him so that he may not only endure the crisis, but also make it a condition of creative work, then this myth becomes reality, according to the New Testament idea of "new being" or of "rebirth." But in the New Testament this is grace—and it still is today. Though introducing itself at a very inopportune time, this new theological liberalism does not ultimately depend upon its name for its success; for, with its idea of truth as a rational clarity producing community, with its illusionless conceptions of God reaching toward the abyss, and finally with its Christological understanding as the expression of a real, experienceable salvation, this new liberal theology may correspond to the searching and questioning of modern man. In any case, it is closer to an answer to our ultimate problems than the orthodoxy that serves up again and again the fairy tales of a dead liberalism.

THE KINGDOM—WHEN AND WHERE?

GILBERT COPE
University of Birmingham, England

One of the most controversial sayings attributed to Jesus is: "The kingdom of God is *entos humōn.*"[1] The problem as it is presented in the English versions is the choice between two translations: 1. "within you" (text), and 2. "among you" (AVm) or "in the midst of you" (RVm). It would thus appear that there is some doubt whether Jesus said that the "kingdom" was 1. something which was in the nature of an interior personal experience, *i.e.,* a private individual relationship between each person as subject and God as king, or 2. a new social order of human relationships which God had initiated by Jesus, and which was already "in the midst" of the contemporaries of Jesus in the theocratic movement he was organizing—the beginnings of the new divine commonwealth.

These two interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, though those who emphasize the former generally exclude the latter. We propose to discuss the fuller implications of the two views. But we must also ask whether these two alternatives really exhaust the possibilities. Is no other approach to be made?

In all studies of a saying attributed to Jesus there are five main questions to be answered:

1. Did Jesus actually use the words attributed to him, and, if so, to whom was he speaking and how was the saying understood by those who heard?
2. In the period during which the words of Jesus were recalled, translated, recorded, and arranged in the gospel record, has the original meaning of the saying been preserved, or have subsequent conditions and beliefs substantially modified its content?
3. What did the writers of the gospel record think the saying meant, and how may it be interpreted in relation to other sayings of a similar character and in the context in which it is presented?
4. How has the saying been interpreted in the history of the church?
5. What is the significance of the saying today—nineteen hundred years after it was recorded?

The above questions have been posed in chronological order, but in attempting to answer them we have always to start with No. 3. We have first to ascertain, from a linguistic study, what the words of a saying *could* mean, and then, secondly, we have to try to estimate what was their probable interpretation in the mind of the evangelist, taking into account (a) their immediate literary context, and (b) their relationship to similar sayings in the gospel record.

[1] Luke 17:21.

On linguistic grounds it seems that much of the evidence points to "within you" as the meaning of *entos humōn.* Even so, this evidence is curiously inconclusive, and it cannot be categorically stated that *entos humōn*="an interior personal experience of yours" or "within your individual hearts," and that no other translation is possible. In the New Testament *entos* is used only once elsewhere, *viz.,* "Cleanse first the *entos* of the cup,"[2] and though the common sense of this is the "inside" of the vessel, we may notice that this is not the same as "within the substance" of the cup. In the LXX Greek version of the Old Testament, however, *entos* is generally used with reference to the supposed locus of the human emotions, *e.g.,* "My heart was hot *within* me,";[3] "Bless the Lord, O my soul, and all that is *within* me . . . ;[4] "My bowels sound like a harp for Moab, and mine *inward parts* for Kir-heres."[5] The exception to this anatomical use is to be found in the somewhat obscure, but intriguing, description of a conveyance (said to have been designed by Solomon) which had *in the midst of it* a "pavement of love"[6]—here we have *entos* used of something which is localised in a specified place and which is surrounded by other things. In classical Greek there are a few isolated examples of *entos* used in the sense of "within certain limits," so that *entos humōn* linguistically could mean "within your circle" or "amongst your group" or "in your number." Attention has recently been drawn[7] to a letter written *c.* A.D. 270 by a Greek doctor on active service: he wrote "Send me the woollen jacket that I may have it with me (*entos mou auto heuro*)." Here the sense is of something *external* being "in my possession (or control)," or "within my reach." On these grounds it is suggested that *entos humōn* in Luke could be translated "with you, in your possession, if you want it, now."

Before we leave the linguistic problem of the single word *entos,* we may profitably ask what alternatives were available to Luke. It is at once obvious that had he wished to convey the unambiguous meaning "in the midst of" he could have used some formation of *mesos,* as, indeed, he does on a number of occasions: *e.g.,* "the demon had thrown him down in the midst";[8] "Rise up and stand forth in the midst";[9] "He himself stood in the midst of them."[10] Not only does Luke avoid a definite "in your midst,"

[2] Matt. 23:26.
[3] Psalm 38(39):3.
[4] Psalm 102(103):1.
[5] Isa. 16:11.
[6] Song 3:10.
[7] Colin H. Roberts, "The Kingdom of Heaven," in *Harvard Theological Review,* Vol. XLI, No. 1.
[8] Luke 4:35.
[9] Luke 6:8.
[10] Luke 24:36. *Cf.* Luke 4:30; 5:19; 21:21; 22:27; Acts 2:22; 27:21.

but equally avoided is a definite "in your hearts" (*kardia*). Such a phrase is used by Paul (*inter alia*) *e.g.*, "ye are in our hearts."[11]

It is not unreasonable to conclude that: 1. the original Aramaic phrase seemed to require a Greek word other than either *mesos* or *kardia, i.e.*, that it was itself ambiguous; or 2. a deliberate ambiguity was introduced at some stage of translation or transmission; or 3. the phrase is not a genuine utterance of Jesus at all, but is a pious doctrinal fiction introduced for a specific purpose (see below). The words are peculiar to Luke, and we may surmise whether they came from his special source and were, therefore, unknown to Mark and Matthew, or whether they were in Q and were omitted by Matthew because he considered them either unauthentic or incomprehensible.

The avoidance of *kardia* is particularly striking because close to the saying under consideration we find: "Ye [Pharisees] are they that justify yourselves in the sight of men; but God knoweth your hearts (*kardias*): for that which is exalted among men is an abomination in the sight of God."[12] This is important, because it is argued by some that God's knowledge of the hearts of the Pharisees corresponds to his "reign" in their hearts (which they do not accept), and that this, in turn, is to be equated with the "kingdom of God." The obvious weakness of the argument is that text and context give no support whatever—on the contrary the saying is reduced to nonsense, thus: "Ye [Pharisees] are they that justify yourselves in the sight of men; *but the kingdom of God is in your hearts:* for that which is exalted in the sight of men is an abomination in the sight of God"(!)

In order to try to estimate which of the above alternative conclusions is most probable we must now pass to a consideration of the other significant words of the saying, *viz.*, "kingdom of God" and "you."

What we come to believe Jesus meant by "kingdom of God" will depend in no small measure upon the interpretation we give to this saying; therefore, to avoid a circular argument, we will first consider *humōn,* and the immediate context of the saying in Luke. The first thing to notice is that "you" is plural, and that this fact militates strongly in favor of translating *entos* as "among," or at least "within your reach," and not in any individualistic way. Secondly, Luke makes "you" refer to the Pharisees, and presents the saying as part of the answer to their question about *"when* the kingdom of God cometh." Characteristic of the Pharisees was their belief that strict observance of the Mosaic law was a necessary condition for the coming of the Messianic kingdom, and this enquiry is really a hostile question on the attitude of Jesus to the law. With his usual skill,

[11] II Cor. 7:3. *Cf.* Mark 7:18 f.; Luke 1:51; Acts 5:3; Rom. 1:9 f.; Phil. 1:7.
[12] Luke 16:15.

Jesus avoids a direct answer, but implies that strict observance of the law is not a prerequisite of the coming of the kingdom. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation (*paratērēsis*)." Once more, we have considerable ambiguity—probably a deliberate pun—for *paratēreo* has two clear meanings: 1. to watch closely (with evil intent), *e.g.*, "they (the Pharisees) were watching him";[13] 2. scrupulously to observe ceremonial —*cf.* AVm "the kingdom of God cometh not with outward shew," and "Ye *observe* days and months, seasons and years."[14] (There is even the possibility of a double pun, for a third meaning of *paratēreo* might be to look for the "signs" of the coming kingdom.[15]) In its immediate context the reply of Jesus to the Pharisees is quite characteristic of his extremely critical attitude towards them. His retort is a plain assertion that they are quite incapable of recognizing the kingdom, and that it is something entirely apart from their "observation"—in any sense of the word.

Now comes the critical question for us. Did Jesus then go on to say that "the kingdom of God" was either (a) "within you Pharisees," or (b) "in the actual possession of you Pharisees," or (c) "in the midst of you Pharisees"? Interpretation (a) applies to an individual *interior* personal feeling, but both (b) and (c) must refer to something *external.*

Before we proceed further, we must recognize the two senses inherent in the term "kingdom"—a duality which exists in both the Hebrew word (*malkuth*) and in the Greek word which translates it (*basileia*). This duality consists in the use of the same term for both the abstraction and the concrete reality: thus "kingdom" comprehends both a "sovereignty" ("kingly rule," "reign," etc.) *and* a territory, its people and their social order. In Luke we read how "a certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom."[16] Here the emphasis is on the abstract sovereignty, but, immediately, mention is made of the citizens who "sent an ambassage after him saying, 'We will not that this man reign over us,' "[17] and thus the emphasis is shifted to the actual community which constitutes the kingdom. From this it is clear that one word "kingdom" is used of *two aspects of the same thing.* We must avoid falling into the error of separating these two aspects and imagining that there are two separate things. This is precisely what is done by many commentators when they try to expound the meaning of "the kingdom of God."[18]

Returning now to the saying under special consideration, we are faced with three main possibilities:

[13] Luke 14:1.
[14] Gal. 4:10.
[15] *Cf.* Luke 12:54-56; 21:29-31.
[16] Luke 19:12.
[17] Luke 19:14.
[18] Readers are invited to apply this test to the following passages: C. H. Dodd, *Parables of the Kingdom,* pp. 34 ff.; A. R. Richardson, *Gospels in the Making,* pp. 138, 143, 148; T. W. Manson, *Teaching of Jesus,* pp. 131 f., 135; E. W. Barnes, *Rise of Christianity,* pp. 134 ff.

I. Jesus did in fact address this saying to the *Pharisees.*

II. Jesus originally addressed this saying to the *disciples* (or some other nonhostile audience), and Luke has either accidentally or deliberately altered the audience in recording it.

III. Jesus did *not* address this saying to anyone, but the words are a pious fiction composed later for a doctrinal purpose.

Let us consider these possibilities in order.

I. From what is written above, it is abundantly clear that if the words were addressed to the Pharisees they can only mean something like this: "The kingdom of God is already here; you Pharisees are unable to recognize it, but, nevertheless, it is actually within your grasp; it is in your midst, among you, as I and my followers are among you; we are the kingdom of God in embryo; we are the seed which grows secretly; we are the grain of mustard seed; we are the leaven in the midst of the lump. You Pharisees are apart from the kingdom of God; for you everything is done in parables; you see, but you do not perceive; you hear, but you do not understand; if you did, you would repent and enter into the kingdom. It is here, but you cannot see it; it is no good looking elsewhere, for it is here; but nobody, and especially you Pharisees, can enter into it unless he becomes as a little child; it is so very hard for rich men to enter into it; blessed are the poor for the kingdom is in their possession; but you, and others like you, shut the kingdom of God against men; you do not go in yourselves, and you hinder those who are entering. Do not be deceived; God takes the kingdom away from the likes of you and gives it to people who by their actions show themselves to be worthy of it. By all human standards it is impossible for your sort to participate in the life of the kingdom, but with God all things are possible, and there may be some of you who, before you die, will realize that the kingdom has indeed come. God knows your hearts but you do not accept his rule, for everything that you value is an abomination to God. People are coming from every quarter, gentiles and Jews, to sit down in fellowship in the kingdom; but you will be filled with remorse when you realize that you are completely excluded from the life of the kingdom, while the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the followers of all the prophets actually share in it. You Pharisees do not see the kingdom because you are not really looking for it—seek and ye shall find—for the simple reason that it is here, *here, under your noses.*"

Everywhere in the New Testament the concept of redemption or salvation is plural and social—just as the Old Testament hope had been. The "kingdom of God" is primarily an ordering of human relationships according to God's requirements of justice and mercy: it is the human community in which God's will for mankind is realized.

II. If it could be shown that the words under consideration were originally addressed, not to the Pharisees, but to the disciples (or some other sympathetic audience), then the case for the purely subjective interpretation might be strengthened. But there is no evidence for such a contention. The speculative restorations of Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 654 suggest that a similar saying about the kingdom was addressed to the disciples in response to a question of Judas (not Iscariot), but these speculations are very far from being conclusive.

If it be that Luke has "accidentally" altered the audience, then nothing more can be said. But if his alteration has been deliberate, then his reason for doing so would be the same as for the "invention" of the saying and incident as a whole (see below). There may be some significance in the fact that the immediately following verse[19] is a saying addressed to the disciples.

III. Finally, let us suppose that the words "the kingdom of God is *entos humōn*" are falsely attributed to Jesus, that the phrase is a doctrinal fiction, and that it was fabricated in an attempt to bridge a gap between what was believed to have been the original teaching of Jesus and some of the beliefs current in the church towards the end of the first century. Thus, by some, Jesus was believed to have predicted a cataclysmic transition from "this *aiōn*" to the new age of the apocalyptic kingdom of God: half a century after his death this had not occurred, but, apparently in its place, the pattern of the fellowship of the Spirit (the church) was rapidly being laid down. The new theocracy had not taken the form of a Messianic kingdom in power on earth, but the Spirit of God was being outpoured on all flesh in the new sacramental movement. To many members of the movement there seemed to be no hope whatever of the overthrow of Roman imperialism; on the contrary, persecution was being intensified and members of the church were being martyred in increasing numbers. That the meek should inherit the earth seemed to be an illusion. But, if the emerging "church" could be identified with the expected "kingdom," then it would be possible to represent this "kingdom" merely as an interior personal experience so far as life on earth was concerned. In this way it could be suggested that the "kingdom" would never be realized on earth in such a way that it would be a recognizable ordering of human relationships under the rule of God.

This identification of the "kingdom" with the international fellowship of the Spirit finds expression elsewhere under the editorship of Luke: the disciples ask the risen Lord: "Lord, dost thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel? And he said unto them, It is not for you to know the times or seasons, which the Father hath set within his own authority.

[19] Luke 17:22.

But ye shall receive power, when the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall be my witnesses both in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa and Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth."[20] Here we have, in anticipation, an explicit rejection of the apocalyptic tradition of the coming kingdom of the Messiah, and its replacement by a much vaguer promise.

Again, in Matthew, we find an identification of the new Christian *ekklēsia* with the "kingdom": "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it. I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. . . ."[21] By anticipation, once more, the authority which belongs to the Messiah is delegated to an "apostle" because the Messiah does not reign himself in the "kingdom." In the light of what was happening at the end of the century, a saying is attributed to Jesus.

With these tendencies abroad, and with such thoughts in mind, a "contributor" to the gospel record may well have used the contemporary literary methods of compilation as follows: he would start with a genuine reply of Jesus to the Pharisees who had asked when the kingdom of God would come: "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation."[22] To this he would add: 1. some words which were part of a warning against "false messiahs,[23] and which he repeats two verses further on in a context similar to that of Mark "neither shall they say, Lo, here! or, There!"[24] and 2. a further saying which is either his own invention, or is derived from a tradition where it was originally addressed to a sympathetic audience, "for lo, the kingdom of God is *entos humōn*."[25]

The fundamental error of this interpretive editing was the excusable failure to envisage the vast scope of human history, and to make allowance for the unknown possibilities ahead. On such a short view, the "kingdom" seemed to be *either* an apocalyptic inrush *or* an interior personal experience. Since the former had not occurred, the latter must replace it. If necessary, some attempt must be made to adjust the written tradition accordingly.

After a further nineteen hundred years, we can see that this "either-or" dilemma was fictitious. In the light of actual historical development, what we have to consider is a "neither-nor" situation, *i.e.*, the "kingdom" is properly thought of neither as an apocalyptic cataclysm nor as an individual cardiac condition. Dialectically speaking, it reflects something of both this thesis and this antithesis, but is properly seen in the synthesis which is being worked out in history: the kingdom comes on earth as the poor

[20] Acts 1:6-8.
[21] Matt. 16:18 f.
[22] Luke 17:20.
[23] Mark 13:21.
[24] Luke 17:21a.
[25] Luke 17:21b.

take hold of their inheritance. Sometimes the process is marked by periods of revolutionary violence; always it needs the acceptance by men "in their hearts" of the principles of justice, mercy, and unselfishness. The "kingdom" is both "in the midst" and "within" in this *new* sense—the sense of the synthesis which is in fact emerging in history, and which is neither strictly apocalyptic nor merely individualistic.

Something of this may after all have been in the mind of our "contributor" to the gospel record. Not only does he use a new and exceptional expression in connection with the "kingdom," but he immediately follows it with another saying attributed to Jesus (Luke only) which suggests the prospect of a series of crises in the development of human history: "The days will come when ye [the disciples] shall desire to see *one of the days of the Son of man,* and ye shall not see it."[26] It may be that, though in the previous verse there is an attempt to shift the meaning of the "kingdom" from something primarily social to something primarily personal, the "contributor" is not himself convinced that this is true. He therefore immediately introduces another saying which is, in fact, a correct description of what does happen in human history. The followers of Jesus long to see one of these crises of divine advance, but not all have that privilege. We who live in one of these days of the Son of man must not fail to recognize it as such and behave accordingly.

[26] Luke 17:22.

"THEIR NURSERY ENDEARMENTS"

ALEXANDER MACKIE
Presbyterian Ministers' Fund

NOTHING which I have read in a long while has done my soul so much good as a statement I recently came across attributed, by the Reverend James W. Alexander, D.D., to the redoubtable Dr. Chalmers. I had always been afraid of the Alexander Family immortalized in Alexander Hall, the famous dormitory of the elite, on the campus of The Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church at Princeton, New Jersey, and in the Byzantine Roman Catholic Mosque on the campus of Princeton University. The Alexanders always seemed to me stern and forbidding and far away and integral parts of the Presbyterianism of yesterday. But when I read the *Familiar Letters of James Wadell Alexander, D.D.,* I felt his hand in mine and I said to myself, "Well, even in those days—a century ago—there were not only giants in the land but men of like passions with ourselves." And so I thanked God and took courage.

This is what, *inter alia,* he wrote: "The life of McCheyne humbles me. What zeal and faith! What a proof that Old Calvinism is not insusceptible of being used as an arousing instrument! . . . The book is open to an objection, conveyed me in an anecdote told me by a nice Scotswoman, the other day. Dr. Chalmers said of Burns jr., McCheyne, McDonald, &c: 'These young brethren are doing a good work; but I wish they would have done with their *nursery endearments.*' "[1]

"Their nursery endearments"! Bless the stout heart of old Dr. Chalmers and the stout hearts of all vertebrate Christians! I never knew much about McCheyne. I understood he was somebody very, very wonderful. Dr. Robert E. Speer used to talk about him and Chinese Gordon when I went to Y.M.C.A. meetings in college. But I never knew whether Dr. Speer approved of him one hundred per cent or not. I always felt that McCheyne dwelt in a far, far away land—as far as I was concerned, in a "never, never land"—and I never hoped ever to be like him. But as I grew older and my Christianity moved over from the airy-fairy and sentimental to the ethical and hard-boiled, I grew to wondering whether the great purpose of Christianity was to give unbridled license to the subjective and indefinite to the exclusion of the objective and the practical. And this wonder was accentuated a little by my own experiences with those who seemed to be a little better than the rest of us. These boys appeared to my unregenerate soul, opinionated, somewhat stingy with their money, and just a little bit self-important and vain.

[1] *"Familiar Letters of James W. Alexander, D.D.,"* edited by John Hall, New York, 1860, Vol. II, pp. 11-12.

When the Good Lord in his all-wise Providence sent to England in the eighteenth century a man named John Wesley, he sent to that benighted land—for there was in those days, indeed, darkness over the face of the land—a queer combination of mystic and hard-boiled Christian. Carrying about with him a heart that was "strangely warmed" at Aldersgate, he walked with his feet ever on the ground. He was a sort of combination of "Johnnie-Look-In-The-Air" and the Connecticut Yankee. When certain unruly sisters were constrained to evidence their spirituality by making a disturbance in the service, he acquiesced in the suggestion of his brother Charles that they be ducked in the horsepond just outside the church. But he listened with credulity to stories of ghosts and supernatural visitants. "His sermons," we are told,[2] "certainly owed nothing to the exterior graces of the rhetorician or the orator. He had none of Whitefield's dramatic power. Nor did he covet it. He used to speak with just a little contempt of what he called 'the amorous style of praying and the luscious style of preaching,' which the great pulpit orator allowed himself."

Here we have it again—McCheyne's "nursery endearments" and Whitefield's "amorous style of praying and the luscious style of preaching!" These are a little hard to attain for some of us. And we wonder whether, and we hope that we can be Christians without them.

Let's face the question in a realistic and factual way. Is it absolutely necessary for us to be soft and sentimental in our preaching? Isn't it even possible that we can thus be a little offensive to some of our more intelligent hearers? Are all these illustrations of doubtful authenticity, which we so glibly use, just the best thing for great big healthy men? There is, for example, the story of the little girl who said to her father, or the little boy who said to his Sunday-school teacher, etc. etc. You can fill in the rest of the story to suit your own taste. Did you ever know a child who talked that way outside of a sermon illustration or outside of the pages of "Sunbeam" or whatever the approved title of the primary department weekly literature may be? Were there ever such priggish and even impudent boys and girls in all this world as those who made their ghostly way through the pages of our old Sunday-school library books? Maybe it is just as well that the Sunday-school library has gone, or is going, the way of all flesh.

Unquestionably, the most acceptable type of preaching (certainly among laymen) is the soporific type—preaching that doesn't disturb a busy businessman's thoughts, as, during the morning service, he plans, carefully if not prayerfully, the next week's work. A deep voice, the old shibboleths, an occasional thump on the pulpit—these are the accepted and acceptable *modus operandi* in preaching. Let the preacher mind his busi-

[2] Caleb Thomas Winchester, *The Life of John Wesley*, New York, 1906, p. 121.

ness! This means let him recite the Ten Commandments, but let him be sure never to apply or interpret them. Perhaps this is what is meant by "Let the Church be the Church!"—so popular a topic among our most acceptable pulpiteers a few years ago. Perhaps it might even constitute what Thackeray rather irreverently calls "the sanctified dulness of the faithful"[3] or "the certified *soundness* of dull men" of which Mrs. Oliphant writes in *The Life of Edward Irving.*[4] But let Edward Irving speak for himself: " 'You are content to go back and forward on the same route, like this boat,' he is reported to have said, as the party struck across the swelling waters of the Gair-loch; 'but as for me, I hope yet to go deep into the ocean of truth.' "

There is no doubt that in the communions in which the congregations "call" the minister, willingness to go back and forward over the same route is, in large part, responsible for the present-day flair for young preachers. Few men just out of seminary have begun to do their own thinking. For the most part, they exude the platitudinous instructions of their seminary professors and the choicest gems of *Thirty Thousand Sacred Thoughts.* They are not, early in their ministry, disturbers of thought. They are safe. At least the pulpit committee thinks they are safe, or at least controllable. And they know full well that some of the older men have convictions and are inclined to talk about them.

But I have wandered far afield from the "nursery endearments" of McCheyne and the "amorous style of praying" of George Whitefield. But not so far as one might think! For "nursery endearments" and the "amorous style of praying" are just as dear to the hearts of some feminine-minded contributors as "Tell the preacher to mind his own business" is to the up-and-coming businessman on the pulpit committee.

There is a curious contradiction, let us pause to say, in the injection of the feminine into the religious concept. If we call the roll of women who have exemplified female leadership in the realm of religion, we encounter about as unlovely a group of women as can be found in American history—Jemima Wilkinson, of Colonial New England; Anne Lee, high-priestess of the Shakers; the Fox sisters, of the Rochester Rappings; and last but not least, Mary Baker Eddy, of Christian Science fame. They all wore pants when they should have worn panties.

The other side of the picture is in the deification of Mother's Day which has lead to the recent and extraordinary assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. There is more sound religion and more sound normal psychology in gospel hymns like "Have Thine Own Way, Lord," "Safe

[3] William Makepeace Thackeray, *Contributions to Punch,* London and New York, 1905, p. 540.
[4] Margaret O. W. Oliphant, *The Life of Edward Irving,* London, 1862, Vol. I, p. 143.

in the Arms of Jesus," or "I Come to the Garden Alone"—far more—than in deifying either Mary Baker Eddy or the Virgin Mary.

Not far removed from the "lovey-dovey" style of preaching is what we might call the "little bitsy-witsy" style of sermonizing. Here we have in prose what we have in Sunday-school hymnological favorites like "Two Little Hands to Work for Jesus" and "Dropping, Dropping, Dropping, Hear the Pennies Fall." I remember how I used to hate with a perfect hatred a number which our Sunday-school superintendent seemed to delight to give out, containing as its choicest lines "We are little friends of Jesus—we are little friends, we are loving friends," etc. etc. My, how I hated it! I wanted to sing something big and masculine like "Yield Not to Temptation." I didn't want, and I don't want, even now, to be a "little friend" either of Jesus or of anybody else.

Don't think for a moment that this business of "bitsy-witsy" Christianity isn't serious business. It is a partial explanation of the decadence of Protestantism and the decline of Protestant leadership in America. Christianity is not little. It is big—the "biggest," if you will pardon my extraordinary superlative—the "biggest" thing in the world.

In ethics, we have been more concerned with the minor moralities than we have been with the weightier matters of the law. Card playing, dancing, theatregoing, coupled with journeys back and forth from supralapsarianism to eschatology are our stock in trade. No wonder people stopped going to church! There is plenty of tripe in the movies. We don't need to go to church to get it.

And people still come to our churches baffled, perplexed, and sorely beaten to see just a ray of light across the darkening landscape of their lives or to hear a word of hope and faith. Shame on us, Christian brothers! Have we nothing to say for and to those who would dare to take arms against a sea of troubles? Can't you, my brother, at long last, to use an old-fashioned phrase, "Speak Just a Word for Jesus"?

There has been too great an emphasis also upon making the gospel simple. The gospel itself is essentially simple. It is only, it well has been said, "We love Him because He first loved us." Because the gospel is simple, there is no reason to make it silly. The people who come to our churches are familiar with the automobile, the telephone, the radio—and I am sorry to say—television. They dwell in the wonderworld of Jules Verne come to life. And we preach to them out of the old hornbook, beginning "A is for Adam" or "In Adam's fall, we sinned all." Let's don't go back to Adam! Let's begin where we are.

When Jesus said, "Suffer the little children to come unto me," he opened a great and effectual door. But he had no intention of making a child's world the only world. While we are busy making the great concepts of Christianity understandable for children, we are frequently insulting

the intelligence of mature scholarly men. Keep this in mind, please, as you go about with your simple talks for simple children. A child who never grows up intellectually is often what is called a moron. Is Christianity moronic? Shall it drag behind the adult intelligence of this age? Or shall it lead?

To those who are interested in the need of money for the Christian enterprise, a further word might well be said. "Bitsy-witsy" preaching means "bitsy-witsy" programs. It means mite societies and piggy banks where it ought to mean a tithe from the millionaire who could and who would be interested in a plan for the kingdom of God as wide and as big as his plans for his own business. Is Ten-Cent Christianity the only kind of Protestant Christianity of which we can think?

Here is another question worth thinking about while we are talking over our problems in homiletics: What or who is the great object in Christian preaching? Oh! You answer readily enough, "The weak brother!" I am reminded of what old disagreeable but nonetheless realistic Francis Landley Patton, sometime one of the great among the demigods of the Presbyterian Church and onetime president of Princeton Theological Seminary, once said. It was to this effect: "The weak brother! That's all we hear. We can't do this and we can't do that on account of the weak brother. I wish to heaven the weak brother would take a brace." So do I.

You will recall the fable of Æsop about the camel's nose. Jesus had a unique mission to the weak and the discarded. Not only did he call the little children unto him, but he called the lame and the halt and the blind—and the demonized. But I do not think that it was the intention of Jesus that the gospel which he proclaimed should be limited to the intellectual possibilities of the handicapped, physically or mentally. It is understandable but it is to be regretted that Christian people should habitually place a higher value on the religious experiences of the abnormal than on those of the normal—if there are such people as normal people. Again we are back to the tendency to confuse the unusual with the religious or the spiritual. The so-called saints are, for the most part, rather objectionable people. Crying out "Woe! Woe!" in a church service, not taking a bath, standing on top of a flagpole, or sitting around in a diaper or lying down on a bed of spikes are among the activities we sometimes denominate "spiritual." And from these dirty pole-sitters and their ilk we have again and again recruited our religious leaders. No wonder American Protestantism, which once furnished the leadership of American life, now lags far behind science and business. "We have piped unto you and ye have not danced," we say in our shrill childish voices to America, to the world of today. Oh! stop piping and dancing around and get down to hard work and hard thought! There is such a thing as common sense and backbone in religion —and American Protestantism needs sorely both these qualities.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

A WORD of warning has been not infrequently sounded in this column against the all too common practice of quoting biblical sayings in support of opinions or ideas remote from the minds of the authors who penned them. Not infrequently that has been done with a willful disregard for the original meaning through but partial quotation, as in the case of the verse judiciously pruned of its concluding three words to stand as a nice text for a sermon for Mother's Day: "For his mother was his counselor." While superficially less perverse and reprehensible, its companion practice can be, and often is, even more dangerous. And that is the habit of quoting a verse out of its context and using it to buttress something totally different. Many such examples could be cited. One is particularly glaring: "And whatsoever is not of faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23).

With an utter disregard for the context which reveals this statement as the sensible conclusion to a tightly knitted and extraordinarily wholesome argument regarding a problem of especial concern to first-century Christians, Augustine took it as the sheet anchor for his contention: *Omnis infidelium vita peccatum est* ("The whole life of unbelievers is sin"). In his treatise *Against Julian* (especially IV, 3) he repeats it a dozen times to support his view that for non-Christians all their deeds, even their virtues, are sins. Since it is by faith alone—and by *faith* he means the acceptance of Christian doctrine—that a man can please God, it followed for him and seemed to him thus attested by Paul, that before a man became a Christian his acts were in the eyes of God uniformly vicious. And this view was to bear much fruit. Both Calvin and Luther asserted it with confidence, the one seeing the acts of unbelievers, "however splendid and excellent in appearance" they might be, as sin, and the other equally insistent that "every one who lacks faith, while he does what is right (*dum bene facit*), sins."

Despite the insistence of the bishop of Hippo and of those who read with his spectacles, this is not what Paul meant, as Chrysostom, among many others, saw clearly. Most modern commentators, quite regardless of their "orthodoxy," agree with the eloquent preacher of Antioch in his sound interpretation: "All this is said by Paul with regard to the preceding argument; it is not a general maxim."

One of the real reasons for the misinterpretation was the failure to see what Paul did (and did not) mean by "faith." For a subsequent generation "faith" was speedily to become "the faith," that is, Christian doctrine. Certainly it has become such for the author of Jude with his famous word: "Contend earnestly for the *faith* which was once for all delivered to the saints." For Paul it is nothing of the sort. Rather it is essentially a quality of life—rich, radiant, vibrant—the quality of life

which actuates and characterizes the new man in Christ. He uses it with various shades of meaning. It is still a word which is alive, which has not been hardened or solidified as was soon unfortunately to be the case.

In this particular chapter his argument is very clear even though the exact circumstance which led up to it may be at this remove a bit uncertain. Apparently his contention is as follows: In some of the groups of early Christians was a tendency to regard certain foods, especially meat and wine, with suspicion. And some Christians were thus inclined to refrain from their use. On the other hand, other Christians with a somewhat immature zeal for their new freedom found especial satisfaction in their use, not so much because they liked their taste as because it proved them to be free and emancipated. This situation constituted an especially thorny problem for Paul, always eager to keep his groups in peace and unity. Forbearance was the essential quality. Each must be tolerant of the other. Actually, in this particular circumstance Paul apparently indicates that he feels the scruples of the weak unfounded in real fact. The matters involved are actually of little consequence, and in the first half of the chapter (verses 1-12) he cracks down on the censorious fussiness of the "weak." If they have these scruples, well and good; they are to realize that it is the concern of God (not of them) to pass final judgment.

But there is another side too. No man lives to himself alone. Whether we will or not, we are our brother's keeper. Thus there is a very real danger lest those who are convinced that they are quite innocent in partaking of these foods and in refraining from observing certain days and seasons may be a source of danger to their less emancipated brethren. If the latter see them so acting, they may well be lured into doing it too —and accordingly acting against the dictates of their consciences. Thus the strong, either unwittingly or indifferently, may easily find themselves in the rôle of injuring a brother for whom Christ died.

Hence Paul's conclusion: The act in itself is of no consequence, but what leads a man so to act is of great concern. If a man complies, not because he is convinced that it is proper, but because he does not want to seem conspicuously different or inferior, he has committed a sin, and a grievous one.

Thus interpreted this word is in precise agreement with an early gloss preserved in a sixth-century manuscript of Luke: "On the same day, seeing one working on the sabbath, Jesus said unto him: 'Man, if indeed thou knowest what thou doest, thou art blessed; but if thou knowest not, thou art cursed and a transgressor of the law.' "

Paul and this other nameless Christian may not have been privileged to take courses in psychology or even clinical work in pastoral counseling: they sounded nonetheless a note which is timeless and which will bear repeating without apology in the year of grace 1951.

From Off the Campus and On

Occasional copies of Crozer Quarterly are returned by the post office because of stale addresses. These are very few in proportion to our mailing list, but we hate to have any. At once we try to get a new and correct address, but that always makes the copy late. In a former day frequently your local post office would attempt to inform you that a piece of mail requiring additional postage was at your old address. At the moment the only thing you can expect from the Post Office Department is slow and indifferent service and rising rates. Therefore, if you move, please send us your new address without delay. We try to be prophetic. We are not clairvoyant.

Dr. Davis is professor of Christian theology at Crozer. He holds degrees from the University of Pittsburgh, Colgate-Rochester, and Yale (Ph.D.). Before coming to Crozer in 1938 he spent several years in the Baptist pastorate. He is a member of the American Theological Society and the author of many articles and reviews. This thoughtful paper was presented at Crozer as the matriculation address in September, 1950.

Dr. Hyatt is professor of Old Testament and director of graduate studies in religion at Vanderbilt, where he has been since 1941. He holds two degrees (B.D. and Ph.D.) from Yale. He is a member of the Old Testament section of the Standard Bible Committee which is at work on the Old Testament volume to complete the *RSV*. Long a member of the Society of Biblical Literature and in 1949-50 the president of its southern section, he was for a term editor of the *Journal of Biblical Literature*.

Mr. Davis is admissions and records officer of Goddard College, Plainfield, Vt. He is a graduate of Harvard in both arts and theology and has done two years additional work in candidacy for his doctorate. For three years he was with the Army Airways Communication System in the Pacific theatre.

Dr. Fritz Buri is a *Dozent* for systematic theology at the Universities of Basel and Bern and editor of *Schweizerische Theologische Umschau*. Long active in the International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom, he is one of the principal leaders of liberal Christianity in Switzerland. He is the author of six volumes, the two most recent of which appeared in 1947: *Kreuz und Ring* and *Albert Schweitzer und unsere Zeit*. It is a pleasure to welcome this distinguished foreign scholar to our pages.

Mr. Cope is organizing tutor of the Board of Adult Education of the University of Birmingham. He is a graduate (with honors in biochemistry) of that university and also in theology from Oxford. Before returning to the faculty of Birmingham, he was a parish minister in that diocese and later in Coventry.

Dr. Mackie is an old friend of readers of CROZER QUARTERLY. A distinguished Presbyterian minister, he has been since 1936 president of the Presbyterian Ministers' Fund. Prior to this appointment he had held a long pastorate at the Tully Memorial Church (Sharon Hill, Pa.) which he had built from a struggling little group into a strong and influential church. He is a graduate of Princeton—both the University and the Seminary—and holds an honorary D.D. from Parsons College. He has been indefatigable in aiding the financing and establishing of many Presbyterian churches in this area. It is a joy to welcome again to our pages this clear-sighted and warmhearted friend of men and hater of bunk.

Sixty-two books are reviewed or noticed in this issue. Once again our thirty-eight reviewers have sought to give candid and factual appraisals, and once again they deserve and receive our warmest thanks. Dr. Andrews is head of the department of religion at Goucher College. Dr. Bixler, a theologian of distinction, is president of Colby College. Dr. Branton is professor of New Testament at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Brightman is Borden Parker Bowne professor of philosophy at Boston University. Dr. Brush is professor of church history at Andover Newton. Dr. Mortimer Cohen is rabbi of Beth Sholom Congregation, Philadelphia. Dr. Samuel Cohon is professor of Jewish theology at Hebrew Union College. Dr. Cully is minister of the First Congregational Church, Haverhill, Mass. Dr. Davies is minister of All Souls' Church, Washington, D. C. Dr. Davis has already been introduced. Mr. Ellis is an instructor in religion at the University of Richmond. Mr. Enslin is a writer living amid the sand dunes of Cape Cod. Dr. Fleming is professor *emeritus* of missions at Union Theological Seminary (New York). Dr. Foote is a retired Unitarian minister and former member of the Harvard Divinity School faculty. Dr. Grant is professor of New Testament at Union (New York). Dr. Griffin is minister *emeritus* of the First Unitarian Church, Philadelphia. Dr. Hough is dean *emeritus* of Drew Theological Seminary. Dr. Hudson is professor of church history at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Igarashi is a member of the staff of the International Manuscript Project. Mr. Keighton is professor of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. Knudson is dean *emeritus* of the Boston University School of Theology. Mr. Kustas is on the staff of the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection. Dr. Latourette is professor of missions and oriental history at Yale. Dr. McCasland is professor of religion at the University of Virginia. Dr. McDanel is professor of history at the University of Richmond. Dr. Outler is Dwight professor of theology at Yale. Dr. Ross is associate professor of church history and world religions at the University of Southern California. Mr. Scholefield is minister of the First Unitarian Church, Philadelphia. Dr. Sellers is dean and professor of Old Testament at McCormick. Dr. Stanger is director of religious activities at Lynchburg College. Mr. Starr is librarian at Crozer. Dr. Steere is professor of philosophy at Haverford. Dr. Stinespring is professor of Old Testament at Duke. Dr. Stroup is dean of the faculty of Brooklyn College. Dr. Ward is minister of the Williamsburg (Va.) Baptist Church. Dr. Willoughby is professor of New Testament at the University of Chicago. Dr. Wright is professor of philosophy *emeritus* at Dartmouth. Dr. Young is assistant professor of New Testament at Yale.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Philosophies of F. R. Tennant and John Dewey, by J. Oliver Buswell, Jr., New York, Philosophical Library, 1950, pp. xvii, 516, $6.

This book on Tennant and Dewey will arouse the curiosity and attract the attention of all who are seriously interested in philosophy of religion. Tennant is one of Britain's greatest philosophical theists, Dewey one of America's greatest philosophical antitheists. Both are empirical; both are concerned with philosophy of mind, with epistemology, and (to a degree) with metaphysics. Both are out of sympathy with the current analytic philosophy. The reputation of both is puzzling. It remains to be explained why Tennant has had so little influence in Britain, and why Dewey has had so much influence in America.

The book deals with many, if not all, of the points just referred to. Its author, J. Oliver Buswell, Jr., has been president of Wheaton College (Illinois), and of the National Bible Institute in New York. He served with distinction as a chaplain in the First World War. He is a theological conservative, who makes no attempt to conceal his convictions. In fact, the main purpose of the book is, as he says, "constructive"—"to sketch against the background of Tennant's and Dewey's philosophies an integrated system of theistic metaphysics and epistemology." Such a program leads a wary reader to scent propaganda; but, on the whole, Mr. Buswell is to be complimented on his frankness, and with his persistent attempt to deal honestly and objectively with his two men.

The book is a thesis for the doctorate in philosophy, presented at New York University. Although it has its defects, it would have had the approval of this reviewer (had it been submitted to him) as worthy of being accepted toward the degree. It is one more evidence of a renewal of scholarly interest among conservatives—a group almost equally hostile to the labels "fundamentalist," "liberal," and "Barthian." There is a well-selected bibliography, marred only by the omission of Tennant, *The Concept of Sin* (1912), and of Lovejoy's brilliant essay, "Pragmatism vs. the Pragmatist." Documentation is superior—and Dewey is rebuked for lack of it.

Buswell's book is far from being an example of what L. H. DeWolf has called "the religious revolt against reason." It intends to prove that religious belief is rational. The author condemns Emile Cailliet of Princeton Seminary for writing that "there will never be a harmonious continuity between [philosophical] truth and the truth which is in Jesus Christ" (p. viii).

He is much more favorable to Tennant than to Dewey, and not merely because the former is a theist. In the foreword he points out that 1. "Tennant's psychology is personalistic, . . . Dewey's . . . is anti-personalistic." 2. "Tennant's theory of knowledge is strongly inclined toward dualism . . . Dewey's . . . is belligerently anti-dualistic." 3. "In metaphysics Tennant recognizes existing objective entities in the world of reality." "Dewey opposes objects . . .; he substitutes data." In the book he stresses Tennant's argument for teleology in the inorganic realm. But in the end (p. viii), Tennant's "inadequate realism" and Dewey's "*a priori* negations" are both attacked.

There is recognition of the work of others, especially of Bertocci and Scudder on Tennant and of White and Garnett on Dewey. There is scrupulous care to supplement printed sources by correspondence and conversation, when possible. Some odd scholarly judgments appear, such as a preference for M'Mahon's translation (in the

Bohn edition) of Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* to the Ross. Another example is a reference to "the so-called 'double truth' of Ritschl" (p. 154), in a context where the phrase may come from Tennant, yet should in any case be explained as not originated by Ritschl.

The basic feature of the book is its defense of dualism, both epistemic and metaphysical. Buswell bases his metaphysics specifically on Charles Hodge's "realistic dualism," with some reference to Descartes. It is strange that he does not seek aid and comfort from scholastic or neoscholastic writers for the dualistic view that "thinking things and moving things" are "two important interacting classes of objects" (p. viii) in the created universe, and that (presumably) the two classes are irreducible. God created both, but he created them to be distinct. In the foreword, "monists" are told that "unity without diversity is mere static nothing, that interacting dualism implies no 'great gulf,' and that active integration is possible only within the heterogeneous." When a personalistic idealist reads those words, he sees in them no argument for any ultimate dualism. Persons are unity with diversity (*unitas multiplex,* as Stern said); persons interact; and there is immense hetereogeneity within personal experience—its sensory, rational, moral, æsthetic, and religious *qualia* offer plenty of variety, and society contains highly heterogeneous persons. What more heterogeneity is needed?

Since defense of dualism is the author's chief constructive aim, and since he seems to find it essential to the Judæo-Christian tradition (which in its biblical phase was really barren of all technical metaphysics), let us consider two aspects of it.

1. As has been stated, Buswell presupposes the concept of substance, a concept rejected by most philosophers other than the Thomists. I have long sought for a clear, precise, and concrete definition of substance. Cardinal Mercier has come nearest to furnishing it; but even he has left me bogged down in unempirical abstraction. Perhaps Buswell needs substance for the Trinitarian formula of one substance, three persons. There then remains the question whether a person is a substance; and if so, what one substance, three substances means; and, in any case, what the Trinity is if both Sabellianism and tritheism are false, as he urges against Tennant.

2. Although here and there a distinction between epistemic dualism and metaphysical dualism is referred to (pp. 92, 140), the usual assumption is that if you can prove that the knowing subject and the object known are not identical, you have also proved that one is irreducibly distinct in all respects from the other. For example, "metaphysical dualism distinguishes thought from ontologically existing things" (p. 149). This is supposed to state metaphysical dualism; but any idealist or personalist could accept it, adding the words "which are the will-energy of God in action." The confusion reappears on p. 329 and p. 350. Buswell appears to think that if physical objects are themselves aspects of divine experience they then become empty, and nonmental objects are needed. But if God or lesser persons are for him substances, why do they cease to function as substances when known?

Little has been said in this review about Buswell's detailed treatment of Tennant or Dewey, but this must be left to the reader. The volume is a better piece of binding and bookmaking than is usual in these days. There are, however, two errors which permeate the book. One is the use of *data* as a singular (see pp. 116, 186, 203, 240, 492, etc.). The other is the usual omission of all punctuation between the body of the text and a following indented quotation; sometimes (*e.g.,* pp. 44, 187, 379, 420, 452, 454, 472-474, 477) the needed colon appears, and rarely a period (pp. 231, 397, 459). Other slips exist: there is printer's pie on p. 142; one finds "not as consistent" (p. 206), "Chalcidonian" (p. 246); German chaos obtains on pp. 273 and 279; and one reads "approbrious" (p. 431).

Buswell's book is, for all its defects, an informing and vigorous statement of his point of view. It is wholesome diet for neoörthodox, Deweyites, and personalists (for that matter), if they can rein in their *odium theologicum.* Buswell's criticisms are well stated and should be faced. His own point of view, however, needs another book for its clarification.

EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN

The Sacred River: An Approach to James Joyce, by L. A. G. Strong, New York, Pellegrini & Cudahy, ©1951, pp. 161, $2.75.

It would be well to reconstruct a little of the background which in my opinion is indispensable, both to a proper understanding of this book, and to a realization of its importance. James Joyce was by no means an isolated phenomenon among his contemporaries. It is true that he used methods of structure which were at radical variance from accepted patterns, but he was thoroughly conscious of what he was about, and in no sense of the word did he attempt to mystify his readers. The fact that they were (and are) mystified must be laid squarely at their own (the readers') doorsteps, for refusing to make certain readjustments in their conventional ideas of time-sequence, and, of course, in the ordinary procedures of reading a narrative. I hasten to add that I am not minimizing the difficulties that are a part of this reorientation, nor am I attempting to gloss over the fact that much of Joyce's later work is still obscure to expert critics; but it would appear to me that any reader who wishes to consider himself well versed in contemporary literature must at one time or another confront Joyce without begging the issue on the grounds of "difficulty." He is an important writer doing a very important piece of work, squarely within the bounds of a tradition, although it may not always be clear that such is the case.

The reasons for the emergence of such phenomena as *Ulysses* or *Finnegan's Wake* seem to me to lie in a tendency which runs through a great body of our contemporary literature, indeed of contemporary thought: we are dissatisfied with the apparent chaos of the world in which we live. This leads to a desire for a different set of conditions from those now existing. The more rational among us realize that we cannot escape things as they are, and so attempt to draw together all of the loose ends in a summation of these conditions. If the summation can be achieved with any degree of completeness, it follows that we are ready for a new set of conditions. Wishful thinking, perhaps, and an inadmissable conclusion for many, but it is a tendency that has appeared from time to time, and one which is very apparent in contemporary literature. A work of art which fulfills these conditions satisfactorily is defined as a "classic" (not to be confused with the general term, "the classics") by Mr. T. S. Eliot in his essay, *What is a Classic?* (By definition, the works of Bach are "classic" since they sum up the rules of contrapuntal music which went before them, while the works of Beethoven are not, since they are, in a sense, experimental. But to return to literature:) Many contemporary writers have striven to sum up their own conceptions of our common tradition. The most successful have taken cognizance of this vast inheritance which they must utilize, albeit from a personal standpoint, if they are to go about their work intelligently. André Gide has done precisely this in *Thésée.* Deliberately turning his back on contemporary happenings, he has squeezed every particle of flavor from all available references to the legends concerning Theseus. Thus *Thésée,* with anything but a contemporary theme, attempts to become a contemporary "classic." *The Cantos* of Ezra Pound contrast and attempt to equate the economic disasters which have occurred, and are occurring, in many types of civilization. In *The Divine Pilgrim,* Conrad Aiken comes to grips with the soul of man, through many men and many spiritual adventures, which are, nevertheless, one man

and one adventure. All of these books attempt to sum up—to see whether or not the phase is ended. *Ulysses* and *Finnegan's Wake* attempt the same thing, although they do it according to a different set of principles, realizing at the same time that such a summation cannot be cut off abruptly from the things which are to come.

I have made this digression prior to a consideration of Mr. Strong's *The Sacred River,* hoping that what I have to say about his book may be somewhat clearer in consequence. The plan of this study is an excellent one, and while it deals almost exclusively with *Finnegan's Wake,* it does fit Joyce into a logical context and should, from its first chapters, make its readers interested in all of Joyce's writings. Through use of many quotations from *Finnegan's Wake,* Mr. Strong bolsters his more important conclusions: 1. Joyce lived in a world of sensations which he had deliberately cut off at the time when he left Ireland as a voluntary exile. 2. He retained a deep, though somewhat exasperated, love for his native Dublin. (Everything that Joyce ever wrote is centred there.) 3. His interest in singing led him to make sound a primary factor in the composition of both *Ulysses* and *Finnegan's Wake.* 4. He rejected the authority, but never escaped the spiritual demands, of Catholicism. He brought a staggering compendium of knowledge (someone has said that there are threads of every myth in the world in *Finnegan's Wake*) and an active intelligence to the laborious composition of his *magnum opus*—an immense cycle set in motion by the dreams of a single man, on a single night in Dublin. It is interesting to find this cyclic theory which Joyce had from the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher, Giovanni Battista (Giambattista) Vico, so thoroughly considered by Mr. Strong. I believe he is the first of the writers about Joyce to have given it proper attention.

Mr. Strong, however, defines *Finnegan's Wake* as the logical fulfillment of romanticism. It may be that he and I do not understand the same thing when we use this term, but he defends himself by laying basis for his claim on the tendency to heighten the particular instance to an universal axiom, which he calls a "Romantic" principle. It does not seem to me that the evidence warrants such a conclusion, unless one wishes to reverse the ingrained opinion of most that the first half of the last century was a fertile period for the romantics. I may be splitting hairs, but I think Mr. Strong should have said "general" not "universal" when considering romanticism, and I am not willing to call Joyce a "gèneral" writer. Again, romanticism is usually identified with a cause, not with craftsmanship. And Joyce first, last, and foremost was a craftsman, with a craftsman's love of order. But this is only one weak spot in a book which is for the most part admirable.

I trust that Mr. Strong's desire to acquaint the general reader with Joyce is successful. I am afraid, though, that if he means the person who "just loves good books" he is doomed to disappointment. The general reader has heard, secondhand, that Joyce was a madman, not worth bothering about. True, some of the misconceptions about his work could be cleared away by a careful reading of this book, and I hope that it has a wide enough circulation to accomplish some missionary work; but missionary work alone is not enough. We must go to the work itself with minds free from prejudice, and realize that what Mr. Strong says of Joyce in 160 pages, Joyce says of himself in the first paragraph of *Finnegan's Wake:*

> riverrun past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs.

Which, rendered in part, tells us that the river of life—the sacred river—flows on and on with unending continuity, and that he, Joyce, intends to consider this eternal cycle from the neighborhood of Howth Castle, Dublin.

THEODORE ENSLIN

Jesus in the Jewish Tradition, by Morris Goldstein, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. ix, 319, $4.

Dr. Goldstein has here expanded his doctoral thesis on Jesus in rabbinic literature to include a "Post-Talmudic Period." But the treatment of the rabbinic periods remains the largest and most important part of the work.

The author was surprised to find that the only scholars to publish complete works on the subject of Jesus in rabbinic literature have been Christians seeking to throw more light on Christianity, *viz.,* Heinrich Laible, R. Travers Herford, and Hermann Strack. Dr. Goldstein's primary purpose is "a clearer understanding of Judaism, past and present," and he thinks it high time that a Jew undertook such a work. To be sure, there have been partial and incidental studies of the problem by such Jewish scholars as Klausner, Loewe, and Montefiore, but Goldstein is the first to make it the sole concern of a whole book.

The body of this book is divided into three parts: Tannaitic Period, Amoraic Period, and Post-Talmudic Period. In the first two periods, the material is divided into "Authentic References to Jesus," "References Incorrectly Identified with Jesus," and "Indirect Allusions."

From the Tannaitic period our author finds five authentic references: Baraitha—B. Sanhedrin 43a; Baraitha—B. San. 43a (bottom); Tosefta—Hullin II, 22, 23; Baraitha—B. Abodah Zarah 16b, 17a; and Tosefta—Hullin II, 24; B. Shabbath 116a, b. From these it may be gathered that, according to Tannaitic tradition, Jesus did heal, though by sorcery, and for this and leading people astray he was hanged on the eve of Passover. He had five disciples. During the century following the crucifixion, certain Jews still quoted sayings of Jesus or even sought to heal in his name, but this was frowned upon by the rabbis. Among the references incorrectly identified with Jesus are those to "Ben Stada," "Balaam," "a certain person," and those mentioning a Jesus who lived a century earlier than the accepted date. References to *minim* sometimes indicate Christians, but not always. The term *aven gilyon* does actually refer to the gospels, however.

From the Amoraic period there are three groups of authentic references distributed among seven passages. These add little to what we see from the Tannaitic period, and are of course of less historical significance because of late date. Among unauthentic references are those to a certain Miriam the hairdresser and those about Balaam, as in the previous period. The results from this period are meagre, as the author points out.

One of the findings of Goldstein is in a way negative. By rejecting such references as those to Ben Stada, Balaam, a certain person, and Miriam the hairdresser, he eliminates much that Christians in the past have considered offensive in the talmudic treatment of Jesus. The persecuting Christian has found offense in the Talmud because he wanted to find it. Even Herford, most friendly of Christian scholars, did not altogether escape this error, thinks the author.

In the third part of the book the most important item is a brief study of the *Toledoth Yeshu,* with some comments on Schonfield's recent (1937) challenging book on the subject. Without admitting Schonfield's hypothesis that the *Toledoth* stems from the Gospel according to the Hebrews, Goldstein is nevertheless prepared to date the *Toledoth* as early as the sixth century, as against Klausner (tenth century).

The body of the book concludes with a rapid survey of "Disputations and Polemics of the Middle Ages," including the Karaites, Saadia Gaon, Rashi, the Kimhis, Judah Halevi, Maimonides, and finally Spinoza.

Enough has been said in these brief remarks, it is hoped, to give the impression

of a very careful, fair, and objective study that every Christian and Jewish scholar who seeks the truth will want to read. It is also to be hoped that Dr. Goldstein will be able to prepare his proposed companion volume on Jesus in modern Jewish thought.

W. F. STINESPRING

Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus, by Amos Niven Wilder, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 223, $2.50.

In recent decades the problem of defining and evaluating the significance of eschatology in the life and teachings of Jesus has stimulated lively discussion and extensive research. In Dr. Wilder's revision (and revision at crucial points) of his well-known book we have a comprehensive survey and critical appraisal of the most important work achieved in this field of study. It represents a remarkable job of sifting and digesting from a large quantity of English and continental sources, as well as American.

With regard to Jesus' concept of the kingdom of God which was central to all his teaching the author maintains that it must be understood neither in wholly futuristic or wholly imminent terms. Both elements are present; to neglect one aspect at the expense of the other is to fail to understand Jesus. Eschatology provides the framework for all his thought and action. But as a corrective to the "consistent eschatology" of A. Schweitzer we must understand that the eschatological framework does not necessitate an "exclusively otherworldly outlook." Hence Jesus' ethic is not an "interim ethic." For Jesus the eschatological dimension was the transcendent dimension. "The transcendental eschatological element is the counterpart and overtone of the historical element. Jesus' errand was one of this-worldly redemption. . . . Creative eschatology, when ethically inspired and when springing from a true insight into the ways of God with man, constitutes a body of myth, a vehicle of profound and significant truth bearing immediately upon historical-social realities. It follows that when the purport of historical phenomena exhausts a statement in immediate and realistic terms, it can only be adequately conveyed by the imaginative terms of faith, in this case eschatological terms." Thus, while the ethic finds its ultimate sanction in a transcendent dimension expressed in eschatological terminology it is not irrelevant to the social-historical future. To those who would object that Jesus did not use his terms so symbolically Wilder replies that the word *symbol* has two meanings. "It is one thing for a person deliberately to employ figurative terms or symbols with the conscious knowledge that they are only symbols for the purpose of illuminating readily identifiable realities. It is another thing for a person in dealing with realities that are beyond express identification or characterization, i.e., ineffable, to use imaginative conceptions to suggest them." In the latter sense we can speak of Jesus' eschatology as symbolic.

Wilder summarizes the sanctions for Jesus' ethic as follows: "The nearness of the Kingdom of Heaven, viewed both as promise and as menace, is the dominant sanction for righteousness. This dominant eschatological sanction is, however, a formal sanction only, secondary to, if closely related to, the essential sanction. The essential sanction for righteousness is the nature of God."

In the last analysis Wilder suggests we must ask the question as to whether "there may not be a true sense in which the Kingdom of God is above good and evil and in which it transcends moral preoccupation." In this connection he recalls Schweitzer's arguments for eschatological mysticism. "For the gospel despite the prominence of the ethical claims appears to approach the sinner with indulgence, to waive the law, to confound all human standards of justice as in the parable of the

eleventh hour workers in the market place, and to make salvation ultimately a matter of divine grace." This leaves us with a paradox whose solution is to be found only in the essential mystery of Jesus' personality which is the source of the supramoral elements in Christianity. "Jesus is a charismatic figure as well as a prophet in the ethical sense." And the life in the kingdom of God which is offered through him "constantly points to and approximates to an experience beyond good and evil." For the Christian it can be summarized thus: "Any access of moral vigor must wait upon a prior emancipating act of God. There must be successive acts of divine creativity as antecedents to increased personal autonomy in the moral realm. It is only because the Kingdom of God represents such supra-moral values that it has such significance for moral attainment."

At certain points the reviewer is prompted to question the author. For example, if in Jesus we have in history the beginning of the fulfillment of the end of history, then how can we speak of eschatological sanction in terms of future rewards and punishments alone? Again, the author seems to leave us with a contradiction at a crucial point: first, he argues that the reason or "common sense" is itself a source of sanction for the ethics of Jesus; then, he argues that the sanction ultimately involves belief in the kind of a God Jesus revealed. Does not the latter proposition at least call into question the validity of the former, and vice versa?

As description and analysis this book is inclusive and incisive; as constructive interpretation it is exceedingly provocative. It is unique in its field. For all these reasons it will gain the respect and attention it deserves from ministers, teachers, and students.

FRANKLIN W. YOUNG

Morals Since 1900, by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xv, 223, $3.

This author's full name, as given in *The Author's and Writer's Who's Who,* is Henry Fitzgerald Heard. He was born in London in 1889 and in 1937 came to the United States, where he settled in California. He has a long list of books to his credit. Quite a number of these have religious titles, such as *A Preface to Prayer, Social Substance of Religion, The Creed of Christ, The Code of Christ, Interpretation of the Lord's Prayer, The Eternal Gospel,* and *The Interpretation of the Beatitudes.* I have, however, not read any of these earlier books, and hence am not in a position to compare the present volume with them.

In a general way the book, while dealing primarily with morals since 1900 in Britain and subordinately with contemporary developments in the United States, does have an underlying apologetic purpose. It seeks to show that along with the disturbing changes in modern thought and practice, that have worked against morality and social cohesion, there is in pure religion a "direct experience of value which is the ultimate, direct and unshakable sanction of all morality" and which "may well bring about a new cohesion adequate for the new stresses."

The book has four parts. Part I is devoted to the political process, especially to imperialism, liberalism, socialism, and nationalism. Part II deals at length with the changes in the application of what the author calls "the five natural moral laws." These laws are 1. force in the form of armies, and police, 2. sex, 3. wealth, 4. the given word, and 5. thought. All the changes in the applied sciences in these different fields, we are here told, seem "to tell against idealism and indicate only that ethics have no objective sanction—indeed morality is a bar to efficiency" (p. 157).

Part III, on the other hand, finds in the pure research of the past half century a directly contrary trend. The author here discusses briefly the moral effects of current cosmology, biology, anthropology, and psychology. The study of the inorganic,

he says, has established man's freedom, the essential postulate of his morality (p. 163). And as for the biological field he declares that the basic concepts of natural morality, concepts which nineteenth-century biology seemed to have undermined, were during the first half of the twentieth century largely reëstablished (p. 170). The study of anthropology, he contends, has during the last fifty years swung "the main focus of our attention from economics, as the true science of man, to psychology, the study of the field of consciousness." Pure research in these different fields has, we are assured, "tended away from materialism and mechanism, toward an idealism that would consider mind and will as basic factors and in their own right" (p. 183).

Part IV concludes the author's survey of morals since 1900 with a discussion of what he calls "the three criteria of civilization." These criteria are law, education, and health. As long as men are traditionalists they trust law. Then when they become rationalists they turn to education. When that ends in materialism, they turn to medicine (p. 209). This, we are told, is what has occurred in the modern world. "By the beginning of the twentieth century the doctor was the heir apparent to the moral throne" (p. 208). And since then he has succeeded to the throne itself. "But the medical profession," we read, has done no basic thinking" on the issues involved in its newer methods of both preserving and interfering with life. So the doctors, as well as the lawyers and educators, have failed in their moral leadership.

The book is somewhat dispersive in character. It could not well be otherwise in view of its subject matter. Many different topics are discussed, and hence the book lacks the impressiveness of a closely-knit, unified, and sustained argument. But it is an excellent introduction to the moral phases of our contemporary democratic civilization. It abounds in interesting observations, penetrating analyses and insights, and sound criticisms. Every alert reader, abreast of the times, will find it an informing and stimulating volume.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

Medieval Skepticism and Chaucer, by Mary Edith Thomas, New York, William-Frederick Press, 1950, pp. 184, $3.

At the outset it must be made clear that the mediæval skepticism about which this book is concerned is not a philosophical skepticism. "Religious skepticism of the Middle Ages was . . . of various kinds and degrees: there was the skepticism that came as a reaction to the moral degeneration of representatives of the Church; the skepticism that accompanied adversity and hardship; the skepticism of the materialist; the involuntary skepticism of the devout; the rational skepticism of those who could neither accept nor explain the unjust distribution of temporal favors. But a special kind of skepticism—a perplexity as to God's will or power to fight His own battles—was swept into Europe by the crusades" (p. 34).

To a description of such skepticism and to a very conclusive array of primary sources about two thirds of the book are given, the remaining third being devoted to Chaucer. Thus the author very clearly establishes her contention that the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, traditionally held to be the times of great faith, were also the times of great doubt. Skepticism was not new to this age nor was it unique in its scope. Rather is was the normal expression of a people living in the climate of growing adventure. In such a climate Chaucer lived widely and wrote broadly.

The author, in common with most modern scholars, rejects the view that Chaucer was a follower of Wyclif. Rather he was a good Catholic, a man with a sincere feeling for spiritual values. Yet he challenges God's foresight, discusses the existence of heaven and hell, and raises questions about immortality, God's justice, rewards and punishments, and problems of evil. Something of his attitude toward these things

may be seen in the way he treats the almost universal belief in astrology, toward which "he adopts an attitude not of general acquiescence of his time but, rather, enlightened opinion of the few" (p. 113). There is one important difference, however, between his treatment of skepticism and that generally employed by his contemporaries. He does not criticize the frailty of human nature, its lack of faith. Instead "he was an observer, not an arbiter of mankind—perhaps because he was not certain of the fundamental doctrines of the faith he stoutly embraced" (p. 130).

It is good to have this view of Chaucer, because he has always been considered to be a man of wide experience and interests, one who knew human nature and found it his chief interest, enriching the world's literature by his recognizable and familiar-in-every-age men and women. We expect him, therefore, to write about the skepticism of his day. Not to be aware of it is to be insensitive, but not to notice it would be to merit the judgment of insincerity, or at best incompetent workmanship.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Jew-Hate as a Sociological Problem, by Peretz F. Bernstein, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. 300, $3.75.

This approach to the often observed enmity between Jews and non-Jews is from the point of view of social psychology. It is a stimulating book which will open new insights into the problems of personality for anyone who is interested in the study of group and mob reactions the world over. A clear distinction is drawn between the hate which arises as a natural reaction to some type of injustice or outright injury and that to which one is subjected merely because of his membership in some group, regardless of his own personal innocence. That individual Jews do at times commit overt acts which provoke hatred, the author readily admits, but the theme of his book is the hatred to which Jews as a group are subjected, for which there is no specific, determinable cause. It is this abstract hate which appears to have no root in any concrete action which the author labels Jew-hate, a term which he prefers to anti-Semitism, which is ambiguous, since most Semites are not Jews.

This Jew-hate is to be explained, the author holds, from the fact that all human beings have deeply implanted in their inner nature, perhaps in what Freud called the *id,* an irresistible compulsion to hate somebody. This deep need to hate arises in turn from the fact of suffering which we all encounter as a result of the endless defeats and frustrations of our desires and ambitions. This hatred is ineradicable, all moral homilies and penitential sermons and prayers to the contrary. Although the author does not say so in so many words, he would be forced in reality to say that the injunction of Moses to love your neighbor as yourself, of Jesus to love your enemies, and of Gautama Buddha to overcome ill will, are only the empty and unrealistic mandates of blind guides who had no insight into the dark morass of human nature.

With the absolute need for hate established, as he sees it, the author then proceeds to trace with no little skill the way in which it gets itself attached to an individual and then to a group which has an alien stamp upon it. Hence anti-Semitism. The Jews are thus the innocent victims of a hatred which has no realistic basis in their own attitudes or conduct. No remedy for this deep hatred found in gentile hearts needs to be sought. No moral issue is involved. The hate mechanism is purely impersonal and is inexorable. If one apparent cause or pretext is removed, another will be found.

The Jew therefore is caught in a situation of pure tragedy for which he is not to blame and for which there is no cure so long as Jews must live in the alien society of gentiles. Jew and gentile are engaged in an inevitable social conflict which has no

moral cause and for which there is no moral cure. The situation will continue unabated forever unless Jews, who cannot for a moment consider assimilation, as that would be only a hypocritical attempt to deny their true nature, gain a homeland of their own where Jews will live only with their own kind. Thus the book is an effort to construct a philosophical basis for Zionism. The fact of a great and widespread anti-Semitism cannot be denied; but neither can a prior and still greater *antigoyism,* which has caused the Jews to remain as unassimilated islands in gentile cultures for four thousand years. Yet it must also be recognized that many Jews and gentiles have in the past and still today live in friendly brotherhood. Great numbers of these Jews have more in common with their gentile friends than with any modern Zionist who would lead them to some contemporary land of milk and honey. There is the further disconcerting fact that the new state of Israel is already overflowing with an undernourished population, while the great body of the Jewish people still live in the Diaspora, where, willingly or unwillingly, they will have to continue to live in the future.

S. VERNON MC CASLAND

The Spirit of Love, by C. F. Kelley, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xii, 287, $3.50.

Saint Francis of Sales (1567-1622) is recognized, according to the author, as "the chief Doctor of Ascetic Theology. There is not much to be found in the writings of Ruysbroeck or Saint Teresa which cannot be found in his books or letters. He writes about the same things as St. John of the Cross only he makes them more pleasant, more lucid and intimate and less austere, distant and methodical" (p. 21). This bishop of Geneva, who by his winsome life and words is said to have won back a great many Calvinists to the Roman church, is having a revival in these years. His *Introduction to the Devout Life* is available in attractive editions and continues to win friends. Kelley's book is a kind of running commentary on the ruling thoughts of Francis, with very liberal quotations not only from the master's writings but from those of his contemporary friends and admirers as well as from devotional literature in general. Francis, however, is presented to us not only for his thought and practice but for his character and personality. We are brought close to a man who walked with God.

The master idea around which the book is gathered is love. Yet one may also reckon two themes, love and prayer. Francis would teach us that holy love without prayer involves a flagrant contradiction. The contemporary discussion concerning the meaning and the comparative Christian truth in the two Greek words *agapē* and *eros* is briefly reviewed as a preface to an exposition of *philia,* "a holy and supernatural friendship" (p. 40), a reciprocal movement between God and man, "the systole and diastole of the Divine Heart." Francis' accent is on the effective rather than on the intellective in man's relationship to God. He belongs in the train of Augustine and Bonaventura in stressing the centrality of will and in building around love. "Love is the abridgement of all theology" (p. 150).

Francis is unquestionably the outstanding guide in the Catholic tradition in the life of devotion for the believer outside the monastery walls. Though truly a mystic, he does not tease us by expatiating on the impossible heights of the classical mystic way. He is gifted with admirable common sense. The key to his dealing with souls is gentleness. Violence is always wrong. One must learn to be gentle even with oneself. Francis does not like systems in prayer: he fears the dangers of stretching any human soul on a manufactured frame. He teaches common Christians how to meet God in the daily round of living, where every necessity may be turned to spir-

itual gain. Yet if we must be moderate, we cannot forget such counsel as this: "Be moderate in all things except in the love of God" (p. 23).

This is an attractive book. The forty-two pages of notes in fine print reveal a careful scholar and contain a wealth of Catholic devotional wisdom. A blemish in the volume is the frequency of misspelled words. Jacques Maritain writes an appreciative foreword, although as a Thomist he fears a degree of heretical quietism in Francis' thought.

JOHN W. BRUSH

La Religion des Cathares: Étude sur le gnosticisme de la basse antiquité et du moyen âge, by Hans Söderberg, Uppsala, Almquist & Wiksells, 1949, pp. 300, n.p.

Mr. Söderberg's book is yet another example of the fine scholarship that we have learned to associate with most Swedish theses. His subject is the Cathari, the heresy which spread in France and Italy in the eleventh century and subsequently reached also Germany and England. The research into this field is beset by every type of philological difficulty: the documentary evidence is scanty, late, often unreliable, and in any case hard to evaluate. It is to Söderberg's credit that he has worked patiently through this material and familiarized himself as well with the formidable mass of modern scholarly works on the various religious currents of the mediæval period. The result is a lucid, orderly, and highly readable historical treatment of the tenets of the Cathari, all the more commendable since so many who write on the history of religion often succeed in being no whit less difficult to interpret than the material they set out to explain. For a more critical and detailed analysis of Söderberg's labors I should refer the readers of this journal to H. von Campenhausen's review in *Nuntius* II, 1949, col. 13 ff. I shall rather content myself with a general summary.

After a valuable résumé of modern scholarship in the field (see also the extensive bibliography at the end of the book) and some sound observations on the problem of properly evaluating the literary sources, Söderberg passes on to a general survey of the mediæval heresies which bear on his subject, holding with the general opinion that the Cathari derive historically from the Bogomils (p. 37). Next he proceeds to distinguish two types of Cathari: those who believed in an absolute dualism, that is to say, the original existence of two principles, Good and Evil, which he shows derives (with some modification which gives it a more Christian coloring) from Manichæism; and those associated with what is termed "mitigated" dualism, or the belief that Satan was formerly a fallen angel, who thereby changed nature and became the demiurge, or creator of the visible world, which is accordingly evil. Here the Bogomils are the source. Söderberg continues in this manner to trace historically all the known beliefs and practices of the Cathari, such as their views on the soul, on angelology, eschatology, and baptism. Strangely enough, the Cathari seem to be more in conformity with the Gnosticism and Manichæism of late antiquity than with the Bogomils and Paulicians. His carefully formulated conclusion is worth quoting:

> If one should suppose that mediæval Gnosticism is independent of the Gnosticism of late antiquity, it is difficult to explain the actual phenomenological concordance that exists between them. Of course, one cannot deny that new conceptions were born and changes introduced. Each movement has a certain autonomy and each its own conceptions. But the myths and doctrines that we have studied form a Gnostic ideology. Certain elements of this mythical, doctrinal, and ritual ensemble disappeared at times, to reappear later. The conceptions preserved from late antiquity up to the Cathari confirm the supposition that others, which were part of the circle of Gnostic ideas and which at times disappeared, were not invented but likewise subsisted from before (p. 268).

The large library of Gnostic documents discovered in 1946 in Upper Egypt (see the important article of H.-Ch. Puech, *Les Nouveaux Écrits Gnostiques Découverts en Haute-Égypte, Premier Inventaire et Essai d'Identification* in *Coptic Studies in*

Honor of Walter Ewing Crum, Bulletin of the Byzantine Institute, II, Limoges, A. Bontemps, 1950, pp. 91-154) will no doubt, when it is fully published and properly studied, immeasurably increase our knowledge and in many instances alter our views of the history of Gnosticism and its sister heresies. Söderberg's book displays a competence which leads us to hope that he himself will contribute toward bringing closer that distant day.

GEORGE L. KUSTAS

The Lord's Prayer, by E. F. Scott, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. vii, 126, $2.25.

As the author indicates in the preface to his small volume, there is a dearth of books treating the Lord's Prayer from a critical and historical approach. This book helps fill that lack and is designed also to remove the "charter of the Christian religion" from the realm of "vain repetition" so that it will be understood as it is repeated.

The book begins with a presentation of what the author believes was Jesus' conception of prayer. He includes a brief statement of his own ideas as to the origin and history of prayer and then goes on to Jesus' view of prayer against the backdrop of the Judaism of that day. The two records of the prayer are considered, and Dr. Scott defends his view that the version in Matthew is the more authentic.

In a chapter on background, the author discusses the content of the Lord's Prayer in the light of older source materials from which portions of it seem to have been drawn. These source materials he limits to Jewish scripture and prayers. From this he moves to the originality of the prayer of Jesus. Here he follows the approach used in his book on the ethical teachings of Jesus, pointing out that originality, particularly in the realm of religion, consists of presenting deeper insights into that which is old. In this connection are presented the arguments for the authenticity of the prayer. Taking each section in order, Dr. Scott discusses the interpretation and meaning of the several petitions, and the volume ends with a consideration of the implications of the prayer.

Those who are expecting in this volume one of the scholarly works similar to those that came earlier from the pen of Dr. Scott will perhaps be somewhat disappointed. This is not to say that the book is lacking in scholarship, for the author draws readily upon the background of his long years of study and teaching experience. Rather, the book is perhaps as much homiletical and devotional as it is critical. In fact, some sections almost give the impression of sermonic origin. There is no documentation or bibliography, and very frequently points of view and interpretations that are debatable are simply stated as fact. Undoubtedly a scholar of Dr. Scott's ability is well aware that some of the generalizations he makes must break down, and that several of his interpretations are open to other treatments. In discussing the Lord's Prayer a good deal of material on the life and teachings of Jesus is included, and it is here that much of the treatment is without substantiation, giving the author's view only.

Even in so brief a volume there is a good deal of repetition plus ample illustrative material. This book will probably be of particular value to those who want a short, readable introduction to the Lord's Prayer. It will be of value for the lay student as well as providing ample sermonic suggestions.

P. S. ELLIS, JR.

White Man Boss, by Adamastor, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 240, $3.

South Africa is a complex, mutiracial country where the ruling white two million have imposed a master-slave pattern on the eight or nine million non-Europeans. This region has long been recognized as an area of such racial tension that an explosion of volcanic proportions may well be in the making. At the meeting of the International

Missionary Council in 1927 the relation of blacks and whites in South Africa was one of three of the world's racial problems selected for serious consideration. In 1950, so critical was the position taken by various religious bodies in South Africa that the *ad interim* committee of this same Council agreed to participate in a proposed delegation to visit this area and began consulations on this matter with the South Africa Christian Council and other bodies.

It will be remembered that it was in South Africa that Mahatma Gandhi was mobbed during his valient and sacrificial work in behalf of grossly mistreated Indian laborers. These Indians were originally brought in as indentured labor back in the 1860's, but as they drifted away from the plantations their commerical acumen, their industry, their intelligence and adaptability led to successive restrictions which have been cumulative through the years. Attention on a world scale was drawn to South Africa in 1946 when Indian delegates to the United Nations, led by Mrs. Pandit Nehru, exposed the circumstances in which their South African kinsmen lived. Thus from various angles a book on South Africa is to be welcomed.

White Man Boss aims to give a picture of the complex racial scene where the doctrine of white supremacy rules the passions and shapes the government of the minority in power. It is a detailed statement of history, attitudes, and conditions so forthright in its exposé that the author protects himself under the nom de plume of "Adamastor." Though the author shows himself to be an unblushing partisan and a passionate antagonist of the outdated fanatical and feudal attitudes and policies of the present reactionary government, there is sufficient documentation to buttress statements as being matters of fact.

That the effort to entrench white supremacy has been so successful has been due to the tenacity of three leaders: Paul Kruger, General J. B. M. Hertzog, and Dr. D. F. Malan. We are shown how the piety of one church, the ingenious manipulation of law, the daily processes of trade, and the traditional hatreds and fears of white South Africa have brought about a situation quite out of tune with modern secular as well as Christian attitudes toward backward peoples.

The overwhelming view of the whites in South Africa is that the kaffir must be kept in his place. This policy of maximum segregation centres in the word *apartheid* which has been so much in the press in the last few years. It embodies the political conviction that the white man shall and always will rule in South Africa, preserving white supremacy in every aspect of life, eliminating non-Europeans from all effective political and industrial life.

This policy of vertical segregation received the official support of the Dutch Reformed Church which recently confirmed their long-standing view that separation of races has scriptural authority. However, there are other Christian churches in South Africa which condemn as immoral and unchristian any policy like *apartheid* which is based on racial distinctions. The forty per cent English-speaking minority in the white population are more liberal in their thought than the Afrikaans-speaking section which the author characterizes as "a fanatical white tribe which 300 years ago cut the ties with Europe and became a part of the savagery that is inherent in the *numen* of older Africa." But the political parties of each of these bitterly opposed white groups stand for white supremacy.

South Africa labors under the handicap of a time lag of a half century and more in its patriarchal attitude to non-Europeans. The author believes that the solution lies only in a long period of education in cultural attitudes, and in the emergence of a liberal party which will not feel they are traitors to their white skins because of a desire to share skill, knowledge, and political power with nonwhites, and who feel that the only way to justify white intrusion into South Africa is by belatedly accept-

ing in the fullest sense the truth that Africans have human rights that must be respected.

Two of the three racial hot spots taken up in the meeting of the International Missionary Council to which reference was made in the first paragraph were in the United States. Hence it little behooves us to sit in superior judgment upon South Africa, for the predominant positions taken there hold a mirror up for minority attitudes in America. This book describes injustices far enough away for us to develop an unemotional sense of right that may well be applied in our own land.

DANIEL J. FLEMING

A Solovyov Anthology, arranged by S. L. Frank and translated from the Russian by Natalie Duddington, New York, Scribner, ©1950, pp. 256, $3.50.

Although seven of the principal works of Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900) have already appeared in English translations, his admirers think that British and American readers have never learned to appreciate this "greatest of Russian philosophers and systematic religious thinkers," who was a "perfectly original mystic, a man of the 'prophetic type,' a moral teacher, a political thinker, a poet and a litrary critic." Hence this anthology has been prepared to enable readers of English to become acquainted in a single volume with something of the range and depth of this extraordinarily constructive thinker and writer.

All of Solovyov's many interests and activities were directed toward the expression and realization of one dominant idea—the union of all Christendom within a single church. The first and chief step toward this goal, he thought, should be the combination of the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches within one communion. The traditional doctrinal differences on such subjects as the procession of the Holy Ghost, the immaculate conception, and papal infallibility seemed to him trifles in comparison with the benefits that would come from organic union. This truth once realized, some method of mutual toleration and accommodation should readily be found. In turn, the various Protestant churches would be irresistibly attracted toward reunion with the major part of Christendom. Each of these forms of Christianity has its distinctive merits. A broader, deeper, and more spiritual insight would be attained and universally shared as a result of their union. Solovyov even tried to find in his scheme of comprehension a place that would be acceptable to the Jews. But, alas, when the proposal was brought to the attention of the practically minded Leo XIII, the pope only sighed, remarking, "It is a beautiful idea, but, short of a miracle, impossible!" The Orthodox churches did not react more favorably. Probably few Protestants during Solovyov's lifetime even heard of his project. However, if universal Christian unity should ever be attained, he will be remembered as one of the nineteenth-century pioneers who endeavored to turn Christian thought in that direction.

Included within this anthology are selections from Solovyov's writings upon many other topics of interest to American readers, quite apart from their possible connection with Christian unity. These give the reader some acquaintance with the philosopher's interpretations of God, Christianity, humanity, beauty in nature and art, romantic love, morality, nationality, legal justice, and the secret of progress. The volume ends with the conclusion of a dialogue in the fashion of Plato in which active opposition to evil by force is defended, in refutation of Tolstoy's doctrine of non-resistance (*cf.* p. 254). The introduction by S. L. Frank gives clearly and concisely the information which general readers desire. Mrs. Duddington's translations read well, and give the impression that in the original Russian Solovyov's works must be literary classics of a very high order.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount, by Hans Windisch, translated by S. MacLean Gilmour, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. 224, $4.

The late Professor Windisch's *The Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount* is one of the great books of our time, and ought to be widely read throughout all the churches, not only by theologians and theological students and ministers, but also by laymen. The first edition appeared in 1929, the second, which was completely rewritten, in 1937—soon after the author's death. The revised edition was edited by the late Professor Martin Dibelius. Professor Gilmour's brilliant and accurate translation is as readable as the German original. Unlike some modern translators of foreign theological works, Professor Gilmour is completely competent—he could have written a book of this quality himself, and he doesn't have to guess at the meaning of words and phrases. They are part of his everyday speech!

The great importance of this book lies in its restatement of the traditional view of the Sermon on the Mount as over against some of the bizarre "theological" theories that have emerged since the opening decade of this century. One such theory assumes that Jesus never meant his teaching to be put in practice! Strange as this may sound, it is seriously proposed that what our Lord intended was to state simply, completely, and without qualification the "pure will of God," knowing full well that men would find it impossible to live up to such requirements, and would consequently be thrown back upon the mercy of God. In grief and in penitence, therefore, they would pass through something like the Pauline experience of salvation. Such a theory fits one of the modern emphases in theology—an emphasis that centres in the sheer transcendance of God, and denies all human values. It also fits the traditional pattern of evangelistic theology, and it seems to escape the charge of "mere moralism." (Some of these features may seem advantageous to many persons; to others they will appear as difficulties.) Another view is fairly popular still—Schweitzer's theory of "interim ethics." The high ethic of the gospel, "the heroic for earth too high," was not really meant for the rank and file of men, or even for religious-minded Jews, but was the *ad hoc* discipline laid down by Jesus for his followers in the hope that they would survive the terrible time of tribulation that was soon to come on the earth, and precede the Day of Judgment and the coming of the kingdom of God. Still another view is that which describes Jesus's ethics as "ethics of the kingdom"—impracticable now, but destined eventually to be standard procedure after the kingdom of God has arrived.

It is strange how these utterly unhistorical interpretations have gained ground in modern religious thought. Perhaps the explanation lies in the disjointed and chaotic life of modern man—at least since 1914. Would anyone think of applying such theories to the parallel sayings found in rabbinic tradition? Certainly the rabbis expected their teachings to be put in practice! Is there any hint anywhere in the gospels that Jesus set forth his teachings by indirection, or suggested in any way that it was not to be taken seriously? Even the most extravagant demands carry with them the implication that although some things are "impossible with men" they are still *possible*—with God. What F. C. Burkitt said long ago is still true: it is the gospel ethic that requires critical understanding and interpretation, far more than the gospel miracles. One of the great landmarks on the way toward a sane and defensible interpretation of Jesus's ethic is the book before us. It is a book that deserves to be read and reread, and taken to heart by our generation.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Men of Good Hope, by Daniel Aaron, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951, pp. xiv, 329, $4.50.

This book emphasizes that the progressive spirit in politics, economics, and religion is indigenous to American life. It discusses specifically the progressivism of

seven men whom the author considers to be "prophetic agitators," and two men, Brooks Adams and Theodore Roosevelt, whose progressivism the author considers to be of a pseudo variety. In the camp of the true prophets we find Ralph Waldo Emerson, Theodore Parker, Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Henry Demarest Lloyd, William Dean Howells, and Thorstein Veblen. The concluding chapter contains an evaluation of present-day American progressivism and a short discussion of its relationship to Marxism.

The book makes interesting and solid reading. It brings out, sometimes indirectly, sometimes with more explicitness, the connection which traditionally exists between unorthodox economics or politics and unorthodoxy in religion. By progressivism, the author means "a social philosophy that derived in part from Jeffersonian ideas about popular government, the pursuit of happiness, and the fulfillment of human potentialities, and in part from unorthodox Protestant Christianity more urgent and more fiercely evangelical than the bland reasonableness of the Enlightenment." The charge of blind optimism so frequently made against those nineteenth-century reformers, who, in varrying degrees, were touched by the spirit of transcendentalism, is one which, in the judgment of this author, must be qualified in important respects. For the most part these reformers were more realistically involved in the struggles of the day and more sober in their appraisal of the forces of evil than those who are now firing salvos at their "naïve optimism."

It is a matter of some interest to many of us that two of the seven progressives were clergymen. After a few years in the ministry, Emerson left the church for wider fields of activity. He did indeed need more elbowroom than was afforded him by the narrow mahogany pulpit of Boston's Second Church. Theodore Parker was the victim of professional ostracism even in the Unitarian ministry. But the fact remains that both were clergymen. Their careers illustrate the truth that within American Protestantism and in more than one denomination there has been room for the progressive spirit—though those cherishing it must not expect ecclesiastical preferment! It is statistically interesting that three out of the seven progressives were the sons of clergymen and that the father of a fourth published Sunday-school books. Emerson was descended from a long line of ministers, his father being the minister of Boston's First Church. Edward Bellamy was the son of "a fat, approachable Baptist Divine." Henry Demarest Lloyd was the son of a Dutch Reformed minister who lost his pulpit and subsequently ran "Ye Old Book Shoppe" in New York City. In each of the three cases, the sons broke with the theologies of their fathers, remaining religious but religious in a nonecclesiastical sense. Henry Demarest Lloyd's opinion of the gentlemen of the cloth was at one time expressed thus: "I am too unconventionally and unaffectedly pious to be a minister, I can do what ministers can't do: I can be right without being religious." Most clergymen will admit that, if the remark has a smart-alecky quality, it is still not entirely lacking in substance!

With the possible exception of Henry George, none of the seven was sympathetic to orthodox Protestantism. In the main they found little vitality in conventional religion. Their faith was unorthodox in character. Belief in man's divine potentialities was a common link. They were humanists in that their thinking centred on the basic importance of ethics and social action, but their humanism was not narrow in its context. With Emerson, they shared a belief in the Over Soul. The saturnine Thorstein Veblen walked by himself in this as in other respects, but the author is concerned to point out that in the case of Veblen, "Moralist and Rhetorician," the moral animus is stronger than has commonly been assumed. What he did "was to destroy holy shibboleths by means of a language ordinarily identified with ritualistic or pedantic

expression; he was, in other words, irreverently reverent." A clear line is drawn between the "prophetic agitators" and the "latter-day progressives," Brooks Adams and Theodore Roosevelt, who seemed to find their way into the book as illustrations of the type of deterioration to which progressivism is subject.

Most readers of this book will not be slow to sense that the "good hope" of which the author writes is good hope with respect to the potentialities of human nature and with respect to organizing human society on a basis of justice and equality. These men of good hope were certainly not motivated by a sense of sin! This restatement of their convictions serves to remind us—and this is of particular importance at the present moment—that it is not un-American to be radical, that outright liberalism and Americanism are not the strange bedfellows that some would have us believe, that belief in socialism is not necessarily incompatible with democracy, that Marxist socialism has no more unyielding or intelligent opponent than the genuine progressive, and that men working in the progressive tradition have had a salutary influence upon the nation's life entirely disproportionate to their numerical strength.

HARRY B. SCHOLEFIELD

Consider Paul, by Holmes Rolston, Richmond, John Knox Press, ©1951, pp. 217, $3.

This is an excellent book for those who want a conservative yet nonfundamentalist treatment of the Apostle Paul, well written and very readable. It will probably have wide reception outside the circles of the Presbyterian church in the U. S. since the current theological winds have been blowing in this author's general direction for nearly two decades. In his treatment of the themes of inspiration and revelation is found his clearest differentiation from both the fundamentalist and the liberal positions within Protestant Christianity. The author's spirit and attitude are persuasive rather than belligerent. He opens his book with a quotation: "It is not possible to understand Christianity unless we unite with the teaching and work of Jesus the interpretation thereof furnished by His apostle, Paul." Paul has a fivefold importance because he stands at the centre of the controversy between liberal and conservative Christianty, at the heart of the problem of the relation between Christian and Jew, at the centre of the controversy between the Protestant and the Catholic understanding of the meaning of Christianity, at the heart of the ecumenical movement today, and finally at the heart of that inner conflict within conservative Christianity represented by fundamentalist groups with mechanical views of revelation and conservative groups represented by such a journal as *Theology Today*.

The reviewer, an unlapsed liberal, trained in the ways of a more radical New Testament scholarship finds much that would evoke attempted refutation, were there room for such in a brief review. The author is firmly grounded in his beliefs but he does note disputed points such as Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles, apostolic authorship of James and the Epistles of Peter, then calmly builds his case on the more conservative view. After alluding to Paul's statement that James and John extended to him the right hand of fellowship, the author, in the same paragraph, points to the essential unity between Paul's view of Christ and that of the Gospel of John. The apostolic authorship of the Gospel of John seems here to be Q.E.D. to the author if not to this reviewer. He makes much of the connection of Luke and Paul, accepting the portraits of Paul in the letters and in Acts as essentially the same. If he has any suspicion of Luke's use of hellenistic methods of historiography, it is not in evidence. The speeches of Paul and of Peter in Acts are for him primary sources.

He makes comparatively little use of modern authors. F. C. Porter's refutation

of the radical denial of some of Paul's letters is cited, as is Oscar Cullman's description of liberalism in Christianity as a modern form of Docetism. He joins in the common conservative rejoicing over Schweitzer's demolition of certain liberal portraits of Jesus without noting the disturbing factor—at least it *should* be disturbing!—that Schweitzer was theologically too unorthodox for appointment by a reguarly constituted missionary society for work in Africa. Schweitzer's magnificent incarnation of the love of God moving in contemporary history is certainly not to be monopolized by the theologically correct. Incidentally, to anyone with the hobby of collecting indictments against liberal Christianity, p. 26 is a gem.

He describes in detail and with great sympathy Paul's use of the Old Testament, apparently convinced that the validity of the Old Testament revelation is only to be found in the New Testament. This tendency of some Christians to invalidate Judaism seems quite unfair. After all, there is much in the Old Testament that does not centre in the Messianic hope, and by what logic *must* first-century Jews, *have accepted* the interpretation of Paul as final? Does Paul's insistence that "we are the true Israel" make it so?

Interesting to this reviewer was the author's idea and treatment of the "deposit of faith" in connection with Paul, especially as one remembers his teaching on spiritual gifts. Pauline authorship of the Pastorals is a necessity here, but the author finds the idea in Paul's assertion of an unchanging gospel (Gal. 1:9, where Paul twice pronounces a curse upon those who preach another gospel from his). This deposit of faith is the necessary "core-curriculum" for Protestants, to borrow a term current in academic circles.

But there is neither space nor need to say more. The book is an excellent exposition of what Paul means to the devout conservative. Its selection of those aspects of Paul's thought that lend themselves to well-formulated doctrines of revelation and inspiration make it seem at times incomplete and tending toward the apologetic side, but at any rate this reviewer was glad to note that Paul's views on women are seen as of local and temporary significance. To have to see them as Spirit-guided revelation would just have been the last straw! Fortunately this author is not that type of conservative Christian.

MARY E. ANDREWS

Statement on Race, by Ashley Montagu, New York, Henry Schuman, ©1951, pp. xi, 172, $2.

In this brief volume, Professor Ashley Montagu, chairman of the department of anthropology at Rutgers University and the author of the well-known *Man's Most Dangerous Myth—The Fallacy of Race,* has attempted a simplified homily on the widely publicized UNESCO official "Statement by Experts on Race Problems."

Professor Montagu's method in this book is familiar to preachers. He divides the UNESCO statement into twenty-one paragraphs and proceeds to use them as texts on which to spin his commentary. The main body of the book, however, is preceded by the story (a chronological account) of the manner in which the UNESCO statement came into being. At the close of the book there is an appendix which consists of the "United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights." This document is related to the development of a scientific view of race, although Dr. Montagu does not precisely say in what manner "declarations" of faith relate to precise scientific work. The bibliography accompanying the book at its close is helpful in that it covers a wide range of materials. On the other hand, it includes references of varying depth and importance. The index is relatively simple and reliable.

Professor Montagu is quite right when he states that the UNESCO experiment

in creating a "Statement by Experts on Racial Problems" suggests a methodology in international relations which might be employed with profit on other problems. It is probably true that the "international politican" possesses a different (more aggressive, combative, duelistic) personality orientation than scholars (withdrawn, idealistic, pacifist). Yet, scholars have their own peculiar limitations in international affairs, as students of Woodrow Wilson have been pointing out again recently. It cannot be assumed, moreover, that scholars could deal successfully with many international problems of the present (Korea, the rôle of Germany in world affairs, and general disarmament). Some international problems simply cannot be compared on equal terms with that which the present volume is concerned. Even the "United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights" has not been accepted by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, furthermore, and its satellites were not represented on the UNESCO committee on race. It is interesting to conjecture what differences, if any, such representation would have contributed.

Some readers, especially professors of practical theology, are going to be critical of the expository method employed by Professor Montagu. They will say that he is not sufficiently versed in hermeneutical principles. Does he perform his exegisis with proper regard to the specific meaning of his texts or does he merely use them to provide a "hanger" on which to rest his ideas—even though these ideas on their own are quite interesting and generally correct? This and other questions must be posed of the method employed.

On most points, few will wish to quarrel with Dr. Montagu's exposition. He, like others, is against "sin." His campaign, however, is repetitive. Repetition, moreover, seems to be endemic to his method. The reader should know everything that is to be said before it is said so that he will better understand any particular verse of the "Statement." But he will not understand "everything" until he has read it all.

Professor Montagu continues a theme in this book which he developed earlier: that the term *race* should be dropped and *ethnic* takes its place. There are many reasons surely why *race* is an inadequate term, but can it be ruled out of world discussion by fiat? Do not the social scientist and the biologist have a hopeful opportunity, whenever the term is used, to make clear in what sense it can be employed? Any critical discussion of the term develops into a rapid survey of a large part of modern knowledge. Can that be so bad? Moreover, what connotations shall be given to the term *ethnic?* What does it mean to the man on the street? Finally, and this is perhaps a serious flaw in Montagu's argument, is not race, as he himself earlier claimed, a dangerous "myth?" As a myth does it not have an existence in social relations which confounds and transcends the efforts of scientists and educators? In other words is there no place for what might be called a "theology of race relations?"

Several further questions will arise in the mind of the reader. Does this book accomplish its purpose if it attracts the attention of only a fraction of college students and a few intelligent laymen? Does Professor Montagu ever associate with other than "distinguished" people? Is the golden rule the rule of our nature (p. 118)? Is not his theory of nationalism and the Jews self-defeating (pp. 62 ff.)? What does the following sentence contribute: "we may conclude that the more coöperatively the members of any group behave, the more harmonious the social organization of that group is likely to be (p. 130)? Is that which is unnatural more convincingly evil than that which is immoral (p. 136)? How true is this statement: "Science points the way to survival and happiness for all mankind through love and coöperation" (p. 136)?

Despite several shortcomings, *Statement on Race* provides a basically sound, simple, condensed account of race for the serious although unversed reader.

HERBERT H. STROUP

Luther's Progress to the Diet of Worms, by Ernest Gordon Rupp, Chicago, Wilcox & Follett, ©1951, pp. 109, $2.

Martin Luther is chiefly remembered in terms of his colorful dramatic career, but much more important than the drama of outward events was the inner struggle of spirit which brought about a reassessment of the gospel and provided the theological foundation for the Protestant churches. It is to this latter aspect of Luther's life that Professor Rupp has directed his attention. Contrary to popular legend, Luther came to his new insights in the humdrum fashion that is characteristic of the spiritual growth of theological professors. "I did not learn my theology all at once," he confessed, "but I had to search deeper for it, where my temptations took me." The reader seeking an exciting story, therefore, will not find it here, but the reader seeking an understanding of the real meaning of the tumultuous years that followed the posting of the theses in 1517 will find this litle book deeply rewarding.

The great revival of "Luther research" in Germany and the Scandinavian countries during the last thirty years has been concentrated on "the young Luther," and it is the results of these studies that form the basis of Professor Rupp's account of Luther's inner development and the beginning of his theology. Fortunately, he has not been content to accept these studies uncritically, and has been careful to check their conclusions with the sources. The primary conclusion that the author emphasizes for English readers is that Luther had reached his mature theological position on practically all the major points—including his conception of the nature of sin, grace, faith, redemption, and the church—as early as his lectures on the Psalms in 1513-1514. Far from his thought being shaped by the course of events after 1517, as it has been frequently asserted; Luther's thought actually determined the attitude he took toward those events. Unless Rome changed, therefore, it was quite inevitable that ultimately his words of 1520 should be spoken: "Farewell, unhappy, hopeless, blasphemous Rome! The Wrath of God hath come upon thee, as thou deservest." Equally illuminating is Rupp's discussion of Luther's ethic and his attitude toward the "temporal" order. Unforgetable is Luther's picture of the Ruler as the Mad Coachman.

> When a Prince rules after his own mad will and follows his own opinion, he is like a mad coachman who rushes straight ahead with horse and wagon, through bushes, briars, ditches, water, up hill and down dale, regardless of roads or bridges: he will not drive long, for all will crash in ruin.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of Luther's personality to the contemporary American, acutely conscious of "face" and prestige, is the utter lack of pretension as to his own rôle in the Reformation. "I simply taught, preached, wrote God's Word: otherwise I did nothing. And then, while I slept, or drank Wittenberg beer with my Philip and my Amsdorf, the Word so greatly weakened the Papacy that never a Prince or Emperor inflicted such damage upon it. I did nothing. The Word did it all."

Although Luther "did not take kindly to the idea that men might at some distant date study his writings, when they would be better employed studying the Word of God," Rupp points out that the modern biblical theology rests heavily upon the "Luther renaissance" of the last three or four decades. To leave the matter there, concludes Rupp, would neither please Luther nor be adequate to our need.

> Now, Protestants must be occupied with nothing less than the Reformation of Reformation itself. The characteristic language, forms, institutions, disciplines, which began four hundred years ago, have come to the end of their journey, as evangelical and pastoral vehicles, however imperishable their value to the trained and instructed within the household of faith. If our gospel is to come home to lost, secular, revolutionary man, the Churches . . . must face the need for creative and drastic change. . . . Here Luther would encourage us. "For what, I ask," he said, "is not new that faith does? Was it not a new thing when the Apostles instituted their ministry? Was it not a new thing, when Abraham offered his son? Was it not new when Israel crossed the sea? Will it not be a new thing when I shall pass from death to life?"

This review cannot close without a word of appreciation being expressed for the quotations from *Pilgrim's Progress* which stand at the beginning of each chapter. It was a happy thought which led the author to place them there, for no other words could have caught so vividly and expressed so pointedly the true meaning of Luther's own spiritual odyssey.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

The Hebrew Impact on Western Civilization, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. 922, $10.

This huge volume is frankly "a book of propaganda" in the better sense of the word. It seeks by information and statistics, gathered from numerous sources, to reveal the wide and impressive influence that Jews and Judaism have exerted on Western civilization. Granted that such justification of a people's existence is necessary, this volume serves a useful purpose.

A glance through the table of contents indicates at once the broad scope of the articles and the large areas of information that their writers, each a specialist in his own field, seek to encompass. American democracy's foundations in ancient Hebraic ideals are exposed. Jewish sociologists, political scientists, and statesmen have helped to mold the thinking and destiny of nations. Their contributions as citizens have brought such Jewish patriots both praise and in sterner times blame and even sorrow. Jews have played significant rôles in social service, science, medicine, music, art, the dance, and literature. They have contributed to law and philosophy. They have influenced the drama, in the theatre and in the motion pictures. They have impressed themselves upon modern journalism. Their names are found among global explorers. The Jew has distinguished himself as soldier, strategist, and military adviser. He has made his mark in modern religious development.

A compendium of such proportions cannot but strike the reader with Jewish energy, creativeness, and participation in all the vital concerns of civilized living. This volume, therefore, cannot but feed the legitimate pride of Jewish readers and assure non-Jewish readers that Jews are contributing factors in the making and sustaining of modern civilization.

Granted all this, however, one must regretfully record the fact that these essays are of varied quality. Some, like "Jewish Cultural Influences in the Middle Ages," are outstanding for both scholarship and presentation; others are indifferent both in content and style, being merely lists of names, such as the articles on medicine, art, drama, and philosophy; still others downright bad.

Unfortunately, like so many volumes of an apologetic nature, some of the writers of this volume distort perspectives in their zealousness to prove their points. Thus, such writers as Proust and Kafka are, in terms of space alloted to them, outweighed by so insignificant a writer as Montague Glass, author of *Potash and Perlmutter.* From reading about Jews in music, one would conjecture that Wagner was a mere pygmy in the presence of Meyerbeer. And what is even more derisive is the tendency to claim prominent personalities as Jews even though such a one is not a Jew; for example, Henry L. Mencken, who is not only not a Jew but is mildly anti-Semitic.

Numerous errors are sprinkled throughout the text, more than can be recorded here. Herzl's *Judenstaat* was published in 1896, not in 1869; Richard-Beer Hofmann was born in 1866, not in 1886; Dr. Cyrus Adler cannot be listed among Jewish philosophers; and of course the great work of Moses Maimonides was not *Mishnah-Hatara* as recorded here but *Mishneh Torah;* nor is he ever referred to as Rabbi Maimonides.

Despite its many inaccuracies, distortions, and lack of balance, its poor English in spots and its dull listing of names of men and books, this volume can serve a useful purpose. It does contain a wealth of information about Jews, much of it not known to the general reader; most of it scattered in different books, magazine articles, and other sources of information. It provides a suggestive bibliography at the end of each chapter and will prove a great help to the serious student searching for source material.

Above all, it will help to dispel an ancient and false conception of the Jew, too often conceived as moneylender, shopkeeper, or middleman living on the civilizations of other creative peoples but not contributing creatively towards those civilizations. This volume does underline the affirmation that the Jew has been and is farmer, soldier, explorer, scientist, artist, scholar, and philosopher. As such he has earned his keep in the households of the nations and has helped to created Western civilization.

MORTIMER J. COHEN

Forward Through the Ages, by Basil Mathews, New York, Friendship Press, ©1951, pp. xii, 275, $2.75.

The reviewing of this book brings with it a mixture of sadness and gratitude. It is the last volume to come from the gifted and prolific pen of Basil Mathews, who for a generation has written with charm and accuracy on various aspects of the world mission of the church. Much of it was composed under the handicap of physical weakness and suffering, for the verdict of death had been passed by the surgeons before the work was anywhere near to completion. Yet nowhere does the little volume give the slightest hint of impaired powers. Never had Dr. Mathews written more brilliantly.

The author's purpose was to give in brief, accurate, and readable form the vast sweep of the spread of the gospel across the world and through the centuries. This he accomplished with amazing skill. The book is designed for young people, but those in middle and later life will find it fascinating. It begins, as is proper, with Paul. In less than eighty pages, with broad strokes and yet with concrete illustration, the story is carried through its first fifteen centuries. Two thirds of the space is assigned to the past 450 years and nearly a third to the forty years after 1910. On this seemingly small canvas is spread out an amazing panorama, all the more astounding because it can be seen almost at a glance. It is one which to the Christian is compellingly heartening. In it there are many details, for Dr. Mathews is well aware that most of us think in concrete terms and are impressed as much by individuals and incidents as we are by generalizations. He has given us thumbnail portraits of many men and women, some of them well known to those familiar with the history of the church, and others, important, but known to only a few specialists. The book has both lights and shadows, but it is the lights which predominate. Dr. Mathews was a man of faith and his faith would not permit him to be discouraged in the face of either personal suffering or what appears to be wholesale disaster. Here is an account of the church in many lands both in former centuries and in the decade through which we have just now come. We hear of Roman Catholics, Orthodox, Nestorians, and Protestants. We also read of the rise and progress of the Ecumenical Movement. The little book is made all the more vivid and useful by illustrations, maps, and charts. A carefully selected and well-arranged bibliography has been added. Publication in England is by the Oxford University Press under the title *Disciples of All Nations.*

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

Pastoral Counseling: Its Theory and Practice, by Carroll A. Wise, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xi, 231, $2.75.

One of the fads among a generation that knows little of Jesus or Socrates is to brand pastoral counseling as "something of a fad." But the relevant question is not whether pastoral counseling shall be done; rather, whether it shall be done adequately or inadequately—or even whether it shall be done harmfully or helpfully. Dr. Wise has written a volume which points in the direction of helpful counseling. His aim, as he states it, is "not to try to describe what a pastor without proper training can do," but rather "what the pastor should have training to do" (p. x).

The author, who is professor of pastoral psychology and counseling at Garrett Biblical Institute, describes his approach as "a 'nonaggressive' attitude toward the counselee" (p. 68). The counselor attempts to provide a setting in which the counselee can "communicate" his feelings to the counselor, who, as a kind of mirror-type listening post, communicates understanding and acceptance, while the counselee gradually gains insight and learns to accept himself. It is in this *process,* claims the author, that healing takes place. Basic to the process is an attitude on the part of the counselor which Dr. Esther Richards of Johns Hopkins described some years ago as learning to think in terms of "behaviour to be understood rather than conduct to be judged." Ministers and others who are acquainted with the "nondirective" or "client-centred" counseling of Carl Rogers and the "eductive" method of Seward Hiltner will find themselves in familiar territory.

The most severe visceral reactions to Dr. Wise's book are likely to occur among those readers whose theological orientation is in terms of "sinners in the hands of an angry God" and whose ego structure is such that they feel compelled to "play God" in their dealings with other people. This reviewer wants to have no share in providing such persons with ammunition that they can use against Dr. Wise.

On the other hand, judging by the published blurbs about the book and the fact that it was the "come on" in the newly organized Pastoral Psychology Book Club, there may very well be a large uncritical acceptance of this work by many pastors who are groping for some way of being helpful to the large number of distressed people who may consult a minister. My impression is that neither this volume nor any other currently available in this field can be accepted uncritically. Nor, apparently, would Dr. Wise want it accepted uncritically. "All our formulations are open to question, experimentation, and modification through the accumulation of new facts and deeper insights. At the present stage of our knowledge of personality and counseling everything needs to be examined in the spirit of free inquiry" (p. 4).

In this "spirit of free inquiry" a *caveat* needs to be uttered here and there. By way of example:

The author says that people who are beyond the counselor's skill "should be referred to a psychoanalyst" (p. 25). Obviously the pastor will need to make a number of referrals, and some of these may be to psychoanalysts. On the other hand, equally adequate—or, in some instances, preferable—help might be secured from psychiatrists who are not analysts, from consulting psychologists, and other therapists.

Although Dr. Wise's book is notably free from the jargon that clutters up so many volumes, one could wish for a happier terminology than counselor and "counselee." If the pastor is counselor, then I suppose the age demands that the person with whom he counsels be designated as counselee. (Of course Dr. Wise is not to be held accountable for these terms.) Granted that some term is necessary for describing a person who stands in a particular relationship to another person, it is hoped that a word can be found which at the least does not add to the steadily mounting list of

depersonalizing elements in our culture. Furthermore, "counselor" may not be the happiest designation for the pastor, particularly in the sense in which Dr. Wise uses the term; for Dr. Wise insists that the kind of counseling which he describes is distinctly *not* the giving of advice. There is also the further objection that the term counselor has long been employed to refer to members of the legal profession.

But then, what term is adequate? The word *pastor* ought to imply all that is needed. However, for many people pastor means "preacher," and many apparently believe that a preacher is one whose function is to preach *at* people rather than *to* them and their needs. Until someone comes forth with a more adequate term, I should like to suggest *pastoral therapy* as a designation for the treating and healing activities which it is appropriate for the pastor to undertake.

If therapy be accepted as the frank and thoroughly legitimate aim of the pastor, it then becomes natural to think of the *varieties* of therapy which fall within his domain. Thus might be avoided what strikes me as the major pitfall of Dr. Wise's book: presenting *one* method of "counseling" as *the* counseling procedure. (Item, page 49: "There are situations in which a person needs some objective kind of service or support. . . . However, those situations are not to be confused with counseling." In my opinion, the most disastrous event that could occur in the therapeutic field would be a premature rigidity in either theory or practice, if indeed such rigidity should ever take place. The spirit still "blows where it will." ARCHIBALD F. WARD, JR.

Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, by Saul Lieberman, New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, 1950, pp. xiv, 231, $3.

It would normally be expected that the successor to Louis Ginzberg at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America should be a prime and complete master of rabbinic lore. Such Saul Lieberman has shown himself to be in both his companion volumes: *Greek in Jewish Palestine* (1942) and *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine* (1950). From the point of view of exact rabbinic scholarship the demonstrations have been most impressive and convincing. Normally, however, it would not be anticipated that the Ginzberg successor would also be a prime and highly competent hellenist as well. This most strikingly and most exceptionally Saul Lieberman is also. So far as one can judge from his published writings he is as facile and competent in handling his Greek and Latin sources, whether literature or inscriptions or papyri, as he is in interpreting his talmudic materials. He is one of a very, very small group of scholars who can write equally instructively for both students of hellenism and for rabbinic students as well.

In a very real sense Saul Lieberman's latest publication is a companion and a complementary volume to his earlier book, *Greek in Jewish Palestine*. Both works deal open-mindedly and suggestively with the play of hellenistic influences on Jews of all classes in Palestine during the Alexandrian and Roman periods. There is, however, a clear difference in the respective subject matters of the two volumes that makes them mutually supplementary segments of work, rather than one a mere continuation of the other. Quite properly the first of the two investigations deals with the problem of hellenistic influences on the basis of the concrete linguistic and literary data involved. Quite properly the second of the two volumes advances to the consideration of the more inclusive and less well-defined social phenomena involved: manners, customs, institutions, thought patterns, religious rites, etc. This broad and important differentiation between the two books is indicated very succinctly in the titles given to them: *Greek* [Languages and Literature] *in Jewish Palestine* and *Hellenism* [as Culture] *in Jewish Palestine.*

When one turns to a consideration of the specific topics treated by Lieberman in the present work, he is delighted to discover a much better arranged and logically sequential table of contents than constituted the somewhat miscellaneous group of studies previously compiled. The initial chapter in the present book, "Texts of Scripture in the Early Rabbinic Period," introduces a considerable series of specific investigations of the critical and interpretative methods of the *Sopherim* and the rabbis in comparison, of course, with the critical procedures of gentile scholars. A chapter on "The Publication of the *Mishnah*" brings this long series to culmination. The central and pivotal study in the volume deals in a distinctive and unexpected manner with "The Alleged Ban on Greek Wisdom." Chapters on rabbinic attitudes toward idolatry introduce another long sequence of comparative studies, Jewish and heathen, dealing mainly with presacrificial rites and cult sanctuaries. Quite by itself, just before the appendices at the end of the volume, is an invaluable sketch entitled "The Natural Science of the Rabbis." It is much to be hoped that Lieberman will undertake systematic and comprehensive investigations in this vastly important area when time permits him to do so. Altogether the sequential chapters in this volume are very well arranged, and the nonsequential sections could ill be spared from the book.

There are one or two distinctive methods of interpretation employed by Lieberman himself that deserve particular notation for their interest and importance. One of them is his tendency to specify the concrete historical reference of the rabbinic dicta that he is dealing with. Here he exhibits fine interpretative understanding and extensive mastery of historical sources in coördinating rabbinic teachings with recorded events. Regarding the king in the *Midrash* who says to his children: "Remember that I am going to try capital cases and convict; therefore offer a sacrifice to me, so that when you come before my tribunal I may dismiss your *elogium*." By a comparison with information provided by Lactantius and Eusebius, Lieberman demonstrates that the "king" referred to was none other than Diocletian himself, who compelled his own wife Prisca and his own daughter Valeria, both of them Christians, to offer the prescribed sacrifice in order to avoid condemnation. Repeatedly and effectively the author makes his point that rabbinic teachings were usually quite pointed and timely.

Very challenging, also, is the author's habit of hunting for real though unexpressed reasons and motivations for particular scribal injunctions. The tendency is frankly acknowledged and well exemplified in his discussion of the prerequisites of sacrificial victims, required by pagans but ignored by Jewish authorities (pp. 156 f.), and also in his analysis of the classical abrogations credited to Johanan the high priest (pp. 139 ff.). Undoubtedly this matter of unexpressed motivation to-be-inferred is a very precarious piece of business. Even so, it is quite worth while attempting. When a scholor knows his field—as Lieberman conspicuously does—and when he is capable of objective thinking—as Lieberman usually is—then he is in a position to make inferences regarding purposes and motivations that have possibility or even probability in their favor.

The author's conclusion regarding *Greek in Jewish Palestine*, from the literary and linguistic evidence now available, was as follows: "The degree of a person's Hellenistic culture depended on his social standing. Probably the upper class knew Greek literature, the middle class was less conversant with it, while the knowledge of the lower class was limited to the vernacular only" (p. 21).

To this reasonable basic statement of probability there may now be added the author's broader conclusions in his latest volume, concerning the social and cultural indebedness of Palestinian Jews to their gentile neighbors: "We have sought to demonstrate in the several chapters of this book the great similarities between the

methods, behavior, practices, and notions prevalent among Jews and Gentiles alike. Although some of them may have been the heritage left by a more distant and simpler age, many of the others were nevertheless probably the result of direct contact and close relations among the various peoples in the Hellenistic Mediterranean world" (p. 193).

The well-informed historical student can hardly take exception to this well-balanced and excellently supported generalization. At a time when Protestant scholars are exhibiting an increasing tendency to deny to hellenistic factors an important rôle in the development of early Christianity, this conclusion of a leading rabbinic scholar regarding hellenistic influences operative on Jews in Palestine merits careful consideration.

HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY

The Legacy of Maimonides, by Ben Zion Bokser, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. 128, $3.75.

The perennial interest in Maimonides is evidenced by the latest study of his religious philosophy by Rabbi Bokser. It is based primarily on the principal work of the intellectual giant of mediæval Judaism, the *Guide to the Perplexed,* and is enriched by liberal references to some of his other writings. The book grew out of a series of lectures, and is here presented in expanded form.

A biographical sketch serves as an introduction to the writings of Maimonides and to his place in the world of thought. The chapter on "Reason and the Quest of Truth" sets forth the chief legacy of the master, of his coming to grips with the challenge of Aristotelian naturalism to revealed religion and demonstrating that reason and faith form "complementary channels" for the quest of truth. Man's highest good and religion's principal concern, the love of God, alike are achieved by means of the intellect. It is the contemplation of nature that yields us knowledge concerning God, his wisdom and beneficence. Both love and awe, which climax man's attitude to God, are attainable only through reason. The pursuit of knowledge thus becomes part of man's religious obligation. However, the path of reason is beset with numerous difficulties and pitfalls. Only the chosen few may follow it with any degree of success, and even they are impeded by the limitations of reason beyond which it does not function adequately. So crucial a question as to whether the world is eternal or created could not be decisively resolved by unaided reason. Only divine revelation could offer effective guidance to the human mind.

This leads to the vital core of religion to which the third chapter of the book is devoted. For Maimonides as for his predecessors it was essential not only to establish the existence of God but also to take a stand on how to think of him. The ideas of traditional religion appeared naïve for speculative philosophy. Maimonides, therefore, proceeded to replace them with the Aristotelian conceptions of the First Cause and the Prime Mover. At the same time he salvaged from biblical religion the idea of divine personality, skillfully disengaging it from all anthropopathisms and anthropomorphisms. His negative theology achieved positive results, retaining the elements that are vital to theistic faith and consistent with the demands of reason.

The fourth chapter on "Religion and Culture" presents Maimonides' idea of prophecy in relation to reason, on the one hand, and to the Torah as a practical way of life, on the other. Repudiating racialism, Maimonides conceived of Israel as the people of revelation, charged with the task of summoning the nations to pure worship and ethical faith in God. This view set the pattern for the philosopher's high-minded attitude toward converts to Judaism and to all righteous men of other religions.

Without glossing over the aggressive attitudes of Christianity and Islam, he recognized their high achievements in filling the world with the doctrines of the Torah and the commandments and with the belief in the advent of the Messiah. They have served as trail blazers for the true messianic redemption that yet awaits mankind.

The fifth chapter on "Man as a Citizen of the Universe" treats the anthropology and ethics of Maimonides. The last section returns to the central interest of the book, *viz.*, the abiding elements in the "Legacy of Maimonides." These he finds in the philosopher's achievement of a view of the universe which does not rob life of its dignity or its hope.

The numerous omissions in the treatment of the teachings of Maimonides are accountable by the popular nature of the work. Still the student of religious thought is entitled to a fuller presentation of the master's ideas regarding the articles of Jewish belief, his psychology and eschatology. While the work does not add to the store of available knowledge of Maimonides, it furnishes a clear and in places an attractive summary of the religious philosophy of one of the great thinkers of all time.

SAMUEL S. COHON

The Philosophy of Religion, by William S. Morgan, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. xv., 413, $6.

This purports to be a work in the advanced philosophy of religion, the author describing his effort as " a consideration of the more profound aspects of religious thought." Many will find it just that, as the work grows very involved in its treatment of many of the subjects under consideration. One will not find here too frequently a reduction of religious reality to the great simplicities by which religious men live and die. Yet sometimes the author does reach such a position through the maze of conflicting theories and considerations, as, for instance, when he reaches the conclusion that Ultimate Reality is a unifying and causal principle. Therein he eschews the dualism which plagued Descartes, Geulinex, and even Spinoza, finally reaching the conclusion that the energetic forces of the universe, whether spiritual or physical, focus in the unity of consciousness. Self-activity, growing out of self-consciousness, is the key to understanding the universe of things as well as the mind of man. Thus is found a unitary principle which is the explanation of the multiplicities of the universe and experience.

The broad range of this volume may best be apprehended by noting the titles of the five books into which the work is divided. Book I deals with the nature of philosophy and religion; Book II is concerned with the problem of knowing Reality; Book III interprets Ultimate Reality as a unifying and causal principle; Book IV interprets Ultimate Reality as an ethical and æsthetical principle; Book V reflects on Ultimate Reality in relation to the phenomena of the religious life and the destiny of man. There is a thorough, if sometimes tedious, discussion of each of these areas of concern for the philosophy of religion. The reader will be borne along through them to a sense of the unity of Reality and to the validity of the religious life and faith in immortality.

He who reads will time and time again be refreshed by the author's interpretation of basic elements in the religious life of man. The fall of man, for instance, is put into this setting: "On a particular day, we might well suppose, he [primitive man] returned home after killing a fellow-man, with downcast eyes and a condemning soul; on that day the fall of man occurred: that is to say, barbaric man had fallen and ethical man had risen." Or consider this interpretation of what man is, an

interpretation which grows out of Morgan's unitary view of Reality: "This common life of humanity is none other than the expression of the life of God. In the most real sense we are not only his offspring but verily his embodiment." We also note as a startling thought the author's insistence that mankind needs a Bible for each thousand years of its experience. He writes: "A Bible is needed for each thousand years of the life of the race. It takes a long time to forget the past crystallizations of religious thought. Man is most intense in his religion. Because of this, religious controversies and wars are the most bitter. But if today a united church could agree upon a group of representative men to garner an account of the rich religious experiences of the race into a Bible, what a volume it would make! What a new revelation it would impart! What deep stirrings of the Spirit of God it would reveal! Thus all the believers in all the religions of the world would worship God in the unity of the Spirit and read together one great collection of religiously inspired and inspiring literature." Such are typical of many insights which await the reader of this difficult, but worthful, volume.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man, by E. A. Havelock, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. ix, 218, $2.75.

The last half of this book is devoted to a translation of Æschylus' *Prometheus Bound.* The translation is vivid, fresh, and appealing to modern ears. The first half consists of nine brief essays on the ideas of the drama. The author shows how Æschylus improves on the ancient myth of Prometheus recorded in Hesiod's *Theogony* by transforming fire from a secret and mysterious power into a symbol of the uses and triumphs of scientific technology. Prometheus the fire bringer becomes Prometheus the humanist, defender of man's confidence in himself and his works.

Yet even Æschylus, says the author, was aware that new power meant something beside triumph, and the ancient myths themselves hinted that man, though a victor, might taste defeat in his victory. The Greeks saw the conflict as that between Prometheus and Zeus; moderns think of it as intellect versus power. Professor Havelock has some interesting things to say about the dilemma modern man faces in his inability to make his own purposes prevail. The poignancy of the situation is not relieved by the fact that we are now beginning to learn how significant some human purposes are. Just as the Greeks drew back in their moment of confidence, so we are drawing back in our hour of achievement. Prometheus fought against a will that seemed revengeful and vindictive. We fight, if I understand the author, against a type of political power that in its reckless desire to dominate offers sheer blind opposition to intelligence and its works.

The book is full of arresting insights. If it has a fault, it is that these are not brought together into a total argument that is readily grasped. Frequent references are made, for example, to the nonhumanistic aspects of the myth as both Hesiod and Æschylus treated it and to the evidences of an Oriental attitude of dependence on a greater enviroment. But it is hard to fit this strand with the others and particularly hard to see whether the author thinks it has anything to teach us today. At times, also, I found my ideas of authorship getting mixed as I tried to disentangle Hesiod's ideas from those of Æschylus and Æschylus' ideas from those of Havelock. Yet if the ideas are good I don't know why we should haggle over the question of whose they are. For real insight give us metaphysics rather than history every time, and metaphysics of a stimulating sort is what this book has.

J. S. BIXLER

BOOK NOTICES

Nicholas Berdyaev, by George Seaver, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 122, $2.

Since Berdyaev's death in 1948, three books in English have come out giving a survey of his thought, and the most recent by George Seaver has appeared in both England and the United States within the last months. It is a useful little volume that gives some feeling of Berdyaev and focuses the reader's attention upon the mystical background of all that he wrote. It discusses Berdyaev's view of freedom, of history, and of the deification of man and suggests where in Berdyaev's works the reader may go for further development of these themes. The writer suggests in his introduction that he is out to "reveal the mind of a thinker whose thought so much resembles and at the same time far surpasses his own." And since this method is followed throughout, in spite of the quotations from Berdyaev that are frequent and on the whole good quotations, the reader has the feeling that he is never quite sure whether he is reading Berdyaev or Seaver, and the liberties that Seaver has used may at points be questioned. The strength of the book lies in its treatment of the theological aspects of Berdyaev's thought, and the weakness is clearly in his handling of Berdyaev's critical and prophetic dealing with communism and the political and ethical problems of the time. There are many who believe that such prophetic insights vastly surpass in lasting importance the more loosely phrased and dubious theological insights of Berdyaev, and these will frankly be disappointed in this book and will much prefer the more critical volume of Spinka's. After reading Berdyaev's magnificent autobiography which has just come out in England under the title of *Dream and Reality,* one is acutely aware that when the well-translated works of the author himself are readily accessible, they are vastly to be preferred to the straining of a man's thought through the mind of another. It is doubtful whether we have enough perspective on the life of Berdyaev and on his work to write a book that can be other than such an *Ersatz,* and therefore, no matter how valiant the attempt, the discerning reader will be counseled to go directly to the works of the master himself and to feed on them in their unpremasticated form.

DOUGLAS V. STEERE

The Golden Dawn, by J. Ray Shute, Monroe (N. C.), Nocalore Press, 1950, pp. 78, $1.50.
His Honor the Heretic, by J. Ray Shute, Monroe (N. C.), Nocalore Press, 1950, pp. 76, $1.50.

These two little books by the mayor of Monroe, North Carolina, are as unorthodox as they are delightful. There is no single category into which they can be fitted; they spill over into several. If, however, we are forced to classify them, perhaps we should call them sermons, but if so, the term achieves a new and fascinating range of flexibility. In the summer of 1948, Mayor Shute, who had long been recognized as one of the South's most colorful—as well as influential—personalities, shocked and perplexed the admiring populace which had elected him to office by announcing that he had become a Unitarian. The consternation thus produced seemed likely, at first, to dim the prospect of his re-election. But during the campaign he made it known that Jefferson and Calhoun had also been Unitarians, and proceeded

to expound both his own faith and theirs. Besides winning the election, these activities resulted in a Unitarian church being founded, of which Mayor Shute is not only the lay leader but also—no matter how informal his credentials—the inspired prophet and apostle. In his opinion, the South is ready to turn liberal in religion, and a good deal of what he says in these two books is offered in support of that claim. He writes at times with drastic candor and yet manages to infuse his judgments with an amiability and good humor that make it clear, even in cold print, that we are dealing with a man whose sympathies are unusually broad and generous and a fitting counterpart to his keen and perceptive intellect. He takes his hope, he says, "from the greatest heretic of them all, Jesus of Nazareth," and walks "with joy and confidence the Liberal Lane of Life, knowing no higher religion than truth, and seeking . . . the Kingdom of God where the Galilean said we should find it." For those who are willing to be adventurous in relegion and are not afraid to hear truth spoken just as it comes, unforced and spontaneous, from a buoyantly forthright personality, there can be few happier experiences than this chance to meet with "his honor, the heretic," and share with him the hope of a "golden dawn."

A. POWELL DAVIES

The Whole World Singing, compiled by Edith Lovell Thomas, New York, Friendship Press, ©1950, pp. 126, $2.75 (paper $1.50).

In a home where there is family singing, in school, or in church this collection of ninety-nine songs from thirty-eight national or cultural backgrounds will be a source of pleasure and inspiration. While most of the songs are arranged for solo voice with piano accompaniment, many are adapted for part singing. Some are rounds and some are to be acted as well as sung. Nearly every number is explained by brief and pertinent notes. Children will enjoy these "Songs of Praise and Work and Joy from Many Lands," and a competent leader can use them not only to broaden the singers' knowledge of the world but also to develop attitudes of friendship and peace. The subjects have a wide range, from the Chinese folk song "Fat Baby Sister" to a prayer set to motives from *Parsifal* and ending with the Dresden Amen. Only a few of the selections seem a bit high or with too wide a range for young children; and the accompaniments, while adequate, are comparatively simple. There are songs of planting, harvesting, catching fish, calling the cows; for Christmas, birthdays, St. Valentine's Day, Thanksgiving, Palm Sunday, Easter, and Chanukah. While some of the selections (like "Pippa Passes") may seem a bit optimistic in the present world situation, there is value in songs of cheer. So it is appropriate that many of the songs give praise to God for the good things that children enjoy; minor keys appear only in melodies from oriental countries and Africa, with the exception of a Chippewa Indian melody. The book deserves wide use in groups where children and young people may express themselves.

OVID R. SELLERS

The Place of the Lion, by Charles Williams, New York, Pellegrini & Cudahy, ©1951, pp. 236, $3.

T. S. Eliot has said of Charles Williams' novels, "They are good reading even for those who never read a novel more than once, and demand only that it should keep them interested for two or three hours." Keeping the above statement in mind, it is perfectly possible to read this book with relish without stopping to realize what it is that Mr. Williams is trying to say. The style appears to be balanced between that of Henry James in his impeccable ghost stories, and the more forthright, blood-curdling horrors of Algernon Blackwood. The story itself presents a densely crowded

panorama of beasts and men, real and unreal (often both at the same time) which moves swiftly and terribly to its conclusion: A lioness has escaped from a circus, and is being hunted through the fields around the small English town of Smetham. Suddenly, two witnesses see the lioness change into a gigantic lion which strikes down an aging philosopher out for a walk in his garden. The lion disappears, and the old man is found to be unharmed, although his mind refuses to come back from the contemplation of a place in time where there is no time. Other people in the neighborhood of Smetham see a huge serpent, the lion, immense butterflies, a unicorn, a pterodactyl. Houses fall in, railroad lines are pulverized. It is left to the young subeditor of a literary magazine to unravel this snarl of bewildering events and to control the primitive violence which has been unleashed by the work of a study group under the domination of the old philosopher. In the process, some men are saved, some are damned; but eventually the fiery angel which has left the earth returns to protect mankind, and we are led to believe that the town of Smetham and its inhabitants will be allowed to return to a more normal way of life. All of this is fascinating reading, but it is only skin-deep. There are many hints given as to the real ideas which Mr. Williams wishes to present. These seem to be part and parcel of the neoörthodox movement, which discounts the ordinary efforts of men and women to lead good lives, and concentrates upon ecclesiastical hocus-pocus as the only means to achieve salvation. Coupled with this there is the extreme arrogance of the indoctrinated souls who make it their business to dispose of the lives of those less favored than themselves. (This appears to be axiomatic of neoörthodox fiction: both *The Cocktail Party* of T. S. Eliot, and *The Screwtape Letters* of C. S. Lewis are afflicted with pseudopsychiatric divines who make momentous pronouncements as if ailing humanity must obey them or be damned to eternity.) Naturally, this is very distasteful to many who are not of this particular persuasion. To sum up these several approaches to the book: as theology, I deplore *The Place of the Lion;* as literature, I unhesitatingly rank it among the finest horror stories which we possess—far more interesting and worth while than most. THEODORE ENSLIN

The Secret of God, by Robert D. Hershey, Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press ©1951, pp. vii, 162, $1.75

The pastor of the Lutheran Church of the Holy Communion, Philadelphia, has prepared a volume of unusually brilliant sermons, which is a fine contribution to current homiletical literature. Published as a kind of Lutheran "Presiding Bishop's Book for Lent," the sermons, each a unit in itself, are held together by a unity deeper than the mere repetition of "The Secret of——" at the beginning of each chapter. Some books have been put together out of miscellaneous materials artificially tied together on the thread of a word. One has the feeling that these sermons really do cohere in terms of an underlying purpose to reveal applications of divine mysteries. The book is a kind of introduction to systematic theology for the layman, for the chapters take up the doctrines of the whole faith—redemption, the church, holiness, God, faith, the kingdom, love, forgiveness, the cross, the resurrection. The theology is a blend of the biblical and the rational, fused by the spirit of the living Christ. It would not please the rabidly humanistic-liberal school, nor the rabidly neoörthodox. It has a kind of existential urgency about it which will appeal to those who seek an authentic voice. Dr. Hershey shows evidence of wide reading. Here one will find references to Storm Jameson, Vera Brittain, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Voltaire, Goethe, C. S. Lewis, and many others. There is also a dependence to some extent upon other preachers: Stewart, Fosdick, Macartney's *Illustrations.* The latter kind

of illustration is less convincing than matter taken directly from the original source. For example, on p. 67 there is a quotation from Evelyn Underhill. The footnote states that this quotation was quoted by James Mackay in a sermon in the *Christian World.* It probably represents intellectual honesty to cite the secondary source from which the quotation was derived, but one feels that if the quotation has become a part of the author's thinking, it would be perfectly legitimate to appropriate it for one's own use, citing the original Underhill source, even if that meant looking it up. Presumably, Dr. Mackay had indicated the source in his sermon footnotes? If not, one admits that would mean a terrific amount of research just to track down one sentence! There are some very fine lines in these sermons—memorable statements. Samples: "We want everything to be ours that we may belong to God in Christ, and we want to belong to God in Christ so that everything may be ours. But you and I needn't worry about the paradox, that is God's secret. What we had better worry about is the temptation to forget to whom we belong when we get so many belongings" (p. 75); "Man is so limited and bound by the 'thingness' of things, and the contemporaneousness of time" (p. 153); "No one dare suppose that just because we're loaded with facts, we're on the way to the millennium" (pp. 102 f.). KENDIG BRUBAKER CULLY

Lord of All, by J. Trevor Davies, London, Independent Press, ©1951, pp. 184, 7/6.

This is a volume of twelve excellent sermons from the mind and pen of J. Trevor Davies of New College, London. The purpose of these simple, yet significant, sermons is to emphasize the spirit of Jesus Christ, and to give aid to a better understanding of him in these days of difficult living. The author has taken New Testament incidents and sayings of Jesus which are well known to the average churchman and has applied their message to life situations. The ideas are traditional, yet beautifully expressed. There is nothing new or profound in the messages. Yet, while reading them, I felt my heart strangely warmed, for I believed Dr. Davies to be preaching to me. The illustrations, for the most part, are fresh and vital. The prayers at the conclusion of the sermons are from the historic treasure of our faith and are as helpful as when they were first offered. These "studies," as the author calls them, are timely. Note the following subjects: "True Totalitarianism," "Taking Things for Granted," "Crisis and Christ," "Inside Information," "The Value of the Individual," "Facing up to Failure," "Going With the Crowd," and "Christian Victor." This generation of ours does need to face up to Jesus Christ. Never before have we needed so sorely to re-examine our lives in the light of his glorious life. Dr. Davies helps us to do this through these messages of faith and challenge.

ALLEN B. STANGER

The Age of Terror, by Leslie Paul, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 256, $3.

This is an essay in the philosophy of history. The subject matter of the writer's investigation is European civilization, which he sees to be in the throes of death at this present juncture, when "not only has terror become war: war has become terror." Mr. Paul analyzes the rise of destructive forces in Europe which reached their fulfillment in nazism and communism. He believes that these developed because the Christian purpose of "a full and self-respecting life," itself became warped and twisted through a materialistic urge in the nineteenth century. Eventually man as well as nature became the subject of scientific manipulation. Recognizing the power of ideas to dominate the world, he urges that Europe somehow find an ideology which can yet stem the tides of self-destruction. "European man is grinding his continent to pieces because, disdaining the spirit and worshipping material advantage, he canot, because

he dare not, surrender one title of material power to anyone else. Only when he throws up that struggle for the pursuit of the immortal life of the spirit, only when he grows careless about the distribution of daily bread so that the bread everlasting is not denied to him, only then will it be possible to decide his bloody and unending struggles in a spirit of justice, equity and love." Mr. Paul feels that Russia and America are nations on the periphery of European culture, and that if Europe were really to die, they might live on as great powers but not as civilizations. The style of writing is a cross between that of a news commentator and of a lecturer, but his references to Berdyaev show that he has drawn more deeply from the wells of thought than would be true of a mere journalist. He almost becomes a theologian at times!

KENDIG BRUBAKER CULLY

Early Medieval Philosophy, by George Bosworth Burch, New York, King's Crown Press, 1951, pp. vi, 142, $2.25.

In the business of learning and teaching good handbooks or summaries are useful indeed, both for orientation and review. The history of philosophy and Christian doctrine between Augustine and St. Thomas, for all its importance, is neglected by students and teachers alike because of the intricacies of firsthand research in the period and also because there are so few concise and reliable surveys. Professor Burch's brief, entitled *Early Medieval Philosophy,* is therefore doubly welcome. It provides straightforward and, in the main, adequate expositions of the salient ideas of Erigena, Anselm, Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Isaac of Stella (in each case, a *précis* of their principal writings). It also traces the lines of connection between the main traditions of Christian metaphysics in the period as a whole. Here, in short compass, the neophyte student or the harassed professor can find the sum of an extraordinarily complex philosophical development expounded clearly, directly, and with great objectivity. Burch's own sympathies are avowedly with Abelard; nevertheless, his chapter on Abelard's great persecutor, Bernard, is fully as good an exposition (perhaps even a mite better) as the one on his own favorite. And the chapter on Isaac of Stella turns a clear light on a hitherto quite obscure figure who was nevertheless of real importance in the background of the great debates of high scholasticism. For many readers this particular chapter will afford a real discovery. The book, however, is too short for its own purposes. The expositions, as I have said, are very good. But the introduction and the transitional sections are skimpy and occasionally misleading. Moreover, even a synopsis requires more interpretative and critical material than is supplied here. One wonders if Professor Burch might not be persuaded to do a full-dress history of thought in this neglected period. This little book demonstrates that he has the gifts and apparatus with which to do it.

ALBERT C. OUTLER

Strengthening the Spiritual Life, by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 63, $1.

This book is predicated upon a formula for spiritual success that came to the author's wife in a dream. "Many times God speaks through dreams to those attentive to His voice" (p. 14). "Made inwardly rich through constant prayer, we may begin to hear almost constant voices. How shall we treat these voices? First, let us be thankful for them. . . . Second, we shall test them by the simple method of lifting them up to the Holy Spirit. . . . God can use autosuggestion, if acceptance be that" (pp. 36-37). The author writes further, "I can think of no place I want to be known so well as on my knees confessing my own sins and faults and finding the strength and forgiveness to start again" (p. 57). These quotations, and they are representative,

act as signposts on the roads along which the suggested disciplines of the spiritual life are to travel. The spiritual life does need strengthening, to be sure, and much of what Ferré says is pertinent and important, but still there is an overtone that will not be congenial to many good Christian folks. He has taken the familiar furniture and rearranged the room, but it still resembles the old-fashioned parlor. With some justice many people prefer to think of it as the living room. ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

God Makes the Difference, by Edwin McNeill Poteat, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 242, $3.

Dr. Poteat has a very active mind. He has read widely. He has thought with a certain virile energy. And he writes with a quality of rugged vitality. He sets about commending a vital faith in God precisely because of the difference which this belief will make. History will be seen in a new light. Man will be seen with a new perspective. The family and society will be set in new relationships. Government will be seen with new insight. Organized Christianity will reveal a new soul of meaning. Love will be understood in a transforming fashion. The limitations and the tragedies of life will be placed in new perspectives of hope and expectation. Death will be apprehended as a beginning and not as an end. Redemption will have qualities of utter moral and spiritual compulsion. A great faith in exhaustless life will be established. And the very living and constant adventure of faith in God will become a commanding moral imperative. Endless insights are expressed with a brilliant edge of cutting speech in this volume. A deep and passionate idealism possesses the writer and directs his pen. He uses his own mind to make a home for his spirit in his own world. And he offers the results of this personal enterprise of thinking with good hope that it will be of use, indeed of genuine importance, to others. Dr. Poteat is familiar with contemporary scientific discussion and he uses a scientific vocabulary very freely. There are keen insights here. But often he flings his scientific vocabulary about without very critical examination of its meaning. And once and again he is handicapped as he attempts to make words invented for one sort of meaning the vehicle of another quite alien to their genius. His classifications are often less exhaustive than he would be willing to have the reader believe. His style at its best has a fine mastery. But there are too many crass words and too many phrases which lack in urbanity. And there are pages of tense and eager writing which are likely to leave the reader cold. All these things represent spots on a sun which has its own bright luminousness. The friendly reader will close the book wishing that more men used as much energy as Dr. Poteat in getting away from the conventional to what they believe to be real. Like all books which in the best sense are provocative, this one makes it inevitable that the man who peruses its pages shall think as well as read. And one does not come to the end of the experience without an urgent sense of the meaning of the God whose face we see in the face of Christ.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

Pantomime, by Wallace Fowlie, Chicago, Regnery, 1951, pp. 246, $3.50.

To those who know Wallace Fowlie's pleasantly garrulous style (a style which masks perhaps the best criticism of contemporary French literature now being written in America), any book that bears his name will appear important. Nor will his readers be disappointed in the present volume. A charming autobiography, this book is the record of Fowlie's movement from one enchantment to another and of his eventual fulfillment in a passionate love affair with French literature, as he became acquainted with it, first through Professor André Morize at Harvard, and later in

intimate association with the Renan and Psichari families in Paris. These reminiscences are told in an arresting style which bears evidence of the author's enthusiasm for his subject. Sometimes this same enthusiasm seems a bit sentimental, for example, the nostalgic preoccupations with Baudelaire's tombstone, or Ernest Psichari's desk—but my grievance is a personal one, and such things may actually enhance the value of the book for other readers. There is another side to Fowlie's journal, however, which may not be so evident at first, but which becomes the entire *raison d'être* when one discovers it. This is the author's acute understanding of the tremendous problem which faces any man who dares assume the rôle of creator. Certainly any practicing artist realizes the misery which his position in relationship to that of other people can bring about, but few have been so candid (or so honest) as to be able to write the following: "No matter how involved he becomes with people, an artist never lives, he observes life. He is always suspended, and his personal suffering comes from the terrible truth that he is unable to participate in life without recording it, without stylizing and adjusting it." These are brave words, and no mere breast beating. I suspect that Fowlie learned a respect for accurate self-analysis in the *Journals* of André Gide, a learning that he has put to good use in his own writing. Above all, Fowlie gives his readers the impression that he has studied his part well, realizing that as a clown he may be in dead earnest when he is the gayest. It is in this way that we reach the man himself, and the reason for *Pantomime's* subtitle: *A Journal of Rehearsals*—rehearsals for the serious business of life. THEODORE ENSLIN

The Redeemer: The Work and Person of Jesus Christ, by William R. Cannon, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 224. $2.75.

As the title indicates, this book stresses the theological implications of the career of Jesus rather than the attempt to interpret Jesus historically. Since the Christian's view of Jesus has traditionally been the keystone of his theology, it is right that this should be reëxamined periodically. The reviewer agrees with the author that a correct picture of the historic Jesus is fundamental to the proper evaluation of his person. This, however, the author fails to give. The gospel accounts of Jesus are so presented by Dr. Cannon that his theology *appears* to be substantiated. Dr. Cannon maintains that "the materials of history . . . come to us exactly as they are from the past; and all we can do with them is to look at them, accept or reject them according to the dictates of what we take to be sound judgement, and arrange them in some sort of order or pattern" (pp. 28-29). Would not the presuppositions and prejudices of the original reporters, and of the historian who would study the material, have to be taken into account? And, need not the differences in the thought patterns of the ancient world and of our world be allowed for? Again, surely his condescending summary of the work of generations of devoted New Testament scholars is ungenerous and unjust. Would not a more thorough grasp of the results of their labor enrich his thinking? This leads me to a major criticism of his portrayal of Jesus. The author draws his picture of Jesus by an uncritical harmonization of all four of the gospels. He minimizes the differences among them, insisting that *essentially* the same picture is presented by them. From this portrayal of the historic Jesus, an attempt is made to build a logical theological interpretation of his work. Beginning with a chapter entitled "Man," the author proceeds to others entitled respectively "Prophet," "Judge," "Priest," "Teacher," "Leader," "Ruler of Nature," "Sacrifice," "Life," capping the whole with a chapter on Jesus as "God." After the first thirty pages, impatience with the book led me to dismiss the rest with but a cursory examination. This book is

satisfied with offering stale answers to some questions that urgently needs reëxamining. *The Redeemer* is only one book among a legion of its type. PETER H. IGARASHI

John Knox in Controversy, by Hugh Watt, New York Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. ix, 109, $2.75

This small volume consists of five lectures delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1949 by the principal of New College, Edinburgh University. The first controversy Principal Watt discusses is that precipitated at St. Andrews in 1547, when John Knox challenged Dean Annand's claim that the authority of the Church "damned all Lutherans and heretics." Knox's words in reply to the dean were, "I offer myself, by word or writ, to prove the Roman Church this day further degenerate from the purity which was in the days of the Apostles, than was the Church of the Jews from the ordinance given by Moses, when they consented to the innocent death of Jesus Christ." The sermon which he later delivered made a profound impression. However, as Watt points out, its effect on Knox was twofold: it gave him greater assurance in facing a hostile congregation, but it was too easy a victory. The result was that Knox never made any real contribution to the theological debate that was going on among the Reformers. His contribution was to remain in the field of action. Three other controversies with the old order are discussed in these lectures. Ninian Winzet was one of the few defenders of the old church who could make an acute attack upon the line of reasoning of the Reformers. He himself had made as sweeping indictments of the pre-Reformation church as John Knox; but according to Winzet the Reformation which professed to rest upon Scripture alone was not defensible by Scripture. He pointed out that the Reformation contained many things for which no Scripture authority could be brought forward. The list of questions which he drew up were never answered by Knox, probably (as Watt suggests) because within a year of their issue Knox felt it would be a waste of time to answer them since Winzet had no capable successor. Watt comments: "If the Roman Church had had a few men like Winzet the course of our Scottish history might have been different." The controversy with Quintin Kennedy, the abbot of Crossraguel, on the Mass is discussed in chapter three. Knox was not at his best in this debate. In Roman circles it was agreed that Kennedy had bowled Knox over with Melchizedek. Knox was somewhat taken off his guard by this unusual use of the Melchizedek passages as Scriptural proof of the doctrine of the Mass. The last two lectures deal with Knox's controversy with Queen Mary. The writer clears up several points that have been unduly romanticized. For example, the evidence does not support the view that Knox "stormed into Holyrood" or stalked, unbidden, into the presence of the queen. Neither does the evidence indicate that Mary shrewdly planned the interviews in order to lead up to an indictment of treason. In one respect at least, Mary rose superior to Knox, in her plea for toleration and her defense of the rights of conscience. On the other hand, Watt criticizes Professor James Mackinnon for asserting that Knox was a pure theocrat using at times the language of the democrat. He quotes an excerpt from the Lochleven interview to support his claim that Knox's name "cannot be blotted from the ancestral tree of democracy."

FLOYD H. ROSS

The Impact of America on European Culture, by Bertrand Russell, John Lehmann, Sean O'Faolain, J. E. Morpurgo, Martin Cooper, Perry Miller, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 100, $1.75.

This is a little book with six short essays, five written by Europeans, the last by an American, Perry Miller. By all odds the best is the opening one, by Bertrand

Russell, with Perry Miller's comment on the five papers preceding his a close second. They all bear witness to the tremendous impact which America is now making on Western Europe, for good or ill. The influence of Hollywood in promoting a lowering standard of taste to the level of the common man is deplored by all the writers, but when they say, as Russell does, "Aesthetic standards, except in architecture, will probably be lowered," they overlook the influences which are working for the cultivation of higher standards of taste in this country. For example, there is no hint that in the last half century there has been a great increase in the number of well-managed and well-endowed art museums, in the number of symphony orchestras and of choral societies, and in the musical education given in high schools. Perhaps the chief value of these essays is the light which they throw on the way in which educated Europeans regard us, and their call to us to lift up again the moral and spiritual qualities which give our democracy its strongest appeal.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE

West Point: A History of the United States Military Academy, by Sidney Forman, New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, pp. vii, 255, $3.75.

This book surprises one by the amount of detail, the picture drawn, and the interpretative analysis contained in such small compass. The feeling of a thorough job done in relatively few pages is perhaps partly due to three informative appendices, a complete bibliography, and an excellent index. The last history of the Military Academy was published in 1904. After two world wars it seemed desirable to bring an interesting and important story up to date. It would be hard to find one better fitted for the task than Dr. Forman. Trained in that excellent school of the historians at Columbia University, he has been for several years the archivist and historian of the library at West Point The alumni of the Academy and the student of military history will find the story interesting. Many laymen and ordinary taxpayers will not only be entertained but will be encouraged by the final chapter, in particular, when they learn that substantial and continuing progress is being made in the organization of the curriculum and the improvement of the instruction. It may now be said that the Military Academy mission is "to provide a balanced liberal education in the arts and sciences, and to provide a broad basic military education." It is now essentially an undergraduate school rather than the professional school of an earlier day. The professional training in specialized fields is carried over into the service schools to which officers are assigned after graduation from West Point. The science of war, like all the fields of knowledge, has become too complicated for a single four-year course.

R. C. MC DANEL

With Singleness of Heart, by Gerald Kennedy, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 157, $2.

The parish ministry bears much the same relation to organized Christianity that the family bears to society. The parish, large or small, city or rural, is the immediate and essential unit for worship and religious education, for fellowship and personal influence. Hence the parish minister has a decisive and supremely important part in the life and work of the whole Christian church as well as a favored opportunity for the service of his own people. The parish minister's vocation is one of privilege and responsibility, of temptation and incentive, of perplexities and rare rewards. Bishop Kennedy's book, *With Singleness of Heart,* a series of eight lectures delivered at Southwestern University in 1950, is the fruit of an exceptionally rich experience in scholarship, in administration, and in the pastoral office. Following the initial lecture on singleness of heart and mind, are seven studies on as many phases

of the minister's life, *viz.*, the critic, the pastor, the evangelist, the preacher, the repairer, the saint, and the leader. If, however, pastor means shepherd of the flock, then all the varied rôles or functions emerge into one, the care of his people. Bishop Kennedy has given freely of his wisdom, his humanity, and his own singleness of heart. Because of his wide and varied reading, and, I suspect, equally wide and varied contact with all sorts and conditions of men, and his devotion to Christian faith and practice, his book will be of the utmost value to ministers. There are many books on the same subject but not many which are so thoroughly contemporary in language and pertinence, and yet timeless in central allegiance and thought.

FREDERICK R. GRIFFIN

Go Tell the People, by Theodore Parker Ferris, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. 116, $2.

It is hardly possible in this day and generation for the author of a book on preaching to find much that is new to say on the subject; yet it is always worth while for the run-of-the-mill minister to give heed to counsel offered by one of his outstanding contemporaries. The author of this little book is the distinguished rector of Trinity Church, Boston, who is also a teacher of homiletics in Cambridge. The useful hints and wise counsel which he gives about the preparations and delivery of sermons are, therefore, the fruit of a well-considered experience. Parsons of all denominations can read and ponder to their advantage—and to the advantage of their congregations—the wise advice which Dr. Ferris gives. The book can be cordially commended to all ministers who are on the alert for suggestions as to how to improve the content of their discourses and the effectiveness of their presentation. HENRY WILDER FOOTE

Living Portraits of Jesus, by Sandford Fleming, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1950, pp. 151, $2.

This volume was privately printed in 1939, and was reprinted by the Judson Press in 1950. The studies of Jesus are "nontechnical in character, being designed for those who are not specialists in New Testament study. The homiletical and devotional elements are evident" (p. 7). It begins with the various presentations of Jesus in the New Testament and develops helpful and highly appreciative interpretations. A great deal of background material has been employed in the work. These studies seek to show the various impressions which Jesus made upon men, and what they thought about him and his place in their lives, their faith, and their preaching.

J. R. BRANTON

Apostle of Liberty: Starr King in California, by Arnold Crompton, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. xii, 74, $1.75.

This is a good introduction to the life of Starr King. When thirty-five years of age he came from the Hollis Street Church in Boston to the pastorate of the First Unitarian Church in San Francisco. Preaching with vision and a fearless courage, he fought corruption and saved California for the Union. Four years after coming from the East he died, literally worn-out. In a few years he had accomplished what some men take a lifetime to do. This is an inspiring record of his California activities. *Apostle of Liberty* is a fitting tribute to him. EDWARD C. STARR

Faith That Moves Mountains, by Cyril H. Powell, London, Independent Press, ©1950, pp. 283, 12/6.

The author proposes, "starting with the Synoptic Gospels, to study afresh the meaning of faith throughout the New Testament" (p. 11). This he does by an examination of each instance of the word, and by an exposition of the incident surrounding

such a use. The result is a somewhat uncritical exposition in the best conservative manner. The reader is aware of the author's unwillingness to be casual in his treatment of the text and of his concern for the results of scholarship, but he is more aware of the author's insight into religious experience. As a result, faith becomes a dynamic word of the New Testament, indispensable to the thought and conduct of a twentieth-century Christian.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

This Same Jesus, by J. Campbell Jeffries, New York, Exposition Press, ©1950, pp. 100, $3.

The title of the book is misleading, since it actually deals with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The treatment is traditional, dealing with the Holy Spirit in the gospels, the operation of the Holy Spirit in the disciples, and the activity of the Holy Spirit in Christianity. The general thesis is that God, incarnated in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, has continued to work through his Holy Spirit in the lives of all those who believe in Jesus Christ. Indeed, the presence of the Holy Spirit constitutes the reign of Christ. Wherever the Holy Spirit is manifest, there also is Christ present. The volume will be of interest to those particularly who are concerned about the New Testament basis for a doctrine of the Holy Spirit and who desire to understand how the Holy Spirit works now in promoting the gospel and the kingdom of Jesus Christ.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Freud: Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, edited by Nandor Fodor and Frank Gaynor, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. xii, 208, $3.75.

The cult of Freudianism has produced a bewildering vocabulary. In this underbrush even the student of the movement is apt at times to get lost, to say nothing of being mentally bruised and scratched. The present volume is an attempt to enable all students of Freudiana to see the paths in the Freudian jungle. The concise definition of all the basic terms and concepts which Freud produced as he studied the intricacies of the human mind will prove of service not only to the novice but also to the initiate in Freudian psychology. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts alike will find this volume of particular help. Here is a sampling of the terms covered: anal character, castration complex in women, death instinct, dream-day, eating, ego and its relationship to the preconscious, exhibitionism, libido, normal, phallic primacy period, shame, syphilophobia. For the benefit of those who must watch their dollars in this inflationary period, the present reviewer would add that, in his opinion, this book, like most of the publications of the Philosophical Library, is grossly overpriced.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Truth of Life—Key to Understanding, by Ambrose G. Beltz, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. xiv, 608, $6.

The author assures us in the very first paragraph, in capital letters, that "we are entering an era of truth and understanding, an era of perpetual light and happiness." He goes on to tell us how life has emerged from matter, and how the nervous system gives us conscious and unconscious impressions. He evidently has some knowledge of genetic psychology. He also knows his English Bible. His language is clear and simple. His formula for health and happiness and his explanations of what the Ten Commandments should mean to us today are sensible. But his "picture of the future," "picture of God," and directions how to secure progress, success, peace, love, and happiness are much less convincing. The fact that the book is devoid of footnotes, citations, bibliography, and index, and is crammed with numerous passages in italics and small capitals gives the critical reader some doubt regarding the excellence of its scholarship.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books scheduled for review are not included in this list.

St. Augustine: The Greatness of the Soul and *The Teacher,* translated by Joseph M. Colleran, Westminister (Md.), Newman Press, 1950, pp. 255, $3.

St. Athanasius: The Life of Saint Anthony, translated by Robert T. Meyer, Westminister (Md.), Newman Press, 1950, pp. 154, $2.50.

St. Gregory the Great: Pastoral Care, translated by Henry Davis, Westminister (Md.), Newman Press, 1950, pp. 281, $3.

St. Augustine: Against the Academics, translated by John J. O' Meara, Westminster (Md.), Newman Press, 1950 (©1951), pp. 213, $3.

These four volumes are Nos. 9-12 of the admirable series, *Ancient Christian Writings,* which is being published by the Catholic University of America under the editorship of Frs. Quasten and Plumpe. Each volume contains a lucid and faithful translation of the text, a large number of detailed notes with a large grist of useful information, and an index. It is not too much to say that this series has already achieved an enviable reputation and is a very valuable tool for every student of patristics and early church history. The appearance of each new volume is eagerly awaited. The reading of these four volumes, as has been true of their predecessors, has been no chore but a distinct and rewarding pleasure. I recommend them without hesitation.—M.S.E.

Index of Articles on the New Testament and the Early Church Published in FESTSCHRIFTEN, complied by Bruce M. Metzger, Philadelphia, Society of Biblical Literature, 1951, pp. xv, 182, $2.

This is Vol. V in the *Monograph Series* of *JBL.* It serves a very useful purpose in making available the many valuable articles contributed to and lost in volumes of essays published in honor of distinguished scholars. After a 38-page list of such *Festschriften* are listed 2,150 articles, arranged and classified in a highly intelligent and usable way.

Paul and His Interpreters, by Albert Schweitzer, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. xi, 252, $3.50.

This is a reprinting of W. Montgomery's translation of Schweitzer's *Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung* which appeared in 1912 and which was essentially a continuation of the similar work which appeared in English under the title, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus.* Despite the fact that it is forty years old it is still a very useful volume.

Cowards or Conquerors, by Herschel H. Hobbs, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1951, pp. 240, $2.

Eight sermons by the pastor of the First Baptist Church, Oklahoma City.

The Gospel, by Thomas G. Dietz, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. xiv, 186, $3.

The subtitle reads "The Unification of the Four Gospels from the American Standard Edition of the Revised Bible." Volumes such as this which show an entire disregard of the critical study of the past hundred years are not merely useless; they are thoroughly misleading and definitely perverse.

On Being Happy, Healthy and Wise, by Laurence P. Folsom, New York, Exposition Press, ©1951, pp. 160, $3.

Man's personal happiness depends upon his living a life in which the spiritual, mental, and physical stand in proper balance. The author of this scarcely revolutionary point of view is an optometrist living in South Royalton, Vt.

Sermons for Special Days, by Charles M. Crowe, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 171, $2.

Eighteen sermons by the pastor of the Wilmette (Ill.) Parish Methodist Church.

The Drift of Western Thought, by Carl F. H. Henry, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. 164, $2.50.

The author is convinced that since liberalism is quite unfit to meet the needs of life today the only possible alternatives are biblical theology and naturalistic nihilism. He does not seem to favor the latter.

He Wears Orchids, by Elizabeth Meredith Lee, New York, Friendship Press, ©1951, pp. x, 181, $2.50.

Eighteen biographical sketches of some of the outstanding men and women of Latin America. The book is well written and attractively printed. It will be read with enjoyment.

A Bibliography of Post-Graduate Masters' Theses in Religion, edited by Niels H. Sonne, Chicago, American Library Association, 1951, pp. xi, 82, $2.50.

These 2,682 theses are listed by authors and arranged in a conveniently classified list of subjects. An index of authors follows. Bibliographical material of this sort, while not lending itself to review, is highly useful.

Snake Pit Attendant, edited by Jesse Walter Dees, Jr., New York, Exposition Press, ©1950, pp. 144, $2.50.

Professor Dees, head of the department of sociology at Tampa University, gives here a detailed and vivid account of the deplorable conditions in many of our mental institutions. The volume is a case study compiled from the (I fancy somewhat expurgated) notes of an anonymous custodian who worked in forty-nine such institutions during a period of twenty-five years.